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Abstract
Policy-based management (PBM) is an adaptable security policy mechanism in
information systems (IS) that confirm only authorised users can access resources.
A few decades ago, the traditional PBM has focused on closed systems, where
enforcement mechanisms are trusted by system administrators who define access
control policies. Most of current work on the PBM systems focuses on designing a
centralised policy decision point (PDP), the component that evaluates an access
request against a policy and reports the decision back, which can have performance
and resilience drawbacks.
Performance and resilience are a major concern for applications in military, health
and national security domains where the performance is desirable to increase situ-
ational awareness through collaboration and to decrease the length of the decision
making cycle. The centralised PDP also represents a single point of failure. In
case of the failure of the centralised PDP, all resources in the system may cease to
function. The efficient distribution of enforcement mechanisms is therefore key in
building large scale policy managed distributed systems.
Moving from the traditional PBM systems to dynamic PBM systems supports
dynamic adaptability of behaviour by changing policy without recoding or stop-
ping the system. The SANTA history-based dynamic PBM system has a formal
underpinning in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) allowing for formal analysis and
verification to take place. The main aim of the research to automatically distribute
enforcement mechanisms in the distributed system in order to provide resilience
against network failure whilst preserving efficiency of policy decision making. The
policy formalisation is based on SANTA policy model to provide a high level of
assurance.
The contribution of this work addresses the challenge of performance, manageabil-
ity and security, by designing a Decentralised PBM framework and a corresponding
Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR). The ability of enforcing static
and dynamic security policies in DENAR is the prime research issue, which bal-
ances the desire to distribute systems for flexibility whilst maintaining sufficient
security over operations. Our research developed mechanisms to improve the effi-
ciency of the enforcement of security policy mechanisms and their resilience against
network failures in distributed information systems.
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1.1 Problem Statement
A distributed system consists of a large number of heterogeneous networks that
interact with each other in order to achieve a common goal. Managing distributed
systems results in high administrative costs and long deployment cycles for busi-
ness initiatives. Security and management of distributed systems are mutually
dependent and each needs the services of the other [46]. Managing security in
heterogeneous, distributed systems can become expensive and prone to error be-
cause security administration must be distributed to multiple policy administra-
tors, which makes it difficult to provide consistent security policies across the
entire system. It is thus necessary to analyse security policies for conflicts and
inconsistencies that may lead the system to insecure states. Analysis of policy
specification is also important in order to ensure that enterprise security goals
are met. In large-scale systems with large numbers of both users and policies, it
must be possible to analyse the policies to check for the existence of policies that
implement the high-level security goals of the organisation.
Policy Based Management (PBM) is an evolutionary process. Policy-based re-
source allocation, the association between policy and the devices/entities on which
it must be implemented, and even the policies themselves are subject to frequent
review and change. Decentralised management of large and complex organisational
structures is both difficult and error-prone and administrators must be isolated
from the details of the underlying implementations and policy representations.
This can be accomplished with Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM)
that permits integrated enforcements and hides the heterogeneity of policies and
the complexity of policy deployment.
1.2 Motivation
With the growth of the World Wide Web (WWW), the need for distributed sys-
tems has increased extraordinarily in the last decade. Accompanying this growth
has been the increased need for distributed access control architectures, where
communication and the sharing of information to provide services with limited
resources is essential. In addition, providing services to consumers or users via
new technologies (e.g., mobile agents, active networks) and the use of the Internet
increase the security concerns associated with today’s networked environments.
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The management of these systems must be distributed in order to be scalable
with the size of enterprise networks, and management procedures must be auto-
mated to reduce administrative costs, which can be facilitated with Policy Based
Management approaches. Policy Based Management (PBM) can be defined as
an adaptable security policy mechanism in information systems (IS) that confirm
only authorised users can access information [19, 88]. A few decades ago, the
PBM focused on a closed system, where enforcement mechanisms were trusted
by system administrators who defined access control policies i.e. static policies.
Building on the PBM approach by involving dynamic policies defines decisions on
the basis of the system state or changes in the system state. Sometimes access
control requirements refer to the execution history [3], this means that a policy
decision can depend on the system behaviour that was observed in the past i.e.
dynamic policy. For example, the access requirement is being “if a user at some
point in the past has read file (A) that is secret then the same user cannot write
to file (B), otherwise the user can write on file (B)”.
Sharing information in a secure manner, but keeping information available, is a
major concern for distributed systems in military, health and national security
domains where it is desirable to increase situational awareness through collabora-
tion.
Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) avoids a single point of failure for
security policy enforcement where it involves distributed enforcements. In case of
centralised enforcement, the failure of the enforcement would cease all the resources
on the system to function. In addition, Decentralised Policy Based Management
(PBM) would be more efficient in terms of resource utilisation.
Thus, based on the identified requirements, we concluded that the efficient distri-
bution of enforcements mechanism and the automated decomposition of dynamic
security policies without conflict among them are key in building large-scale policy
managed distributed systems.
1.3 Research Question
The overall and the central research question investigated in this thesis is:
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• Q1. How to improve the access control decision making with support for
static and dynamic security policies in a distributed setting?
• Q2. To what extent can a Decentralised Policy Based Management system
improve performance, security, manageability and resilience?
1.4 Original Contribution
The research improves the efficiency of security policy enforcement mechanisms
and their resilience against policy enforcement failures in Policy Based Manage-
ment system (PBM).
Performance, by the distribution of Policy Decision Points (PDPs), is based on a
sound theory of policy decomposition, in which correctness is preserved to decrease
the length of the authorisation decision to performing any service. Moreover,
the Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) framework is a manageable
system that can be readily understood and safely managed by administrators as
well as analysing dynamic policies and refining them in our Distributed Policy
Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) to result in fewer security breaches due to
administrative and enforcement errors. Finally, the collaborative DENARs are
designed to fulfill resilience in less enforcement failure and resource utilisation.
The objectives of the research are:
• O1. Providing a formal framework for Decentralised (PBM) that enforce
security policies in a distributed setting. [See Chapter 4 and 6]
• O2. Improving the performance (network traffic) of security policy enforce-
ment mechanisms and their resilience against unintentional and intentional
enforcement failures in distributed information systems by designing Dis-
tributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR). [See Chapter 5]
• O3. Providing an automated policy decomposition of static and dynamic
security policies to accomplish high assurance safety-critical information
systems for Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR). [See
Chapter 7]
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• O4. Designing coordination and collaboration enforcement model, using
the policy decomposition of (O3) and the Distributed Policy Enforcements
Architecture (DENAR) of (O2), that enable Decentralised PBM in (O1) to
deploy and enforce policies for large-scale systems. [See Chapter 8]
1.5 Research Methodology
The ’Constructive Research’ is a scientific research method that is detailed in
[63] [29] is used as the research method in this research. The constructive research
method is being used in the majority of the computer science approaches. It refers
to knowledge contributions being developed as a new framework, theory, model or
algorithm.
The methodology of the proposed research is made up of nine work packages which
are adjusted with the list of the steps in constructive research [63]. The first work
package addresses the research background and the research project requirements.
Seven are scientific research work packages. The last work package concentrates
on the thesis writing up. The investigation work packages are illustrated in Figure
1.1.
1.5.1 Research Work Packages and Milestones
The research is undertaken along a theoretical to an applied axis and is structured
in work packages as follows.
Work package organisation
• WP1: Literature Review.
An introduction and critical review of related work is conducted via the dig-
ital resources, including the following topics: Access control models, security
policy specification languages and enforcement policy systems in centralised
and distributed PDPs. Additionally, the literature review provides the tech-
nology that we used: Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA).
• WP2: Decentralised PBM Framework.
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Figure 1.1: Research work packages.
The framework that expresses compositional policies, and their decomposi-
tion and enforcement in the PDPs is designed to capture the research objec-
tives as expressed in the research question.
– Task 2.1: Identifying requirements for a Decentralised PBM and de-
signing a framework that show the methodology to achieve decentralised
enforcement.
• WP3: Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR).
This work package designs Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture
(DENAR). The research in this work package explicitly states how the ar-
chitecture components interact to achieve the research objectives.
– Task 3.1: Designing Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture
(DENAR) that fulfill the second research objective.
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– Task 3.2: Describing the DENAR component interaction.
• WP4: DENAR Analysis.
The research investigation in this stage focus on the development of a novel
formal model for policy enforcement in DENAR (Analysis and Dependen-
cies). This work package is concerned with the analysis of policies and de-
pendencies on the requirements of the access control in Decentralised PBM.
– Task 4.1: Syntactic and semantic analysis of policies to identify depen-
dencies between policy and the access control in information systems.
– Task 4.2: Analysis the enforcement of static and dynamic policies is
being in DENAR to achieve a collaboration enforcements.
• WP5: Policy Decomposition Model.
This work package addresses the policy decomposition model of re-specifying
the policy into independent sub-policies that can be deployed and enforced
in the (DENAR).
– Task 5.1: Development of the policy decomposition model that can
split a policy based on the rule object domain with the concern of policy
dependencies that found in dynamic policy. e.g. Chinese Wall [25].
– Task 5.2: Specification of measurements for efficiency and resilience
based on the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR)
[See Task 3.1 and Task 4.2] and identification of the effect of the refine-
ment rules on these measures.
• WP6: DENAR Enforcement and Coordination.
The development of a behavioural model to express decomposed sub-policies
and enforcement in the DENAR including coordination and concurrency
between DENARs.
– Task 6.1: Behavioral semantics of DENAR capturing decision making
and their interaction with PEPs.
– Task 6.2: Modelling Push and Pull Models to achieve coordination
and concurrency between DENARs .
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• WP7: DENAR Prototype
This work package describes the design and implementation of our prototype
for DENAR.
• WP8: Evaluation through case study.
The Decentralised PBM performance, security, manageability and resilience
against the centralised PBM approach through representative case studies.
– Task 8.1: Network simulators of the Centralised PBM and Decen-
tralised PBM systems to case studies, which are developed. the case
studies show the expressiveness of the dynamic and static policies and
exemplify the enforcement and coordination in the Distributed Policy
Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) for a realistic system scenario.
– Task 8.2: Validation of the results against the objectives of the ap-
proach: i) Performance: by the network traffic for DENAR in compar-
ison with the centralised PDP results; ii) Security: by comparative dis-
cussion of the ability of enforcing the case studies developed in Task 8.1
using the centralised PDP and the DENAR; iii) Manageability: by dis-
cussing the resource utilisation and administration in the DENAR; iiii)
Resilience: by simulating both the centralised PDP and the (DENAR)
and varying the number of failures are discussed.
• WP9: Write up. Based on results of work packages.
1.5.2 Deliverables/Milestones
The following deliverables are produced as part of the work program:
• D1 Problem, objectives, proposed framework and solution and literature
review. From reports on WP1 and WP2 and reports, we produced a first
published paper [6].
• D2 Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) model (WP5)
and tool-support. This delivery includes a software prototype that demon-
strates the feasibility of automation. Reported on the a second published
paper [7].
• D3 PhD Theses. Reports on the case study and validation of the approach.
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1.6 Success Criteria
In today’s critical communication and information-sharing age, healthcare, com-
mercial and governmental organisations require to protect the information assets
within their organisations’ networks as well as the security requirements, which
can be mutable and frequently dependent on the history of the system by involving
the dynamic policy (e.g., Chinese-Wall policies) or require dynamic reconfiguration
triggered by events. Therefore, policy decisions cannot be made in isolation of the
system. However, research on the impact that history-based and dynamic policies
have on the distribution of PDPs in a system is still in its infancy. PDPs are very
much linked to the system and are required to have the ability to observe events
in order to make decisions. The proposed framework exploits these dependencies
to identify an efficient and resilient deployment of PDPs in our Distributed Policy
Enforcements Architecture (DENAR), whilst ensuring that static and dynamic
policies are correctly enforced in DENAR.
The measure of success is that both the Decentralised PBM framework and Dis-
tributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) and their supporting algo-
rithm indeed resolve the proposed research question and demonstrate it by exper-
iments through the implementation prototype. The DENAR prototype demon-
strates that the research output results match the research objective factors as
follows:
• Performance, a discussion of improving the enforcement will be provided
and some experiments will be used to measure the network traffic in both
centralised PDP and a network of DENARs.
• Security, some experiments will be used to discuss the ability of enforcing
both static and dynamic policies in both centralised PDP and the network
of DENARs.
• Manageability, a discussion of the resource utilisation and administration
in the DENAR will be provided.
• Resilience, Network simulators for both centralised PDP and the network
of DENARs will be used to discuss the resilience in some potential failures
scenarios.
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1.7 Thesis Outline
This section provides the proposed structure of the authors’ PhD thesis.
Chapter 1: Introduction.
This Chapter gives an overview of the problem, motivation and approach to the
solution.
Chapter 2: Related Work.
Access control models, security policy specification languages, enforcement policy
systems in centralised and distributed PDPs are introduced. Additionally, the
security policy concepts are presented.
Chapter 3: Preliminaries.
The Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA) technology is described in this
Chapter.
Chapter 4: Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM).
The Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) framework that expresses the
policy decomposition and enforcement in the DENAR is described. This Chapter
identifies the methodology used in the proposed framework. This Chapter fulfils
the first objective in the research.
Chapter 5: Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR).
The Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) components are de-
tailed in structural and behavioural diagrams with their interaction. The network
of DENARs is described in scope of administration task. This Chapter fulfils the
second objective in the research.
Chapter 6: DENAR Analysis.
This Chapter is concerned with the analysis of security policies and dependencies
on the structure of information systems. Formal model of policies and enforce-
ment is provided (Analysis and Dependencies). Clearly, syntactic and semantic
analysis of policies to identify dependencies between policy and the access control
requirements in information systems (particularly in dynamic policies). Moreover,
it identifies and analyses the distributed policy enforcements challenges to meet
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the enforcement in collaborative DENARs. This Chapter fulfils the second and
third objectives in the research.
Chapter 7: Policy Decomposition and Deployment.
This Chapter models the policy decomposition model that fragment the policy into
sub-policies. The refinement method is then implemented to relate sub-policies
to each other so those can be deployed and enforced in the network of DENARs.
This Chapter fulfils the third objective in the research.
Chapter 8: DENAR Enforcement and Coordination.
In this Chapter, the network of DENARs is presented in structural and be-
havioural diagrams to describe the enforcement mechanism in DENAR. In ad-
dition, DENARs coordination mechanism is provided and related with the result
the produced in Chapter 7. This Chapter fulfils the fourth objective in the re-
search.
Chapter 9: DENAR Prototype.
This Chapter designs the Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) pro-
totype to evaluate the research objectives. DENARs prototype implements for
DENAR network and DENARs enforcement and coordination software.
Chapter 10: Case Study and Evaluation.
This Chapter introduces the Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators.
In addition, the Chapter provides three case studies to illustrate the practical ap-
plicability for both static and dynamic policies those enforced in Centralised PBM
and Decentralised PBM simulators. The performance, security, manageability and
resilience factors are evaluated through the case studies in Decentralised PBM sim-
ulator against the Centralised PBM simulator.
Chapter 11: Conclusion and Future Work.





• Provide an overview of security policy and highlight the current policy spec-
ification languages.
• Give an overview of the access control models.
• Provide an overview of the Policy Based Management (PBM).
• Identify the difficulties and problem of the related research in both cen-
tralised and decentralised policy enforcement.
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2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we critically review related work in the area of security with the
emphasis on Policy-based languages and access control mechanisms in general
using both centralised and distributed approaches. Firstly, we survey some of
the well known access control models (Section 2.3) and critically discuss some of
the formal and informal policy languages that have been proposed in this context
(Section 2.4). Following the review of policy models and languages, we review
the Policy Based Management (PBM) framework. Subsequently, the centralised
and distributed enforcement approaches are discussed in Section 2.6. The Chapter
concludes with a short summary in Section 2.7.
2.2 Security Policy Overview
Security in the context of distributed systems is identified as consisting of four pri-
mary requirements: confidentiality or secrecy, integrity, availability and account-
ability. Confidentiality requires that the information or resources in distributed
systems only be disclosed to authorised parties. Integrity is associated with the
protection of information against improper or unauthorised modification. Avail-
ability refers to the provision of prompt access to information and resources by
those authorised. Finally, accountability indicates knowing who has had access to
information or resources.
Authentication, access control and audit are the mutually supportive technologies
to accomplish the above requirements. Authentication deals with identification
of parties and access control is concerned with limiting the activity of legitimate
parties who have been successfully authenticated by ensuring that every access to
a system and its information or resources is controlled and that only accesses that
are authorised can take place.
An access control system has three primary components: the subjects whose active
entities cause information to flow among objects or change the system state, e.g.
users, agents running on behalf of users, groups, compounds of subjects or roles;
the objects (targets) whose entities contain or receive information; and the rules
which specify the ways in which the subjects can access the targets [75]. However,
in this project we also suppose that the confidentiality and integrity of messages
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that are exchanged between parties in the system should given on the notation of
specification and enforcement of authorisation, obligation, delegation and integrity
constraints on interactions where they are defined according to [51] as:
• Authorisation. Authorisation policies (often called permissions or privi-
leges) define the conditions under which an authenticated subject (a user or
an agent acting on behalf of a user) is allowed to perform a specific action on
an object. In some languages, a positive authorisation policy defines under
which conditions the subjects are permitted to execute a specific action on
objects. On the other hand, a negative authorisation policy specifies under
which conditions the subjects are forbidden to execute a specific action on
objects.
• Obligation. Obligation policies define the conditions or events (sometimes
also called triggers) under which a subject must perform a specific action on
an object, therefore, when certain events occur and provide the ability to
respond to changing circumstances.
• Delegation Delegation policies define the conditions under which a subject
can permit a specific access right (i.e. the right to perform an action on an
object) which they possess, to another subject to perform an action on their
behalf. Integrity policies define constraints on the execution of an action on
an object by a specific subject.
A security policy is defined as a specification of the security requirements of a
system. Access control models provide a formal representation of security policies
such as confidentiality policies or integrity policies or a mixture of both. A variety
of useful access control models are given in (Section 2.3). Additionally, a con-
siderable body of work is devoted to developing languages for expressing security
policies. A review of these works is given in (Section 2.4).
2.3 Access Control Models
In this section we overview different approaches to the specification of security
policies, where the main focus is on access control. Access control is described
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in [12] as follows: ”The function of access-control is to control which principals
(subjects) have access to which resources (objects) in the system”. Based on this
definition, we give an overview of access control as the mechanisms that enforce au-
thorisation and delegation policies. Access control models have been traditionally
divided into Mandatory Access Control (MAC), which is mostly concerned with
controlling information flow between the objects of a system, and Discretionary
Access Control (DAC), which is concerned with the specification of authorisation
rules to govern the access of users to the information.
2.3.1 Discretionary Policies
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model was developed by the TCSEC
[36] and is derived from the Discretionary Security Property of the Bell-LaPadula
Model [See Section 2.3.3.1].
In DAC each object has a possessor who exercises primary control over the object.
The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with possession of access
permission on an object can delegate that permission to any other subject [36].
DAC policies exploit the access matrix model as a framework for reasoning about
the permitted accesses. [See Section 2.3.4 for the access matrix model]
However, DAC policies do not enforce any control on the information flow once
this information has been acquired by a process. As a matter of fact, DAC does
not distinguish between the user and subjects operating on behalf of the user.
As a result, if the ownership of an object is obtained by a malicious or incompe-
tent subject, nothing can prevent that subject from destroying all discretionary
protections.
2.3.2 Non-Discretionary Policies
Non-discretionary policies establish controls that cannot be changed by users di-
rectly, but only through administrative action. In this case, an administrator
determines which subjects can have access to certain objects based on the organ-
isation’s security policy. In this context administrative policies that control who
is authorised to modify access rights are of grater importance.
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Thus, any global and persistent access control policy that depends on access control
decision information not directly controlled by the security administrator is non-
discretionary, and in NDAC, the policy for delegating authority must be explicit
[4].
2.3.3 Mandatory Policies
In mandatory access control (MAC), both principals and target objects are tagged
with security labels. The enforcement of these policies essentially matches the
principal’s security clearance against the security label of the resource. Typically
this form of access control model is used for military and governmental policies.
Examples of MAC policies are Bell-LaPadula or the Chinese Wall Models.
2.3.3.1 Bell-LaPadula Model
The Bell-LaPadula Model (Multilevel Security) [66] provides a means to prove the
security of time-sharing mainframe systems. In the model, information is tagged
with a label that indicates the sensitivity of the information. Traditionally the
military classification scheme contains the levels Unclassified, Confidential, Secret
and Top Secret, but changes to this classification may occur over time and often
lead to incompatibilities between different systems [12]. Principals hold a specific
security clearance corresponding to the classification. An individual is only allowed
to access documents (objects) that he is cleared for, or documents that require a
lower clearance level. The model relies on three basic rules; the *-property, the
simple property and the tranquillity property.
• *-property (star property): An individual is only allowed to access an object
if the security level of the object is the same or greater than the security
level of the individual. Thus information cannot leak out to individuals with
lower security clearances. Therefore, this property is also sometimes referred
to as the confinement property.
• Simple property: An individual must have a security label more privileged
than the labels on the objects they may access.
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• Tranquillity property: The tranquillity property requires that when a system
is currently accessing an object, the security label of the individual and object
involved must not be changed.
Thus, it demonstrates that the current state of the access control system guaran-
tees a correct behaviour.
2.3.3.2 Chinese Wall Model
The Chinese Wall model [25] was stimulated by business operations where it in-
troduces dynamic compartments to capture the concept of separation of duty. It
comes from the financial background, where service firms have internal rules that
prevent conflicting interests. An informal example is given by [25] which explains
the Chinese Wall requirements. This example cannot be expressed using other
MAC models. The key contrast between the Bell-LaPadula and Chinese Wall
models is that the Chinese Wall Model leaves a subject initially the free choice,
which information to access, but restricts further access to compartments, that
are different to the previous one. Two properties then ensure valid access control:
• ss-property: This property states that access is only granted if the requested
object is in the same company dataset as an object already accessed by that
subject, i.e. within the Wall, or belongs to an entirely different conflict of
interest class.
• *-property. This property states that a write access is only permitted if
access is permitted by the simple security property and no object can be
read which is in a different company dataset to the one for which write
access is requested and contains unsanitised information.
The Chinese Wall model is a primitive history-based (or audit-based) access-
control model [1] and as such requires more sophisticated enforcement mechanisms
than the Bell-LaPadula model.
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2.3.4 Access Control Matrix
A good way of representing access-control specifications is in the form of an access-
control matrix. The access control matrix of access control was proposed by Lamp-
son [65] and extended in HRU model [2, 18, 22]. The HRU extension defines the
issue of subject/object creation and deletion rights. The matrix addresses that
subjects are allowed to perform actions on objects in the system. In the access
matrix model, the state of the system is defined by a triple (S,O,A), where S is
the set of subjects, O is the set of objects and A is the access matrix where rows
correspond to subjects, columns correspond to objects and entry A[S,O] reports
the privileges of subjects on objects.
Figure 2.1: Access Control Matrix.
A reference monitor can then directly base the authorisation decision on the matrix
entries. However, in other enforcement mechanisms, the reference monitor needs
to satisfy this specification by other means. The access control matrix can be
distributed to be enforced. The most common form is to distribute the matrix to
each protected object. Figure 2.1 shows the access control matrix and the access
control list which is based on the distribution to objects. The access control matrix
stores the actions, that a subject can perform on an object (resource). However,
in large-scale systems, the access matrix model is insufficient because increasing
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the number of entries in the matrix leads to more complexity, and it becomes less
verifiable.
2.3.5 Role-based Policies
The main motivation for the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model was to
combine the flexibility of explicit access control along with additionally imposed
enterprise-specific constraints. In addition, although different research has been
done so far, the main notion of RBAC remains the same [30]. The RBAC security
system adjusts the access to objects based on organisational activities and respon-
sibilities called roles which are assigned to subjects within the system. Instead
of specifying all the accesses that each subject is permitted to execute, a security
policy in RBAC is specified for roles, while subjects are granted to adopt roles.
The subject playing a role is allowed to execute all privileges for which the role
is authorised. This significantly simplifies the security administration in RBAC.
For example, if a user moves to a new function within the organisation, the user
can simply be assigned to the new role and removed from the old role. An ad-
ditional motivation for RBAC has been to reuse role specifications by a form of
inheritance whereby one role (often a manager in the organisation) can inherit the
privileges of another role and therefore avoid the need to recreate the specification
of permissions.
Sandhu et. al [40] defined four conceptual models in an effort to standardise
RBAC. We briefly summarise these models in order to present an overview of
the features supported by RBAC implementations. RBAC0 contains users, roles,
permissions and sessions. Permissions are assigned to roles and users can be as-
signed to roles to assume those permissions. A user can start a session to activate
a subset of the roles to which the user is assigned. RBAC1 includes RBAC0 and
initiates role hierarchies [84]. Hierarchies are a way of structuring roles to reflect an
organisation’s lines of authority and responsibility, and are specified using inheri-
tance between roles. Role inheritance allows the reuse of permissions by allowing
a senior role to inherit permissions from a junior role. RBAC0 example is given
in [84] and shown in Figure 6.1.
RBAC2 includes RBAC0 and initiates constraints to restrict the activation of
roles in sessions or the assignment of users or permissions to roles. Constraints are
used to specify application-dependent conditions, and satisfy well-defined control
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Figure 2.2: RBAC0 Example.
principles such as the principles of least-privilege and separation of duties. Finally,
RBAC3 combines both RBAC1 and RBAC2, and provides both role hierarchies
and constraints.
The use of RBAC models to manage access to computational resources and dig-
ital information within a closed computer system is widely accepted as a best
practice for commercial applications. Systems such as Microsoft Active Directory,
SELinux, Solaris, Oracle DBMS and PostgreSQL effectively have utilized some
form of RBAC to guarantee the confidentiality of digital resources [82].
Role-based access control models have been still in challenges of researchers be-
cause the simple hierarchical relationship is insufficient to model various sorts of
relationships that may occur. Team-based Access Control [94] is the extension
of RBAC that allows for the specification of temporal constraints on role assign-
ment and activation and was proposed with Temporal Role-based Access Control
by Bertino et.al. [20, 21]. Both RBAC and TRBAC have been modelled by
[16] using Constraint Logic Programming. With the aim of expressing dynamic
separations of duty in RBAC, [73] extending the traditional set-oriented specifi-
cation of RBAC with a version that is based on first order temporal logic. RBAC
has also been standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [8]. RBAC3 models can be expressed using Siewe’s [87] basic authorisation
framework, by introducing specialised actions for role-assignment and (de-) acti-
vation, together with data structures that represent the current role-assignments
and activations.
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2.4 Policy Specification Languages
Having reviewed the foundations of security models and policies, we will now
review the state of the art in policy specification languages. Figure 2.3 summarises
a policy hierarchy (according to [30]), and represents different views on policies
and abstractions of policies for the purpose of refining high-level management goals
into low-level policy rules whose enforcement can be fully automated. A policy
language is expected to include (according to [30]):
Figure 2.3: Policy Representation Levels.
• High level policies, which can be business or management goals, or even
natural language statements. High-level abstract policies are not enforceable
and their recognition involves refining them into one of the other two levels
below.
• Specification level policies (called high level policies by some researchers)
refer to those policies specified by a human administrator to supply ab-
stractions for low-level policies in a specific format. These policies relate to
objects or specific services, and their interpretation can be automated.
• Low-level policies or configurations include security mechanism configura-
tions, device configurations and directory schema entries.
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2.4.1 Authorisation Specification Language (ASL)
The first work investigating logic-based languages for the specification of security
policies was the work by Woo and Lam [98], but this was generally not intuitive and
did not easily map onto implementation mechanisms. Their language has a strong
mathematical background, which can make it complex to use. ASL [48, 49] is
an example of a formal logic language for specifying authorisation policies. They
proposed the use of positive and negative authorisation rules and showed how
conflicts are resolved by decision rules. The example below is an authorisation
rule in ASL, which states that all subjects belonging to the group Employees but
not to Soft-Developers are authorised to read file1.
cando(file1, s,+read) < −in(s, Employees) & −in(s, Soft−Developers)
The ”cando” predicate indicated a specification of positive authorisations; the
sign in front of the action in the ”cando” predicate indicates the modality of the
authorisation e.g. negative authorisation would be denoted by a (-) sign in front
of the read action. A ”dercando” predicate is defined in the language to specify
derived authorisations based on previous access using so-called ”done” rules. These
are essentially facts, which are created by the system during runtime and reflect
the access executed by a user. Furthermore, the ”do” and ”done” predicates, can
be used to specify history-dependent authorisations based on actions previously
executed by a subject. The final decision, whether to grant access or deny a
request is then resolved by a so-called decision rule. For example the following:
do(file, s,+a) < −dercando(file, s,+a)&− dercando(file, s,−a)
This rule indicates that if it can be derived that s is authorised to perform action
a on file, and it cannot be derived that s is denied to perform action a on file, then
s is effectively authorised to perform a on file.
However, temporal dependencies among authorisations are not compositional.
Thus, Siewe’s [87] extends the language to allow temporal dependency of autho-
risations and caters for the compositionality of security policies, but the major
points for criticism are that it is not possible to express obligation policies in ASL.
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In addition, the approach of derived authorisations based on the system state or
the occurrence of an event is still ambiguous. The Flexible Authorization Frame-
work (FAF) [50] extends the approach in [49] to handle dynamic authorizations
and is also based on stratified clausal-form logic. It includes support for RBAC
and discusses propagation rules (for example the propagation of access rights from
groups to group-members) as well as having an emphasis on integrity rules. How-
ever, the integrity rules in their model cannot take into account the result of the
execution, as integrity constraints are checked prior to the decision whether the
access is granted or denied - they are mainly concerned with the integrity of the
access control policy specification itself.
2.4.2 LaSCO
The Language for Security Constraints on Objects (LaSCO) [45]is a graphical
approach for specifying security constraints on objects. A policy graph is an an-
notated directed graph where nodes represent system objects and edges represent
system events. Nodes and edges are decorated using domain predicates and re-
quirement predicates. Domain predicates restrict what can match a node or edge
while requirement predicates are constraints to be met on domain match.
Damianou [31] states some of the drawbacks of LaSCO. Firstly, it cannot express
any form of obligation (which is also the case for ASL), secondly it is not com-
positional and thirdly there is no textual representation of LaSCO graphs, as is
found in other graph-oriented languages.
The main advantage of LaSCO is that a graphical representation is more accessible
to the human user and aids in the specification of security policies. We also believe
that the representation of access rights in the form of a graph is intuitive for the
analysis of permissible information flows in policies.
2.4.3 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML [76] is a technology developed as a research project by SUN Microsys-
tems. It is a standard language (XACML version 2.0 has been accepted by the
Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS))
for specifying access control policy, the structure of XML messages that request
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access to resources, and the structure of the messages responding to these requests.
The language is based on eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and specifies a sub-
ject, object, action and condition policy in the context of XML documents. The
language supports role based access control, where roles, the same as groups, are
defined as collections of attributes relevant to a principal [19].
Figure 2.4: XACML Representation.
XACML’s standardised architecture for decision making exploits two components:
the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The
PEP constructs the request based on the requester’s attributes, the resource re-
quested, the action specified, and other situation-dependent information through
PIP. The PDP receives the constructed request, evaluates it with the applicable
policy and system state through the Policy Access Point (PAP), and then returns
permit, deny, indeterminate or not-applicable to the PEP. The PEP then allows
or denies access to the resource. The PEP and PDP components can be embedded
within a single application or distributed across a network. Figure 2.4 illustrates
the XACML standardised architecture as described above. In [34] XACML obliga-
tion is presented but the attribute coordination is not addressed between multiple
PDPs. Moreover, in [60, 61], the description logic reason for the language is pro-
vided.
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However, in XACML the underlying representation is XML; therefore, the policy
is verbose and not really aimed at human interpretation. On the other hand,
XACML comes with an open source reference implementation of a Policy Decision
Point (PDP).
2.4.4 Ponder
The Ponder policy specification system [30, 33, 37], is an object-oriented, declara-
tive policy language to express security and management policies that was created
at Imperial College.
Ponder policies have been implemented for controlling policy-based networking
(PBN) equipment or software written in the Java language. Moreover, it provides
a common language abstraction over the heterogeneous components in such a secu-
rity network. Additionally, the language supports native authorisation, delegation
obligation and, unlike the previously discussed policy models [5], obligation poli-
cies [32]. Ponder also provides the grouping of objects in domains and roles and
groups give structure to the system’s subjects. The Ponder authorisation policy
syntax is:
inst ( auth+ | auth-) policyName "{"
subject [<type>] domain-Scope-Expression ;
target [<type>] domain-Scope-Expression ;
action action-list;
[ when constraint-Expression ; ]"}"
Positive (auth+) and negative (auth-) authorisation policy defines which subject
(group or role) can perform what actions (activities) on a domain of objects,
where the former is indicative of a permission, and the latter a prohibition. As
we mentioned, Ponder’s roles can have attached obligation policies, which is the
strength of Ponder. The syntax for such policies is:
inst oblig policyName "{"
on event-specification ;
subject [<type>] domain-Scope-Expression ;
[ target [<type>] domain-Scope-Expression ; ]
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do obligation-action-list ;
[ catec Expression-specification ; ]
[ when constraint-Expression ; ]"}"
Ponder is an attractive policy specification language, since it has tool-support
which allows it to have a graphical view, it is suitable for large system policies
and defines the domains and the Ponder compiler. It translates high-level Ponder
specifications into low level policy languages, for instance the Windows 2000 secu-
rity templates, or policies for the Java security model. The three policy languages,
ACL, LaSCO and Ponder are discussed in the comparative study [5]. It critically
compares the expressiveness of the BMA security model for Electronic Patient
Records system developed in [10, 11]. It conclude that because Ponder allows the
specification of obligation policies Ponder gives the most flexibility rather than
ACL and LaSCO.
2.4.5 Usage Control (UCON)
UCON is a relatively new approach that aims to unify prior models at a high
abstraction level over the usage of digital objects and to combine Access Control,
Trust Management and Digital Rights Management in one more expressive frame-
work. The authors of UCON , Park and Sandhu [77, 85] address concepts behind
UCON and describe the different forms of usage in terms of rights mixture. The
UCON model abstracts a system, as previous models, into subjects, objects and
rights. Furthermore, it obtains authorisation rules, obligations, and conditions.
The authors in [78]introduced the (UCONABC) core models that particularly fo-
cus on the notion of mutable and immutable attributes that are associated with
objects or subjects. Mutable attributes can change during the execution of the
system, whereas immutable attributes can only change by administrative action.
Before, ongoing and post usage are phases addressed in this model that satisfy
denying a resource whilst the resource is already in use. Furthermore, they ad-
dress pre-update, ongoing and post-update functions to comply with obligations
and maintain mutable attributes. For example on classification of attributes we
refer to [79]. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the model.
While covering many aspects of former models, like access-history tracking or
auditing, the definitions that are given in the paper are mostly informal and are
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Figure 2.5: Continuity and Mutability Properties of UCON.
Figure 2.6: UCON Components.
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not suited for the analysis of UCON policies. However, it is a powerful abstract
model that covers some aspects which are not covered by former frameworks.
Later on, Zhang [101, 102, 103]formalised the different (UCONABC) models using
Lamport’s temporal logic of action (TLA) [64]for providing a formal definition of
the (UCONABC) core models and their functioning. Obligations in UCON are
presented in [59].
In [56], an alternative approach to formalise UCON model is presented which is
based on ITL. The approach deals mainly with scenarios of continuous on-going
usage. It redefines a concept of a usage process and request. Usage process is
formed by a sequence of intervals constructed using a set of operators. Interval
is a (in)finite sequence of system states. In [53, 54], although the formal model
significantly reduces the number of assumptions made in [3], it is being improved
to specify the potential of usage control.
2.4.6 Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA)
SANTA [51, 87] is a framework which integrates the specification of security, func-
tional and temporal requirements for the development of distributed systems in
a uniform and formal framework that was developed at The Software Technology
Research Laboratory, DMU. The authors have chosen Multi-Agent Systems as a
representative of distributed systems for the reasons which have been addressed
in [57] by Janicke. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [74] is used as the underpinning
logic for SANTA. Therefore, it shows that the system implementation satisfies the
functional, security and temporal requirements. Figure 2.7 outlines the SANTA
framework.
The foundation is a formal computational model and a compatible security model.
It provides linguistic support, in the form of the SANTA Wide-Spectrum Language
(SANTA-WSL), that supports the specification and design of a Secure Multi Agent
System (SMAS). The language is agent-based and offers constructs for the speci-
fication of reactive agents, objects that represent shared resources, security poli-
cies and their enforcement mechanisms. The specification-oriented semantics of
SANTA-WSL is given in ITL which is the basic logical underpinning of the SANTA
framework. Policies are defined at a higher level of abstraction than the system
implementation itself. For instance, an authorisation policy defines the conditions
under which a user can access a specific resource in a declarative manner (without
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Figure 2.7: SANTA Components [51].
detailing how this constraint is actually implemented). SANTA has the ability
to express behaviours as part of the specification removes the need to explicitly
model state for the execution history as is, e.g. the case in UCON [78] or [17].
Additionally, enforcement mechanisms are defined at a high abstraction level. The
system properties that must be satisfied to comply with a specific policy are stated
by enforcement mechanisms. Then, during the development process, policies and
enforcement mechanisms are refined into concrete and deterministic enforcement
code that can be readily implemented in agent frameworks such as JADE [80].
Finally, SPAT [87]is tool-support for the specification and analysis of policies and
is provided as part of the SANTA framework. The support for obligations spec-
ification, integrity constraints and scoping and parallel composition of policies is
the strength of SANTA.
2.4.7 Trust Specification
Web based labelling, signed email, active networks and e-commerce applications
require connectivity between entities that do not know each other for establishing
and enforcing access control [42]. Thus, there has been significant prior research
into schemes which allow gradual exchange of digital certificates or credentials
Chapter 2. Related Work 30
that represent statements certified by given entities, which can be used to estab-
lish properties of their holder (e.g. identity, accreditation). An access control
decision of whether or not a party may execute an access is based on properties
that the party may have, and can prove by presenting credentials. This approach
is called certificate-based authorisation and is adopted for trust specification [30].
The access control decision is a complex process and its completion sometimes re-
quires trust negotiations for privacy guaranteed, safe and fair credentials exchange
between parties (subject and object providers) [67].
Yao [99] has described a number of existing trust management systems, in par-
ticular tracing PolicyMaker’s [24] evolution into KeyNote [23] and the Internet
Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [39].
Most of these schemes are based on asymmetric digital cryptography as well as
providing a universal solution to both access control and authentication which
make the systems more complex.
2.5 Policy Based Management (PBM)
Policy Based Management (PBM) is a technology wherein various resources on a
network are not individually configured but rather are dynamically configured by
an overlay network [69] based on various policies that are defined by a network
administrator. In this section, an overview is introduced as well as a current
framework and protocol is described.
2.5.1 Overview
Present day computer networks are extremely complex both in terms of the tech-
nologies behind them as well as the variety of network hardware that they use.
There are multiple types of servers, routers, switches and other network hard-
ware supplied by multiple vendors. In addition, not all the systems on a network
may use the same software platform. Due to this, a network administrator would
typically be required to know about multiple operating systems, hardware and
software and be continuously informed and updated about the various new fea-
tures being continuously introduced. Policy Based Management (PBM) provides a
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way to overcome this problem by simplifying and largely automating the network
administration process.
Ensuring that the many different devices on present day IP networks inter operate
smoothly is not a trivial task. In addition, various new technologies that have
emerged in order to overcome a few limitations of the traditional IP protocols, such
as delivering Quality of Service, have only served to make present day networks
more and more complex. In many cases, it is more economical to simply introduce
excess capacity into existing networks rather than train the manpower on the
different technologies that are continuously being introduced. Indeed this is often
the route employed by many network administrators. However, with the advent
of Policy Based Management, this is poised to become a thing of the past.
PBM is a technology wherein various resources on a network are not individu-
ally configured but rather are dynamically configured by an overlay network [69]
based on various policies that are defined by a network administrator. For ex-
ample, instead of configuring a hundred printers on a network independently to
print documents only in black and white, a network administrator would simply
define a single policy for the same and update it on a central policy server. This
policy would then automatically be applied to all printers on the network by the
network management software. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and
the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) [100] are the chief bodies for the
standardisation of this policy framework so that various resources and technologies
can comply with it and it can become an accepted standard.
2.5.2 IETF Policy Based Admission Control Framework
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has proposed a framework for policy
based admission control [100] in order to aid applications or end users to request
specific quality or levels of service from an internetwork in addition to the IP best
effort services. This framework addresses important aspects of admission control
which were previously unresolved. As per RFC 2753, “network managers and
service providers must be able to monitor, control, and enforce use of network
resources and services based on policies derived from criteria such as the identity
of users and applications, traffic/bandwidth requirements, security considerations
and time of day/week.”
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The IETF/DMTF policy framework consists of four elements the Policy Manage-
ment Tool, the Policy Repository (PR), the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
The Policy Management Tool is the user interface of a Policy Based Management
system. The network administrator uses the policy management tool to specify
policies that are to be enforced on all devices in a network. These policies are
stored in a Policy Repository (PR). The actual point at which the policies are
enforced on the network is known as the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). This
Policy Enforcement Point gets its directions from the Policy Decision Point (PDP)
which is responsible for interpreting the policies stored in the Policy Repository
and communicating them to the PEP. The general layout of these elements in
Policy Based Management is shown in Figure 2.8 below.
Figure 2.8: IETF/DMTF policy framework.
The policies stored in the Policy Repository must correspond to the information
model specified by the Policy Framework Working Group in order to allow various
devices with various capabilities and from different vendors to inter operate with
each other. Various standardised protocols are used by various components of the
Policy Management System to communicate with each other. The Common Open
Policy Service (COPS) [38] or Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [26]
is generally used for PDP and PEP communication. The Policy Repository may
be accessed using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [43].
Effective implementation of Policy Based Management is dependent on two fea-
tures of the management architecture which are centralisation and business level
abstraction. Centralisation is the means by which all devices on a network can
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be configured from a single point which is the Policy Management Tool. Without
the benefits of PBM an administrator would have to spend hours configuring and
provisioning each device on a network manually. With a Policy Based Manage-
ment system, however, he/she simply requires to spend a few minutes entering the
desired policy into the Policy Management Tool and the system will take care of
the rest and apply the policy to all the various devices automatically.
As we have seen, there are two basic elements for policy control the PEP (Policy
Enforcement Point) and the PDP (Policy Decision Point). The Policy Enforce-
ment point (PDP)-. is the point at which the policies for network management
such as admission control policies based on factors such as the time of day, user
identity, credentials, user groups, service agreements between various ISPs related
to revenue sharing on the basis of bandwidth usage, priorities for services such as
video conferencing, VoIP etc. are actually enforced. The Policy Decision Point is
responsible for making decisions which the PEP enforces.
When the PEP requires to make a decision regarding access control for resources,
bandwidth etc, it formulates a request for policy control which may contain one
or more policy elements detailing the resource requested and sends it to the PDP.
The PDP accesses the policy repository and returns the policy decision which the
PEP then enforces by appropriately accepting or denying the request. The PDP
may also return additional information to the PEP which may be used for formu-
lating error messages or warnings based on pre defined criteria. The PDP may
use additional mechanisms and protocols for providing accounting, authentication,
policy storage and other functions. For this purpose, it may contact other external
servers using protocols defined for network management and communication like
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) [26] or LDAP (Lightweight Direc-
tory Access Protocol) [43] among others. The detailed component framework for
Policy Based Admission Control is shown in Figure 2.9.
We now come to the question of the format in which the policies should be entered
into the policy management tool. Due to the large plethora of vendors and equip-
ment available on the market today, one policy format may not be compatible
between all the multiple equipment that the network supports. For this reason,
policies can be defined at two levels a business level and a technology level. Busi-
ness level policies are general policies that apply to all the various devices on the
network whereas technology level policies are policies that are derived from the
business level policies according to the technological requirements and instruction
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Figure 2.9: Components Architecture for Policy Based Admission Control.
formats of the various devices on the network. The process of separating the busi-
ness level policies from the technology level policies is known as Business Level
Abstraction. The network management system uses a policy transformation logic
to transform the business level policies into technology level policies based on the
various devices on the network and stores them in the policy repository from where
they are accessed by the PDP in order to convey a decision to the PEP based on
the policy.
2.5.3 Common Open Policy Service (COPS) Protocol
The COPS protocol is a simple query and response protocol between a PEP and
a PDP. The basic model of this interaction is compatible with the framework
document for policy based admission control [38]. As per RFC 2748 [38], Durham
et. al describe the COPS protocol in detail, the main characteristics of the COPS
protocol include:
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• COPS utilizes a client-server model. It is the PEP that sends requests to
the PDP which acts as the server and the PDP responds with its decisions.
• TCP is used as the transport protocol for exchange of messages and no
additional mechanisms are specified for reliable communication between the
PDP and the PEP.
• The protocol is designed for general configuration and enforcement of policies
and uses self identifying objects that encapsulate all relevant information for
decision making. As a result the protocol itself need not be modified for
various usage scenarios.
• Though COPS provides for message level security for message integrity and
protection, existing protocols for security such as IPSEC [14] or TLS [35]
may optionally be utilized as a security measure to secure communications
between the PDP and the PEP.
• The protocol is intended to be stateful. The PDP is expected to retain
previous requests made by the PEP unless they are explicitly deleted by
the PEP and may generate asynchronous decisions at any time to modify
a previously installed request state. Also it may respond to a new request
differently based on the decision made on a previous request. The PDP is
also capable of transmitting configuration information about various devices
to the PEP and modifying or removing them at a later stage as required.
2.6 Enforcement
The enforcement of policies refers to providing mechanisms in the system which
can ensure that the policy specification is not violated by the system’s execution
[51]. A well known and widely used architecture for policy enforcement is the
Reference Monitor (RM). The ISO standard (ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996) [47] defines
the standard model for policy enforcement that is used in most centralised and
distributed policy enforcement approaches. Figure 2.10 depicts this model. The
model separates the enforcement and the policy evaluation into a Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP). PEP is the component
intercepting the request, and the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the component
that evaluates an access request against a policy and reports the decision back
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to the PEP. Thus, it is beneficial as the implementation of the PEP is usually
application or platform specific [9].
Figure 2.10: Policy Enforcement Model.
2.6.1 Centralised Policy Enforcement
The policy enforcement model in the ISO standard (ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996) [47] is
based on a centralised enforcement decision mechanism that receives events from
different components of the system. This means enforcing local security policies
in which all the security relevant events are produced by a single node. There-
fore, a centralised policy decision point in large scale computational systems is
not sufficient due to the heavy congestion resulting from the very large number of
events which becomes a single point of failure. A major challenge to shift the com-
putational mechanism towards distributed systems is interpreting and efficiently
enforcing security policies. Most approaches to policy enforcement such as [1] and
[70] are based on the centralised enforcement decision mechanism.
The centralised Policy Based Management (PBM) is more efficient when the length
of the authorisation decision and the authorisation traffic to performing any service
are not critical and the service can be provided later, e.g. banking services. On the
other hand, in such systems, when the authorisation decision response time and
the traffic are being important, the Decentralised PBM becomes more efficient,
e.g. Military, National Security.
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2.6.2 Decentralised Policy Enforcement
The chief disadvantages of having a centralised PDP is that though coordination
among various decision requests are easily achieved, it is a bottleneck to perfor-
mance because all requests have to be routed through it.
The GlobusToolkit [86] have addressed distributed PDPs (Master/Slave PDPs
model) and the coordination between them. The master PDP orchestrates the
querying of a series of slave PDPs which each make their own (sub)-authorisation
decisions whilst the master then determines whether the ultimate decision is
granted or denied. They do not detail how their “master policies” are incor-
porated into the XACML-PDP policies. In addition, the model does not address
coordination between multi-user access requests.
Another method to enhance the PDP’s performance is to add LPDP (Local Policy
Decision Point) as an assistant to the centralised PDP, such as the case in [38].
LPDP stays in the same application or network node with a PEP, rather than
in the server as a centralised PDP does. It frequently backups the decisions of
the PDP, so when connection is interrupted between the PDP and the PEP, the
LPDP can substitute the PDP to guide the PEP temporarily. But centralised
PDP has the superior authority. LGI [71] is based on controllers that moderate
the network traffic going to and coming from observed nodes. Minsky et. al [71]
have illustrated a conceptual mechanism of Distributed Chinese-Wall (an example
of stateful policies) that can be enforced using LGI where it is a decentralised
enforcement mechanism. LGI has provided the exchange of messages between
targets, and does not deal with the behaviour of targets, or to changes in their
internal state. The significant differences between LGI and our work is that the
enforcement depends on agent cooperation in LGI where as in our work it is
automatically enforced on objects-domain or in another domain that has been
made decisions in the past by other PDPs.
A set of distributed PDP’s co-located with each of the PEP’s would solve this
problem. One of the ways which have been proposed in order to achieve distributed
PDP’s is to break down a main policy into its component parts based on the target
device to which it applies [90]. Though we will not delve into the mechanics of
how exactly decomposition is done in this paper, it should be clear to us that
when a main policy is broken down into its various component parts, coordination
is required between the various PDP to whom it is distributed to ensure that the
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component policies produce the same effect as intended by the main policy. The
sum of the parts should perform in exactly the same manner as the main policy
performs.
In [90], [68], the notion of policy decomposition have been provided. Lin et. al.
[68] identify that the policy decomposition is based on the sensitivity of attribute
information necessary for access control and/or user defined constraints at each
PDP. However, Chadwick et. al. [90] policy decomposition model is guided by the
resource type hierarchy. Their model considers refining a high-level access control
policy into sub-policies that is specific to a resource instance and then sub-policies
are then deployed at the PDPs controlling each resource. In comparison, our
policy decomposition model is not guided by the resource type hierarchy or the
sensitivity of attribute information but object domains, thus, not every domain
has its PDP where that is based on policy analysis.
Chadwick et. al. [27], have also provided a conceptual model for coordination by
sharing and exchanging coordination data between one or more PDPs and have
extended the policy specification to include coordination and obligation policies.
Nevertheless, their work is informal and they do not show how new policies are
deployed to the PDPs when the system configuration or policy changes. Their
proposed coordination object is conceptually a repository which maintains a per-
sistent record of the various coordination attributes each time a request to access
a particular controlled resource is permitted. It may contain multiple dimensions
for the subject, resource, action or the environment variables. It is persistent and
stateful, much like the environment variables of date and time - the only difference
being that in the latter, the system is only required to read the values whereas in
the former, it is required to read as well as update the values on successful execu-
tion of the request. A case when the subject attribute may require coordination is
in a situation where maybe only one of a group of users or user groups is allowed
access to a particular resource. The resource attribute may require coordination
in practical scenarios like limiting the total usage of bandwidth per user to say 3
GB. The action attribute may require to be coordinated in cases when the same
user cannot both create and execute a given test and the environment attribute
may require coordination in cases where no more than, say 250 Dollar is to be
withdrawn from a given ATM in a given day. In this research, we study this inter-
esting problem and propose an efficient decentralised enforcement mechanism of
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security policies in distributed systems while managing the coordination between
them.
2.7 Summary
In this Chapter we reviewed the specification and policy enforcement, obligation
and integrity constraints of access control. Particularly, we focussed on policy
models and languages for the specification of these requirements in access control
systems. Many languages to define security policies have been proposed. The
more formal, logic-based approaches (e.g. ASL) in general lack the flexibility and
scalability of more informal specifications (e.g. Ponder, XACML), but have the
advantage, that properties of the specification can be proved. The advantage of
the informal models is typically the increased scalability, due to concepts like in-
heritance or instantiation of policy classes as well as the generally better developed
tool-support. As has been noted by others [1, 70], most languages that did not
start with a formal model as the underlying foundation are prone to semantic
ambiguities. Thus, a mathematical approach is essential to achieve a level of as-
surance in the policy. Additionally, Janicke [51]emphasises Becker’s view, that the
logical foundation should not hinder the understandability of the model and the
language through its complexity and give the example that the algebra for policy
composition presented in [96], whilst addressing an important subject, appears to
introduce a level of complexity that is not justifiable. Finally, we concluded the
discussion of related work with the Policy Based Management (PBM) systems in
both centralised and decentralised approaches.
Unfortunately, no policy models and languages have defined the distributed en-
forcements mechanism of dynamic security policies that achieve the mean of De-




• Give an overview of the SANTA policy language formalisation that involved
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3.1 Introduction
The Security Analysis Toolkit for Agents (SANTA) history-based dynamic PBM
system [87] [51] has a formal underpinning in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [74]
allowing formal authorisation and verification to take place [56]. We build our
decomposition policy model on the formal policy model of SANTA to provide a
high level of assurance. Consequently, our framework can automatically distribute
PDPs in the system in order to provide resilience against network failure and
efficacy of policy decision making.
The SANTA security policy framework involves three main components. Firstly,
the policy model allows for the expression of security requirements such as autho-
risation, obligation and delegation (delegation is excluded in our work). ITL is
appropriate to express temporal dependencies and the dynamic change of system
requirements in a compositional manner for outcome of policy decisions. More-
over, ITL specification can link different granularity of time via the projection
operator. In addition, ITL has an executable subset, Tempura, which means
an interpreter for our decomposition policy is readily available, if expressible in
this subset. Therefore, much of the proof of a system that is specified in ITL
can be decomposed into proofs of its parts. Secondly, linguistic support is pre-
sented to abstract from the underlying mathematical description and appeal to a
more business-oriented audience. However, the semantics of the language is unam-
biguous as it directly translates into the underlying model. Finally, the Security
Policy Analysis Tool (SPAT) [87] is tool-support for the specification and analysis
of policies that are provided as part of the SANTA framework. SPAT allows for
the prototyping and validation of policies, and which assists policy developers to
translate high-level requirements into concrete policies.
3.2 SANTA Policy Language
A security policy expresses protection requirements on the system in a precise and
unambiguous form. Policies in SANTA are concerned with access control, obliga-
tions and integrity. They relate to the entities in the system, and define constraints
on their interactions. Access control requirements in this model are authorisation
requirements, viz. constraints on the actions that a subject can perform on ob-
jects. Obligation requirements express that subjects must perform specific actions.
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The aim of policies is to express these requirements at a high level of abstraction,
hiding the details of the implementation that is necessary for their enforcement.
In SANTA, policy rules are used as the basis for policy specifications. Rule-based
languages are well established and well suited because most of these requirements
are already informally expressed in the form of conditions and consequences. Each
rule is expressed in terms of subjects, objects and actions. Subjects are the actors
in the system. They can request access to objects, that represent the available
resources.
In SANTA two different types of policies are distinguished: environmental and
behavioural policies. The former represents the more traditional view that the
access to shared resources in the environment is protected. The latter addresses
constraints on the behaviour of agents in the system which is not in our considered
in work.
Policy Specification is the process of expressing informal protection require-
ments within the policy language. Policy rules form the basis of SANTA policy
specifications and one of the major tasks during the specification process is the
development of rules that adequately capture the informal requirements. The ac-
curate specification of rules can be difficult when complex requirements need to
be expressed. These are for example dependencies on the state of the system or
dependencies on the history of the execution [3]. The SANTA policy language
provides support for both state and history dependencies. Not all requirements
can be easily expressed in form of rules. One example would be an electronic paper
submission system that is staged in different phases, e.g. registration, submission,
review, etc. During each phase a different policy applies, controlling the ability of
users to submit, review and comment on a paper. This would require the policy
to change dynamically at the transition from one phase to the next. This form of
requirements is difficult and cumbersome to encode in rules, because the different
phases have to be considered in each of the rules. The approach in SANTA is
different in that these types of requirements are captured through policy compo-
sition. Thus, SANTA policy specifications is being more efficient to be involved
for the policy decomposition to be deployed in distributed enforcements.
Policy Composition The advantage of SANTA policies over the majority of
other policy languages is that policies can be specified in small units, which are
composed using a rich set of operators. The provided operators allow for policies
to be composed along a temporal and structural axis.
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Temporal composition leads to policies that change dynamically over time or on
the occurrence of events. This can be used to specify the transition from one policy
to another, for example to capture protection requirements for different phases.
Structural composition is concerned with the separation of subjects, objects, ac-
tions and policies, that apply only to a certain subset of these entities. A typical
example is a hierarchical organisational structure, where each department defines
its own policies. The combination of all these policies, together with some general
protection requirements, yield the overall policy that applies to the organisation as
a whole. The concept of Dynamically Changing Access Control Policies has been
investigated by Siewe [87]. Indeed, his work on temporal composition of authorisa-
tion policies forms the basis of the SANTA policy model. It has been significantly
extended to capture other types of requirements, such as delegation, obligation
and integrity. The structural composition and the unique problems that arise for
the conflict resolution between two dynamically changing policies are addressed.
Using these new concepts, policies can be specified as compositions of smaller,
simpler policies along both the temporal and structural axis. This composition-
ality is also of great advantage for the enforcement of policies. Whilst the overall
composition allows for the analysis of the system wide effects that the enforcement
of the policy has, it is also a great aid to decompose policies into units that are
enforceable by the mechanisms present in the system. This makes it possible to
drop the assumption of a centralised enforcement mechanism and replace it by the
decentralised enforcements. Therefore, the policy composition is not an objective
in this research where it is well described in [87] and we focus on both Access
Control List (ACL) [2] and History Based Policy (HBP) [3] only.
3.2.1 Policy Syntax
Policies in SANTA are an integral part of the system specification. They capture
protection requirements for the IS. The smallest unit of a policy specification is
a policy rule. Rules capture individual requirements, such as: “allow students to
submit their assignments.” The rule syntax and the informal semantics is detailed
in [51] where it provides examples and the informal meaning of authorisation,
delegation, obligation and integrity rules. Rules are combined into larger units,
named simple policies. Simple policies are a set of rules that are all enforced
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simultaneously. They define for example the protection requirements that apply
in a specific situation or phase of the system execution.
3.2.1.1 Policy Rules
The rule-based approach to policy specification is advantageous because it pro-
vides a higher level of abstraction to the specification. An access control rule for
example describes under what conditions a specific access control decision is taken
it does not define the actual mechanism that is used to enforce this decision. In
this sense the policy is more abstract than a concrete check that is implemented
directly in the accessing code. Also, the syntax of policy rules contains some high
level constructs to reference the past behaviour of the system. Examples are the
temporal modalities always and sometime.
Rule Structure A simple policy (central policy) is a set of policy rules enclosed
in parenthesis. The set may be empty. Every rule consists of a premise and
a consequence. The premise describes the condition that when observed by the
enforcement mechanism leads to he specified consequence. Figure 3.4 defines the
rule structure which is presented in [54].
The general form of a rule is:
consequence (x, y, z) when premise
The consequence of a rule distinguishes the class of requirements that can be
expressed in that rule. The triplet (x,y,z) references the subject, object and action
to which the rule applies. Finally, the premise of the rule describes the condition
under which the rule fires.
Policy Scope. Every policy has a scope, that defines to which subjects, objects
and actions the policy applies to. The scope of a policy is accessible in the syntax
using the keywords subjects, objects and actions, that represent the set of subjects,
the set of objects and the set of actions in the scope of the policy. The scope
of a policy affects the rules contained in that policy. The subject, object and
action in each rule definition must be within the scope of the policy (x ∈ subjects
o ∈ objects and z ∈ actions). Rules can also be defined in terms of all subjects,
objects and actions in the scope using the keywords S, O and A. This provides a
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Figure 3.1: SANTA Rule Structure [54].
greater flexibility in the expression of rules. By default the scope is the universal
scope, viz. the sets of all subjects, objects and actions in the system.
Using the keywords S, O and A. Often rules apply to more than one subject,
object or action. To avoid the effort to duplicate the rules for the different subject,
object and action pairings, the keywords S, O and A can be used to reference free
variables in the rule definition. These free variables are bound by the scope of
the policy in the semantics of each rule. For example, given that the scope of the
policy is:
subjects = {x1, ..., xn} objects = {y1} actions = {read}
The requirement to unconditionally grant all subjects in the scope of the policy
the right to perform read on object o1, would require the definition of n rules:
allow (x1, y1, read) when true
allow (x2, y1, read) when true
...
allow (xn, y1, read) when true
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Using the keyword S this could be written more compact as:
allow (S, y1, read) when true
Referencing state and history in rules. Rules in SANTA can express state
and history-based dependencies. This is achieved by allowing the premise of a
rule to reference the current state of the system or the behaviour of the system
in the past. The referenced state and behaviour is restricted to the part of the
system that is observable by the mechanism enforcing the policy. This means that
policies and the mechanisms enforcing them cannot be seen in separation if the
requirements are dependent on the system state or the history of the execution.
These constraints are not a limitation of the policy language itself. Policies can
violate these restrictions. However, it is beneficial to be aware of the limitations
of the enforcement mechanisms when writing the policy to ensure that it is en-
forceable.
Premise of Policy Rules.
The premise of a rule allows the expression of a set of behaviours, that when
observed trigger (or fire) the rule. The syntax of the premise is restricted to
ensure that the rules are implementable. Due to the expressiveness of the model
care needs to be taken to ensure that the premise does capture the requirement
correctly and does not define a too large (or too narrow) set of behaviours that
trigger the rule.
Figure 3.2: Informal Interpretation of a Policy Rule
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Figure 3.5 depicts informally the relation between the set of behaviours expressed
in the premise and the consequence.
Assume the policy containing the rule started to be enforced in state σ′0 . Given
that the premise of a rule is represented by the formula f and the consequence of
the rule is evaluated in the state σ′3 , then the consequence is true if the behaviour
described by f is satisfied by at least one of the intervals depicted in Figure 3.5.
For example the rule consequence when x = 0 would mean that if x has been
zero in state σ′0 , or σ
′
1 , . . . , or σ
′
3 then the consequence would be true in
state σ′3 . The expressiveness of the policy model is both a boon and a bane. The
benefits are that many complex requirements can be captured in a concise and
short form. The disadvantage is that some requirements, that are straightforward
to express in other policy models, require more thought. This is especially the case
when rules depend on the past behaviour of the system. The following illustrates
the syntax that can be used to specify premises of policy rules that are state or
history-dependent.
Constraining the length of the behaviour. Often rules are state-dependent,
this means that f does not actually express a behaviour, but rather a predicate
on the current state of the system. For example to express that the rule should
only fire if x is now (in state σ′3 ) equal to zero then the length of the formula f
must be explicitly restricted by writing:
consequence when 0 : x = 0
Sequence. It is also possible to specify a list to restrict the length of the be-
haviour, for example the rule:
consequence when [0 . . 2] : x = 0




0 , viz. on an interval of length 0, 1 or 2 in
the past. The concrete meaning of 2 states in the past depends on the concrete
enforcement mechanism that is chosen for the enforcement of the policy. For the
enforcement mechanisms described in SANTA the transition from one policy state
to the next means that the enforcement mechanisms solicited (granted or denied)
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exactly one access. Figure 3.5 depicts informally the relation between the set of
behaviours expressed in the premise and the consequence.
Temporal Modalities. Often the modalities always or sometime are used
informally in requirements. These can be directly expressed in SANTA. Their
scope is restricted by the length of the interval specification that contains the
modality. For example writing:
consequence when 2 : sometime x = 0
Denotes within the past interval length two there is some suffix interval that
satisfies x = 0. In other words it means that:
consequence when 2 : (x = 0 or (1 : true; x = 0) or (2 : true; x = 0))
The global length specification is important, to limit the interpretation of the
behaviour to the past interval of length 2. The case for always is similar, however
all suffix intervals must satisfy x = 0, which is equivalent to replacing the or in
the above rule with an and. The informal meaning of the conditional choice is self
explanatory. The existential and universal quantification can be used to quantify
over lists, e.g. the list subjects, objects and actions that can be used to access the
policy scope.
Consequence of Policy Rules
Authorisation, Delegation, Obligation and Integrity rules are distinguished syn-
tactically by their consequence. However, we are not interested in Delegation and
Integrity rules in SANTA so refer the reader to [51] for more details. Table 7.1
provides an overview of the available consequences:
Authorisation (See Section 3.3.1.2)
allow(x, y, z) positive authorisation
deny(x, y, z) negative authorisation
decide(x, y, z) decision rule
Obligation (See Section 3.3.1.3)
oblige(x1, x2, z) obligation
Table 3.1: Consequences in Policy Rules
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3.2.1.2 Authorisation Rules
Authorisation rules express access control requirements. Three different types of
rules are concerned with authorisation: positive authorisation, negative authoriza-
tion and decision rules.
Positive Authorisation. Positive authorisation rules are statements that indi-
cate under which condition an access request should be granted. It is important to
note that it is only an indication, which is taken into account for the final access
decision of the policy.
Negative Authorisation. Negative authorization rules are statements that in-
dicate under which condition an access request should be denied. Similarly to
positive authorisations, they are only an indication, which is taken into account
for the final access decision of the policy.
State-based Authorisation Rule. The condition in this rule must be fulfilled
at the time of the access control check.
Example 3.1 (Positive Authorisation)
allow (S, temp, clear) when true
The rule states an unconditional positive authorisation for all subjects to perform
action (clear) on file (temp).
Example 3.2 (Negative Authorisation)
deny (S,marks, write) when 0 : group(S, student)
The rule states the negative authorisation for any subject in the policy scope
that is a member of the group student to write in file marks where the predicate
group(subject, group) denotes the group membership test. This relation is main-
tained by the system and must be accessible to the mechanisms that enforce the
policy. This is an example of a The preceding 0: denotes that this condition must
be fulfilled at the time of the access control check.
Example 3.3 (Negative Authorisation)
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deny (S,O, read) when 0 : level(O) > clearance(S)
The second rule is the no read up rule from the Bell-LaPadula policy [66]. It
states that no subject with a clearance level (denoted by clearance(S)) that is
lower than the security level of the object (denoted by level(O)) is allowed to read
information.
History-based Authorisation Rule. The condition in this rule must be fulfilled
based on the past of the access control check.
Example 3.4 (Positive Authorisation)
allow (S,O,A) when true
allow (S, passwd, write) when 0 : group (S, admin)
allow (S,O,A) when T : (
exists y in objects : exists z in actions :
((dataset(O) = dataset(y)) and
(sometime done (S, y, z)))
The first rule states an unconditional positive authorisation for all subjects, objects
and actions in the scope of the containing policy. This is an example of an activity
based authorisation rule. The second rule states the positive authorisation for
any subject in the policy scope that is a member of the group admin. Here the
predicate group(subject, group) denotes the group membership test. This relation
is maintained by the system and must be accessible to the mechanisms that enforce
the policy. The preceding 0: denotes that this condition must be fulfilled at the
time of the access control check. This is an example of a state-based authorisation
rule.
The third rule states a positive authorisation from the Chinese Wall policy [25]:
Once a subject [denoted by S] has accessed [denoted by z] an object [denoted by y],
the only other objects [denoted by O] accessible by that subject are within the same
company data-set [denoted by dataset].
The preceding T: denotes that the length of the subsequent behaviour is the time
since the rule started being enforced. The rule is actually more precise, as it
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explicitly specifies that O and y must have been in the same data-set at the time
the rule started being enforced. The sometime done(S,y,z) denotes that at some
point in time since the enforcement of the rule the subject S successfully performed
an action z on an object y in the same data-set. This rule is an example of a
history-based authorisation rule.
Decision Rules and Conflict Resolution. Decision rules specify the final
access control decision of a policy. Any policy should contain at least one decision
rule, as otherwise no access will be granted by the policy. The alternative term
“conflict resolution rule” originates from the fact that this rule de-conflicts the
policy if a positive and negative authorisation is derived for a specific access.
The term decision rule describes more accurately the fact that any access control
decision is defined by the policy is decided by one or more of these rules not only
decisions in the conflicting case. The examples below provide three widely used
decision rules.
Example 3.5 (Decision Rule)
decide (S,O,A) when 0 : allow (S,O,A)
This rule states that access is granted if a positive authorisation can be derived
from the policy. This rule is used in closed policies, where any access is denied,
unless it is explicitly allowed. The rule ignores all negative authorisation rules,
viz. negative authorisation rules in a policy with this decision rule are not having
any effect on the policy decision and should be omitted.
Example 3.6 (Decision Rule)
decide (S,O,A) when 0 : not deny (S,O,A)
The access in this rule is granted if no negative authorisation can be derived from
the policy. This rule is used in open policies, where any access is allowed, unless
it is explicitly denied. Blacklists are typical examples of open policies. The rule
ignores all positive authorisations, viz. positive authorisation rules in a policy
with this decision rule are not having any effect.
Example 3.7 (Decision Rule)
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decide (S,O,A) when 0 : allow (S,O,A) and not deny (S,O,A)
The example states a rule that is used in hybrid policies. Hybrid policies are
taking into account both, positive and negative authorisation. Hybrid policies are
suitable to express more complex access control requirements. The difficulty with
hybrid policies is that conflicts can occur, in the sense that a subject is at the
same time allowed and denied to access a resource. In these cases, the decision
rule does also resolve the conflict. The rule in the example states that access
is only granted if explicitly allowed and not explicitly denied in the policy. It
therefore gives precedence to denials. It is allowed to have more than one decision
rule in the policy. However, it is important to note that it is sufficient to have
one decision rule firing for the access to be granted. Like other rules, the decision
rules can also contain state and history-dependent premises.
3.2.1.3 Obligation Rules
Obligation rules state under which condition a subject must perform a specific
action. Consequently obligations can only be enforced if they are defined as be-
havioural policy rules (e.g. an e-learning system to notify students when their
grades appear).
Example 3.8 (Obligation Rule)
oblige (S, S, notify) when 0 : done (S,O, submit)
This assumes that the e-learning system defines the actions submit grades and
notify students for their grades.
3.2.1.4 Simple Policies
Simple policies represent a collection of policy rules that all apply simultaneously.
In the SANTA language this is currently represented by grouping a set of rules
using parenthesis. Siewe showed in [87] that set theoretic operators can be used
to compose simple policies. He also defined some operators to filter rules based
on their type (e.g. positive authorisation, negative authorisation rules). These
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operators for the set theoretic composition of simple policies are currently not
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4.1 Introduction
This Chapter provides an overview of proposed Decentralised Policy Based Man-
agement (PBM) framework. It identifies the methodologies for the Decentralised
PBM with their need. Improvement of access control decision making is achieved
by Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) framework and its required
steps those described in this Chapter. The framework details the workflow to
achieve the enforcement of static and dynamic policies in a distributed setting.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides general
overview of the framework with its description steps in subsections. Section 4.3
summarises the Chapter.
4.2 Decentralised Policy Based Management
(PBM) Framework
The main aim of this research is the development of a high-level security framework
for the adaptable management of security in large-scale safety-critical information
systems. This section provides the framework definition and identifies the method-
ology to achieve the Decentralised PBM.
Figure 4.1 depicts the steps in the use of our proposed framework where adminis-
trators write policies that express the information system’s security requirements
at a high level of abstraction. The red rectangles are the outputs of each step
where the outputs from each step being inputs for the next step. After our Decen-
tralised PBM system is implemented, changing policies require to return to policy
analysis step again. Moreover, reconfiguring the enforcement infrastructure back
to the policy decomposition step.
The overall system policy is composed of several smaller policies that capture indi-
vidual security requirements. The compositional approach allows for the structur-
ing of the system policy into logical units, reducing the complexity. The decompo-
sition of this policy is design by the network infrastructure and non-fundamental
considerations such as efficiency and resilience.
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Figure 4.1: Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) Framework.
4.2.1 Policy Specification
The technologies we are using in our research is the SANTA [51] for the policy
specification. The SANTA policy language provides support for both state and
history dependencies. The main reason for our choice of policy language is that
the reasoning about histories using temporal logic descriptions is more natural to
support with tools than analysis models that incorporate history-dependencies by
expressions on log-files or lists. [See Section 3.3 for the SANTA details].
4.2.2 Policy Analysis
The policy analysis and its dependencies on the structure of the access control
requirements is a key for policy decomposition. This step addresses the identi-
fication of dependencies between the policy specification and the access control
requirements.
In order to enforce a policy, all relevant observations must be available to all Policy
Decision Points (PDPs) and PDPs must control the interaction with the protected
resources and also between each other when they share a decision. For example,
in Chinese-Wall policy [25] between two resources in such system requires PDPs
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to control interactions with both resources especially when these resources are
located in different systems or locations (domains).
We are mainly interested in history-based policies [3] and build upon the work
on the analysis of this class of policies those described in [58], [56] and [52]. The
techniques presented in this work are as however independent of the concrete policy
language chosen and can easily be adapted to other policy languages that allow
for the expression of history-based policies (e.g. [51]). In Chapter 6, the policy
analysis dependencies are described. [See Chapter 6 for more details]
4.2.3 Policy Decomposition
Policy decomposition addresses the decomposition of the policy into sub-policies
with the consideration of the dependencies between their rules. To ensure correct
enforcement, the decomposition must not violate any dependencies.
Often security requirements distinguish between different situations of the sys-
tem in question. According to [55], policy composition befits the complicated re-
quirements where smaller policies are combined to express more complex security
requirements. On the other hand, the policy decomposition is breaking these com-
posed policies into smaller sub-policies for the needs of distributing enforcements.
In our contribution, the importance of both composition and the decomposition to
fulfil these requirements is essential. We strongly believe that perform composition
to produce a central policy that covers all requirements for the system and then
decomposition model is efficient to guarantee the efficiency of the enforcements in
distributed manner.
In our policy decomposition model, we use structural refinement to transform the
central policy into several policies according to policy object (target) domains. The
domain is a collection of objects governed by the same geographical boundaries,
object type, responsibility or the level of security or authority.
Finally, these sub-polices can be deployed in a network of DENARs to meet the
need of Decentralised PBM. In addition, collaborative DENARs network is mod-
elled to make the shared decision when it’s required.
Unfortunately, freedom in the choice of a policy language for the specification of
policy can result in some advantages when specifying and modelling the policy for
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access control systems from early stage of designing a system. On the other hand,
it results a disadvantages when the policy is specified in rules and then these rules
composed in one simple (central) policy or decompose into sub-policies. (Specially
when some policies are involved like the Bell-LaPadula [66] or the Chinese Wall
Policy [25]). In turn, this would result in a much larger set of sub-policies, more
complex composed and decomposed algorithms, as well as a higher probability of
“orphan” enforcing policies that cannot be matched by requited existing policy.
However, to solve these drawbacks, in [53], the authors show how dependencies
between policy rules affect their enforcement. Moreover in [53], they propose
a technique by UCON model to improve the enforcement mechanism for these
policies. However, our decomposition model and algorithms that are detailed in
Chapter 7 is a refinement of these dependencies where they are being enforced in
centralised PDP and also in distributed PDPs.
The idea of policy decomposition model is based on object’s domains when it offers
less decision response time with the similar accuracy of decision. Additionally,
efficiency in enforcement is satisfied by applying multiple PDPs those share and
synchronise the decision between them. In addition, we choose objects in domains
mechanism instead of subjects where subjects always are free movement in the
network systems but objects rarely are in some systems e.g. AdHoc systems and
that is being a hot topic for researchers and not covered in this work. Moreover,
applying both object’s and subject’s mechanisms to make a preference to the
system administrator is being more efficient and a good future work. Additionally,
the accurate decision is satisfied when split all objects in the system into domains
as mentioned above as well as that can involved the Bell-LaPadula [66] or the
Chinese Wall [25] policies by our mechanisms. [See Chapter 7 for more details in
how decomposition model involved]
An example of a structural decomposition is shown in Figure 4.2 where the policy
is decomposed into three independent sub-policies. Then, sub-policies are deployed
into corresponding DENARs (in particulate Policy Repository PR) in Deployment
step. The deployment is detailed in Chapter 7.
4.2.4 Policy and PDPs Deployment
A network of DENARs in peer to peer fashion is include the PDPs as an overlay
to the network. The DENARs network link the PEP’s to the PDPs dynamically
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Figure 4.2: The Overlay Network of DENARs.
such that policies enforced at their DENAR’ PDP as if they were enforced locally.
Additionally, the policies are distributed among various PRs in DENARs where
each sub-policies deployed in its domain policy repository PR. Having a system of
DENARs removes the bottleneck, improves performance and also eliminates the
single point of failure. Not only would decision making be much faster in such a
setup, the system would be more efficient in terms of resource utilisation.
Though more efficient performance wise by implementing the network of DENARs
has two serious drawbacks. Firstly, it is possible that enforcing these policies may
suffer unexpected failures; perhaps because a PDP cannot retrieve a policy from
its local policy repository (PR) or no backup DENAR is available. Secondly,
coordination between the DENARs network is may lost in case of the policy that
enforced is history-based policy (e.g. Chinese-Wall policy [25]) and requires to
share decision between more than one PDP. Clearly, it is possible that enforcing
this sort of policy may suffer unexpected failures, perhaps because a PDP cannot
retrieve such conditional attribute from remote PIP or there is no collaboration
between DENARs.
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Ideally, policy enforcement must be resilient to such failures if no decision can
be computed or no conditional attribute can be evaluated. This can be achieved
in two steps. The first step would be to physically transmit the decomposed
sub-policy to a particular policy repository PR and connect all DENARs in the
network immediately with it. Once the decomposed policies are deployed to all
the connected DENARs, all of them can take local decisions when a policy request
is received in case of the independent policy is enforced, thus overcoming the prob-
lem of immediate network overload due to multiple possible concurrent decision
requests. The second step would be to incorporate a mechanism by which all the
enforcements query each one of the other connected DENARs in the network for
a decision and allow the operation only if all of them either respond with a ’allow ’
or a ’deny ’ response. However, in a network where there could potentially be
thousands of PDPs connected to each other, this in itself would be a serious bot-
tleneck to performance because of the tremendous amount of bandwidth it would
consume. Therefore, we address this step only for dependent policies with rich the
efficiency as well by propose Pull and Push Models. [See Section 8.3.1 for more
details].
In summary, we combine both the above mentioned models to optimise the dis-
tributed functionality of the network of DENARs based on available the object-
domain for the first issue and the rule dependency for the second one where those
have been proposed and discussed in above units.
4.2.5 PDPs Enforcement and Coordination
After the distribution of policies among various PDPs, the coordination and syn-
chronisation between the distributed PDPs is declared and implemented. PEPs
are automatically linked with DENARs. In addition, the DENARs are connected
with each other to fulfil the need of coordination. In this manner, the PDP’s
can now arrive at decisions locally and thus save on time and network resources.
Moreover, the connections between components of the DENAR’s component are
stated in this step. [See Chapter 5 for the DENAR architecture and Chapter 8 for
the coordination mechanism details]
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4.3 Summary
This Chapter introduced the Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM)
framework. The framework workflow from policy specification to the DENARs co-
ordination is described. The workflow steps illustrated the methodology to achieve
the efficiency in enforcing static and dynamic policies in distributed systems. How-
ever, ignoring any step in the framework affects the overall access control decision
making or affects the original contribution of this research. Involving the frame-
work output the performance, security, manageability and resilience factor that
considered in the research.
The following chapters give description of each steps of the presented framework.
In Chapter 5, the DENAR architecture is designed and detailed. The analysis
of policy and enforcement in DENAR are provided in Chapter 6. The policy
decomposition step and policy deployment are modelled in Chapter 7. Finally,
the coordination step is detailed with the enforcement model for the collaborative
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5.1 Introduction
The Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) is described focusing on
component functionalities and interactions. In addition, the DENAR administra-
tion technique and configuration is provided.
Performance and manageability are contributing factors to improve access control
decision making. Thus, DENAR is designed in this Chapter to fulfill these factors.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2.1 provides an
overview of the architecture. Section 5.2.2 provides a description of the DENAR’s
components functionality where the component interactions are detailed in section
5.2.3. The DENAR administration is described in task of configuration, deploy-
ment, re-propagation and recovery techniques in section 5.3. Finally, section 5.4
summarises the Chapter.
5.2 Distributed Enforcements Architecture
(DENAR)
According to the IETF and DMTF model [100], the policy enforcement architec-
ture consists of three components which are Policy Repository (PR), Policy En-
forcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP). Moreover, it may include
Policy Administration Point (PAP) that formulation, analysis and verification of
policies on the part of humans. In addition, there may involve Policy Information
Point (PIP) that can provide information against which policy conditions (such
as subject, object, environment or past decision access) are evaluated in a PDP.
The PR provides mechanism for storing policies and retrieving them as required
by the decision points. The responsibility of PEPs is enforcing the outcome of
those policy decisions. The PDP is a module in the system that is responsible for
making policy decisions. They evaluate authorisation requests coming from PEP
against the policies stored in the repository that would be applicable under a given
circumstance and determine what needs to be done to comply with those policies.
The below Figure 5.1 shows the Policy Enforcement Architecture in DMTF model.
In such Centralised PBM system, policy makers pre-define a central policy through
a PAP, then the PAP deposits them in a PR. Therefore, a PDP can monitor the
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Figure 5.1: Policy Enforcement Architecture in DMTF model.
access control. Once the specific access request occurs, PEPs trigger the PDP
to retrieve the PR for applicable policies. According to these policies, when the
specific conditions are met, the corresponding actions should be enforced by the
related PEP. For the communication protocol, Simple Network Management Pro-
tocol (SNMP) [26] or Common Open Policy Service (COPS) [38] may be involved
for the communication between the PDP and the PEP. In addition, Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [43] is involved for the communication in the
PDP to retrieve a policy from PR.
Having a centralised PDP has a number of benefits. The most important advantage
to having a centralised PDP is that the activities of the various PEP’s can be
coordinated amongst each other. Resources that are being accessed by multiple
PEP’s can be synchronised and the overall usage limits for a specified resource
across the entire distributed system can be set. Let us illustrate with an example.
Assume that each user in a university network has access to the printers on the
network but can print no more than 100 pages per day.
In case of a centralised PDP, this is easy to accomplish given that the PDP is
stateful and stores access request and decision states for at least a day for later
reference. In case of such a setup, the PDP will check how many pages the user
has already printed before allowing access to print further pages and if the limit
is exceeded, will deny the request. However, in a network which has hundreds of
network nodes and devices, having a centralised PDP can be a huge bottleneck
to performance if the system is busy. Access requests may flood the PDP and
there may be unacceptable delays in getting a response. Another disadvantage to
having a centralised PDP is that it presents a single point of failure. In case of
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the failure of the PDP, all the devices on the network may cease to function. In
practice, this is rarely the case as there is at least one alternate backup provided
in case of the failure of the main PDP but the fact still remains that decision
making is centralised and thus tends to decrease the performance and efficiency of
the system.
The Policy Framework proposed by the IETF, RFC 2753 [100] mentions a local
Policy Decision point in addition to the remote PDP in order to facilitate decision
making. However, according to their specifications, even if a decision is arrived
at by the local PDP, the details of such a decision as well as the original request
needs to be forwarded to the remote PDP for final ratification. Their measure,
in essence is designed simply to ensure minimal disruption in service in case of
the failure of the remote PDP by allowing the local PDP to take decisions for a
limited time frame when the main PDP is not functioning. It is not meant to be a
proper distributed system per se. As a result, most of the earlier implementations
of policy based control as well as a majority of current ones, rely on a centralised
PDP for their decision making.
In such a scenario, having a system of distributed PDPs would remove the bot-
tleneck, improve performance and also eliminate the problem of a single point of
failure. The distributed PDP’s may either be co-located with the PEP or may
service a specified area such as an administrative domain. Not only would deci-
sion making be much faster in such a setup, the system would be more efficient
in terms of resource utilisation. An accepted method which has been proposed
in order to achieve this distribution is to break up high level policies into smaller
component parts specific to each resource being controlled [90] . This process
is known as the decomposition of policies. The decomposed components of the
policy can then be distributed to the respective PDP’s in charge of the specified
resource for which the policy has been decomposed. In this manner, the PDP’s
can now arrive at decisions locally and thus save on time and network resources.
Under such an arrangement, the role of the centralised PDP would simply be to
decompose the policies into component parts and distribute them to the various
distributed PDPs.
However the above arrangement, though more efficient performance wise, has one
serious drawback. All coordination between the distributed PDPs is now lost.
If we consider the example mentioned above, this would mean that a user could
technically print out 99 pages from a printer in the network which is under the
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control of a particular PDP and then simply move to another part of the network
and print out another 99 pages from another printer which is controlled by a
second PDP. As far as both the PDP’s individually are concerned, the user has
not exceeded the limit specified for him in the policy but as far as the entire
distributed system is concerned, he has far exceeded his quota.
Then, it also could not count to 99 where this poses a serious problem. By state-
less, what is meant is that they take access control decisions for every request in
isolation to all previous requests which have been made or permitted. Given this
scenario, coordination is required even in case of a centralised PDP in order to
enforce usage limits on various resources which are being controlled. Indeed this
is the main reason why most distributed systems, like the ATM systems in banks,
rely on centralised PDP’s with custom built software to enforce usage limits in
order to enforce their policies. Chadwick et. al [27] suggested a way to overcome
this problem. They proposed the introduction of a coordination object to enable
otherwise stateless PDP’s to coordinate their decision making.
The coordination is required between all PDPs to share information that is re-
quired in access decision making. Therefore, there is an evident need for adding
new components into IETF and DMTF model [100] for coordination. We design
our Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) based on this needs.
5.2.1 The Architecture
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking approach, at least the one characterised by
Overlay Network [69], appears to be a much more effective architecture on which
to build the distributed PDPs for the Decentralised PBM system.
Since each peer can communicate with any other peer in the network to provide
a service, P2P networks support a more distributed architecture. By involving
an Overlay Network to create a group of DENARs for the Decentralised PBM
system, there are less central components in the DENARs network operations.
Additionally, the PDP peers in the DENARs network can communicate with each
other (in particular, through PIPcoordinator and PDPcoordinator components)
and propagate the decision information throughout the DENARs overlay network.
Thus, this approach provides a fully distributed architecture.
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Obviously, a simple policy (central policy) is decomposed into sub-policies to be
deployed in multiple PRs, so that every PDP peer would only need to communicate
directly with its DENARs’ PR for a policy and PIP for conditional attributes.
A benefit to decompose the policy into sub-policies and deploy them into PRs
is that the network traffic load can be shared through the local domain for local
DENAR or through remote DENAR by PDPs peers, instead of through select
routes to centralised PR. Consequently, it avoids single points of failure and ef-
ficiently utilizes the available network bandwidth, therefore reducing congestion
[97].
P2P protocols provide a discovery mechanism. The discovery mechanism allows
PDP peer to dynamically discover (in the same DENAR) the PR for the policy that
would be enforced and the PIP for the required attributes for the local enforcement.
In the discovery mechanism, each PDP peer can discover other PDP peers for
remote DENAR within the network. We believe discovery to be a useful feature
for the Decentralised PBM system, since we expect there to be situations where
network domains topology may change. Thus, it would be inefficient to structure
the network of DENARs with predefined PDPs, PRs and PIPs.
Therefore, instead of directly implementing the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) model [100] [95] to provide a more suitable policy-based system for the
network, we decided to modify the IETF and DMTF model [100] to be built
using P2P protocols (Overlay Network) and adding new components which are
PDPcoordinator and PIPcoordinator with the other components in the model to
play the role of coordination and concurrency between DENARs.
The below Figure 5.2 shows the DENARs network where the DENAR’s component
and interactions are detailed in the following subsections.
5.2.2 Component Functionalities
Since each peer can communicate with any other peer in the network to provide
a service, P2P networks support a more distributed architecture. By involving
Overlay Network [69] to create distributed PDPs for the Decentralised PBM sys-
tem, distributed PRs and PIPs are involved. Thus, there is no centralisation in the
enforcement operations but each Policy Decision Point (PDP) peer communicates
directly with its PR, PIP, PDPcoordinator and PIPcoordinator in local DENAR.
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Figure 5.2: The DENARs network.
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However, for the remote (collaborative) decision, the PDP peers can communicate
with each other and propagate the decision information throughout the overlay
network of DENAR (in particular, through PDPcoordinator and PIPcoordinator
components) [See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.5 and 5.2.2.6 for more details]. This
approach provides a fully distributed architecture. Obviously, a simple policy
(central policy) is decomposed into sub-policies to be deployed in multiple PRs, so
that every PDP peer would only need to communicate directly with its DENARs’
PR for a policy and PIP for conditional attributes. Figure 5.3 shows DENAR
architecture components where they are detailed in the following subsections.
Figure 5.3: The Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR).
5.2.2.1 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Functionality
A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is a core component in our architecture. It is
responsible for sending requests to a PDP, and enforcing decisions made by the
PDP, thus acting as an authorisation link between the PDP and system elements
(subjects and objects) for the authorisation purpose.
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To perform its task the PEP collects access requests from various system elements,
and forwards them to the PDP for decision making. Moreover, the PEP enforces
the actions determined by the PDP. However, in some cases, when enforcement
task is complicated the PEP must obligate the PDP about the action execution,
and this is done by obligation policies where this value is required in a future
decision, e.g. a bank could define an obligation to notify its customers whenever
anyone withdrew money from their bank account, thus, the process performing
access first and then notifying the action.
In DENAR, a PEP discovers a PDP that it should communicate with as well
as other PEPs in the network. After a PDP has been found, the PEP sends
an authorisation request messages to the PDP. If the PEP fails to communicate
with the PDP, the PEP returns discovery and waits until it has found the PDP
otherwise communicates with backup DENAR. In particular, the PDP in backup
DENAR that configured as backup enforcement by a system administrator, i.e
when any of these PDPs is disconnected, this often causes accessing problems
which lead to security violations. [See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 for more details
for resilience]
The PEP has an initialization phase and a run phase. The main purpose of the
initialization phase is, firstly, to find other PEPs in the network and connect with
them. Secondly, it has to find a proper PDP for this domain and connect with
it. Initialization is completed after the PEP has created its authorisation message
pipe with the proper PDP. After initialization, the PEP uses the authorisation
message pipe to periodically send authorisation request messages to the PDP and
check the response to those messages. If the PEP fails to receive a response from
the PDP after time has elapsed for sending another authorisation request, the
connection to the PDP is gone. When the connection to the PDP is lost the
PEP will return to the initialization phase to find another PDP link otherwise
communicates with backup DENAR (in particular the PDP in backup DENAR).
Once the PEP is up, it uses the pipe advertisement (i.e., the same one that the PDP
used) to set-up a connection with the PDP. Once connectivity between the PDP
and the PEPs has been established, the PEP can send an authorisation request
packet to PDP and receive the decision. The PEP creates a directory with the
configuration file and the cached service advertisements from other peers. Once
the PEP receives the decision, it may execute the obligation that was sent with
the decision.
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5.2.2.2 Policy Repository (PR) Functionality
In each DENAR, there is one PR that stores the sub-policies for a domain or
domains (based on the network topology configuration). System administrators
configure these PRs in their DENARs. The PDP in the DENAR is responsible to
retrieve proper policy from DENARs’ PR.
5.2.2.3 Policy Information Point (PIP) Functionality
An authorisation request is evaluated against a policy and if the policy has some
access restrictions (conditions), a PIP in the DENAR provides local conditional
attributes (those are stored in the same domain) those are evaluated by a PDP.
On the other hand, the PDP contacts a local PIPcoordinator for the remote con-
ditional attributes (those are stored in the different PIPs in other DENARs) [See
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.5].
5.2.2.4 Policy Decision Point (PDP) Functionality
In general, a PDP retrieves a policy from a PR. The request is evaluated against
the policy and if the policy has some access restrictions (conditions), the PDP
contacts the PIP for attributes those would evaluated in the conditions.
In DENAR, the local PDP in the DENAR is responsible for receiving an authori-
sation request that is sent by a PEP and retrieves a policy from a local PR. The
request is evaluated against the policy and if the policy has access restrictions
(conditions), the PDP contacts the local PIP for the local conditional attributes
(those are stored in the local PIP) those would evaluated in the conditions.
Alternatively, it contacts a local DENARs’ PIPcoordinator for the remote condi-
tional attributes (those are stored in the different PIPs in other DENARs in the
network) those will be evaluated in the conditions where PIPcoordinator can com-
municate with other PIPcoordinators in the DENARs network to find the value
for those attributes. In addition, the local PDP contacts a local PDPcoordinator
DENARs’ if the decision is shared by other PDP in the DENARs network. In this
case, the local PDPcoordinator communicates with other PDPcoordinators in the
network to ask their PDPs to share decision.
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For configuration, the PDP creates the default PDPs group. After that, it uses a
server pipe to accept connections from the other peers in that group. There is only
one active PDP within a DENAR. Once the PDP is up and running, it applies
discovery service. Subsequently, a PDP searches for the PR, PIP, PIPCoordinator
and PDPCoordinator within the same DENAR as well as PEPs.
5.2.2.5 PIPcoordinator Functionality
The PIPcoordinator is a new component in Distributed Enforcements Architec-
ture (DENAR). The main function of the PIPcoordinator is to act as bridge for
sharing conditional attributes between two DENARs. A PDP in the DENAR can
communicate with other PIPs in the DENAR network only via PIPcoordinators.
In case of enforcing dynamic policies, the PDP communicates with other PIPs to
evaluate attributes those question in the policy condition and cannot be found in
the local PIP. The PIPcoordinator is being the coordinator between the PDP and
other remote PIPs to perform sending those attributes (push) or request those
attributes (pull). [See Section for details 8.2.1]
The PIPcoordinator discovers other remote PIPcoordinators those should commu-
nicate with in different DENARs. In running phase, after PIPcoordinators have
been found, the PIPcoordinator sends (push) attribute request to other PIPcoor-
dinators in other DENARs if and only if the attribute is located in remote PIP
or PIPcoordinator request (pull) attributes from other PIPcoordinators (produced
from / required for) the current decision (e.g., in case of enforcing history-based
policy). If the PIPcoordinator fails to communicate with another PIPcoordinator
in the DENARs network, the PIPcoordinator returns discovery and waits until
it has found it otherwise communicates with backup DENAR (in particular the
PIPcoordinator in backup DENAR).
The PIPcoordinator has an initialization phase and a run phase. The purpose of
the initialization phase is to find other PIPcoordinators in the DENARs network
and connected with them. Initialization is completed after the PIPcoordinator
has created its shared attribute exchange pipe with other PIPcoordinators. After
initialization, the PIPcoordinator uses the shared attribute exchange pipe to peri-
odically send (push) or request (pull) attributes to proper PIPcoordinator in the
DENARs network and check the response to those messages in case of the Pull or
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Push Models. If the PIPcoordinator fails to receive a response from other PIP-
coordinators after time has elapsed for sending another shared attribute request,
the connection to the PIPcoordinator is gone. When the connection to the other
PIPcoordinators are lost, it will communicate with backup DENAR (in particular
the PIPcoordinator in backup DENAR).
5.2.2.6 PDPcoordinator Functionality
The PDPcoordinator is a new component in the DENAR. The main function of
the PDPcoordinator is to act as bridge for sharing a decision between two PDPs.
A PDP in the DENAR communicates with other PDPs in the DENAR network
only via PDPcoordinators. In case of enforcing hypothetical policy where a rule
depends on another authorisation rule, multiple PDPs communicate to make the
final decision where one of these PDPs is being the coordinator PDP that received
the authorisation request from a PEP.
The PDPcoordinator discovers other remote PDPcoordinators those should com-
municate with in the DENARs network. After PDPcoordinators have been found,
the PDPcoordinator sends an authorisation request messages to other PDPcoordi-
nators in the DENARs network if and only if authorisation decision will be shared
with multiple PDPs (e.g., in case of enforcing hypothetical rule) . If the PDPcoor-
dinator fails to communicate with another PDPcoordinator, the PDPcoordinator
returns discovery and waits until it has found it otherwise communicates with
backup DENAR (in particular the PDPcoordinator in backup DENAR).
The PDPcoordinator has an initialization phase and a run phase. The purpose of
the initialization phase is to find other PDPcoordinators in the DENARs network
and connected with them. Initialization is completed after the PDPcoordinator
has created its shared authorisation decision pipe with other PDPcoordinators. Af-
ter initialization, the PDPcoordinator uses the shared authorisation decision pipe
to periodically send a request for shared authorisation decision to proper PDP-
coordinator in the DENARs network and check the response to those messages.
If the PDPcoordinator fails to receive a response from other PDPcoordinators
after time has elapsed for sending another shared authorisation decision request,
the connection to the PDPcoordinator is gone. When the connection to the other
PDPcoordinators are lost, it will communicate with backup DENAR (in particular
the PDPcoordinator in backup DENAR).
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5.2.3 Component Interactions
Interactions in DENAR are between the component themselves and also between
DENARs in the DENARs overlay network. The component interactions make
the access control decision and interactions between DENARs to support the co-
ordination and synchronisation requirements in access control decision making.
Figure 5.4 illustrates messages exchange pipes in DENARs network to achieve the
above requirements where they are detailed in the below subsections.
Figure 5.4: Messages Exchange in DENARs network.
5.2.3.1 PEP and DENAR Interaction
There are three types of messages for the PEP and the PDP:-
1. Discovery Configuration: to establish a communication between a PEP
and a PDP, the PEP will create its authorisation message pipe with all PDPs
in the DENARs network to find all active PDPs in the network, thus, a sys-
tem administrator has the choice to configure a proper PDP for the PEP
and the backup PDP as well. The administrator can also setup the secure
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message exchange protocol between the PEP and PDP. For the communica-
tion protocol, SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) [26] or COPS
(Common Open Policy Service) [38] may be involved for the communication
between a PDP and a PEP.
2. Peer Authorisation Request: after initialization, the PEP uses the au-
thorisation message pipe to periodically send authorisation request messages
to the DENAR (in particular the PDP) and check the response to those mes-
sages. Transition between the PDP and its PEPs is also logged to a file for
obligation needs.
3. The Decision Information: if there is an obligation policy that must be
enforced, the PEP can respond to the PDP after the action is executed so
the PDP can log that into its local DENARs’ PIP or remote PIPs in different
DENARs( in Push Model).
The diagrams below in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the PEP and DENAR for
the activity and sequence interaction.
5.2.3.2 DENAR Components Interaction (PDP, PR, PIP, PDPcoor-
dinator and PDPcoordinator )
A PDP in the DENAR discovers one PR and PIP that are located in the same
DENAR otherwise discover the backup PR or PIP those configured in DENAR
backup. There are messages exchanges between these components as:-
1. Discovery Configuration: to establish a communication between a PDP
and a PR and PIP, the PDP finds the active PR and PIP in the DENAR.
Then, a system administrator can configure the backup PR and PIP in
DENAR backup. The administrator can also setup the secure message ex-
change protocol between the PDP and local PR and PIP as well as the
message exchange protocol for the backup PR and PIP. For the communica-
tion protocol, LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) [43] is involved
in the PDP to retrieve a PR or PIP.
2. Policy Request: after initialization, the PDP uses the configured protocol
to retrieve a proper policy from the local PR or backup PR that enforced
against the authorisation request to make the decision.
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Figure 5.5: PEP and DENAR Interaction Activity Diagram
3. Shared Decision Request: the PDP contacts its local PDPcoordinator
in the DENAR if the decision is shared with other PDPs in the DENARs
network. In this case, the local PDPcoordinator communicates other PDP-
coordinators in the DENARs network to ask their PDPs to make decision.
[See Chapter 8, Section 8.2 for more details].
4. Local Conditional Attribute Request: after initialization, the PDP uses
the configured protocol to retrieve particular conditional attributes those re-
quired in the policy conditions if there are restrictions in the policy. The PDP
retrieves local attributes from local DENARs’ PIP otherwise from backup
DENAR (in particular PIP backup).
5. Remote Conditional Attribute Request: the PDP uses PIPcoordinator
component to retrieve particular conditional attributes as required in the
policy conditions if there are restrictions in the policy. The PDP retrieves via
this component only remote conditional attributes from remote PIPs those
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Figure 5.6: PEP and DENAR Interaction Sequence Diagram.
are located in different DENARs. The PIPcoordinator can communicate
only with PIPcoordinators in the DENARs network to do this task. However,
we have modelled this task as Pull Model in our coordination mechanism.
[See Chapter 8, Section 8.3]
6. Submission Decision Locally: if there is an obligation policy that must
be enforced, after the PEP sends the confirmation of the action execution.
The PDP after that sends that value into its DENARs’ PIP.
7. Submission Decision Remotely: if there is an obligation policy that must
be enforced, after the PEP sends the conformation of the action execution.
The PDP after that sends that value into remote PIPs those located in
different DENARs. The PDP uses PIPcoordinator component to store the
value into those remote PIPs. The PIPcoordinator can communicate only
with PIPcoordinators in the DENARs network to do this task. However, we
have model this task as Push Model in our coordination mechanism. [See
Chapter 8, Section 8.3]
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The diagrams below in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 illustrate the DENAR compo-
nents for the activity interaction.
Figure 5.7: DENAR Components Interaction Activity Diagram 1.
Figure 5.7 shows the activity after receiving an authorisation request for a PEP
until the DENAR makes its decision and Figure 5.8 shows the activity after receiv-
ing an access notification from the PEP until the DENAR end the enforcement
process.
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Figure 5.8: DENAR Components Interaction Activity Diagram 2.
5.3 DENARs Administration
In the Decentralised PBM, a central policy (a simple policy) is formalised, anal-
ysed, decomposed and then deployed into a network of DENARs by centralised
PAP (Policy Administration Point) into distributed PRs to satisfy and meet all
distributed environments requirements. [See details in the Chapter 7] .
The complexity here would be how policies or domains topology could be changed
on-the-fly. Thus, distributed enforcements topology, decomposed policies struc-
ture, etc., which is beyond our scope at this section.
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Scenario: A network administrator configured a university network to contain
four network domains (D1, D2, D3 and D4) where domains held resources. DENARs
overlay network are configured on top of the university network. The network ad-
ministrator decided that each domain has its local DENAR to make the access
decisions for its resources. The access control policy had specified as central policy
that contain all access rules for this network. Let us assume a case where there are
four DENARs which are distributed and connected to each other. Each of these
DENARs may be contacted in order for various groups of subjects to gain access
to protected resources inside the university.
The administrator deploys the decomposed sub-policies to their policy repositories
PRs according to their DENARs based on our policy decomposition model and
deployment model in Chapter 7. Each decomposed sub-policy would only be
available to the local PDP for the DENAR in which it has been deployed.
In order to assume truly distributed systems, these systems should share some
information and share their decision making as well. The DENARs in the net-
work are able to exchange the information and collaborate to make access control
decision. Each sub-policy is deployed on a certain PR where only the local PDP
should have access to it.
Figure 5.9 below illustrates the DENARs network configuration for the above
scenario. The red dotted lines indicate to shared authorisation decision pipes
between PDPcoordinators. The green dotted lines show shared conditional at-
tribute exchange pipes between PIPcoordinators. The solid black lines show the
authorisation message pipes between PEPs and PDPs.
5.3.1 DENARs Configuration
In general our DENAR architecture provides method to implement Decentralised
PBM system via an Overlay Network [69] architectures to offer a distributed en-
forcements model.
DENAR is based on the IETF model [100] where it use COPS protocol [38] as the
authorisation mechanism between PEPs and peer PDP and P2P protocol (e.g.,
JXTA protocols [97]) for the message exchange between PIPcoordinator peers and
also PDPcoordinators in the DENARs network.
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Figure 5.9: The DENARs network for the Scenario.
The PR and PIP are assumed to be within the DENAR as the PDP. The PDP and
the PEPs will use the same pre-defined COPS protocol to establish a connection.
Clearly, the main motivation for our DENAR architecture is that chosen predefined
PEPs can communicate with the active PDP(s) in domain, otherwise in case of
no PDP is active, PEPs in that domain can communicate to the backup PDP. We
assume that the pipe for a message exchange between PDPs peers defined where
it provides major security concerning for applications in such military, health and
national security domains. The PDPs peers must know the “secret keys” before
two-way communication can be established. The architecture also assumes that an
authorisation request is routed between PEPs in the based in known routing table
tell a particular PEP picks the request to forward to a the PDP that connected
with the PEP. In this case, the object (target) that is need for perform an action on
being within the same domain of the PDP responsible for make the authorisation
decision.
Each PR has a different policy file where it is accessible by the PDP that is re-
sponsible for the authorisation decision for those objects (targets) are located in
the same DENAR. In this case, in the backup DENAR, the PR has a copy of all
decomposed policies and also PIP has a copy of all conditional attributes for all
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targets in the system. Additionally, in case of any policy change or domain topol-
ogy change, our decomposition mechanism will restart again. However, in case of
reconfiguring the policy (changing) or in the network reconfiguration the system
can relay on the backup DENAR only to offer the accessibility and availability.
To meet the efficiency target for enforcing the history-based policy [3], we assume
that, any PDP can ”push” a new value of conditional attribute for the current
decision to other PIPs those required for future decision [this is done by obligation,
see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.3] . On the other hand, the PDP in such cases can
”pull” any conditional attribute value that is located in remote PIPs that required
in the PDP for the current decision. The decomposition attempts to minimise the
lookup and update access control attributes and policies.
Finally, in the DENAR, a central policy (a simple policy) is formalised, analysed
decomposed and deployed by centralised PAP. In fact, distributed enforcements
implementation for distributed environments that often built upon a physically
large and topologically complex network must be reliability and efficiency of ad-
ministration into consideration. Large distributed systems are usually divided into
various and separate domains. As a consequence, policies also are administered
in centralised PAP and then decomposed and deployed into distributed PRs to
satisfy and meet the distributed environments requirements.
5.3.2 DENARs Deployment
A library can be designed to easily create and synchronise a network of DENARs
in a peer to peer fashion based on the network domains topology. A network
administrator is able to configure the DENARs as an overlay to the network and
also link the PEP’s to the DENARs components dynamically. In the case of any
DENARs failing, the library is dynamically reconfigured to connect PEPs or any
components in the DENAR to the backup DENAR components in the network.
The PEP will be capable of connecting to a one active DENAR or if it fails, it will
automatically connect to the backup DENARs for a decision.
For the PEP, the DENARs appear to be one coherent system and the distribution
and coordination between the various DENARs are transparent. The chief char-
acteristic of the overlay network is that it can be used to easily convert existing
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standalone, stateless enforcements into a network of stateful networked enforce-
ments with minimal alteration in the existing enforcements code. Having a system
of DENARs network improves performance in access control decision making and
also eliminates the problem of a single point of failure.
5.3.3 DENARs Re-propagation and Recovery Technique
The distributed policy enforcements that comprise Decentralised Policy Based
Management (PBM) system are viewed as independent pieces and are managed as
such. Administrators have to configure a number of DENARs based on the network
topology. The problems originate from the independent nature of each DENAR.
Every DENAR has private sub-policies those decomposed from the central policy,
performs access control according to that specification, and is oblivious to the
sub-policies those deployed into other DENARs.
This often causes accessing problems which lead to security violations. Firstly,
when any of these DENARs is disconnected. Secondly, the network administra-
tors are trying to reconfigure the overlay DENARs topology (e.g. make more
DENARs than the actual the overlay DENARs topology exist) in some distribu-
tion network view. Finally, the system administrators are trying to reconfigure
the Decentralised PBM system with new policies adding or changing (only with
new dependent policy).
For the three cases, we design a backup DENAR that is configured by the system
administrator. The backup DENAR is utilized in case of any failure communi-
cation between any PEP, PIPcoordinator or PDPcoordinator and DENARs. In
addition, it is used in case of reconfiguring the Decentralised PBM system with new
policies. Clearly, decentralised policy-based management system is become cen-
tralised policy-based management system only during the reconfiguration which
relay on the backup DENAR for access control. The backup DENAR has its PR
that store the central policy (all rules before the decomposition into sub-policies),
its PIP that stores all conditional attributes.
However, according to our Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) frame-
work we detailed in Chapter 4 and the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architec-
ture (DENAR) four benefits are accrued by re-propagation and recovery technique:
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Scalability: A network of DENARs is distributed to improve the performance of
access control decision making, thus, DENARs re-propagation can lead to avoid-
ing the performance bottlenecks of a particular DENAR that has access control
requests.
Flexibility: Adding or removing resources for the system does not affect the
DENARs topology. Therefore, only adding a new policy for that resource and its
attribute can be added without reconfiguring the DENARs topology.
Simplicity: Individualized administration of DENARs is eliminated, simplifying
management.
Consistency: DENARs topology remains consistent in case a new policy is added
or changed. The policy may be analysed and decomposed without changing of
DENARs topology.
5.4 Summary
This Chapter introduced the Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR).
The components, their function and interaction are described. Details of their
design and implementation, together with algorithm are given. Moreover, the net-
work of DENARs administration and configuration are detailed. The deployment
of DENARs in Decentralised PBM is introduced where the collaboration between
them are involved through the two new component we added, which are PIPcoor-
dinator and PDPcoordinator. In addition, re-propagation and recovery techniques
are described for DENARs network.
The novelty of the DENAR architecture is the inclusion of coordination and col-
laboration mechanisms that allow for distributed PDPs of dynamic policies e.g.
history based policies. This improves the standard IETF framework [100] that
cannot coordinate distributed PDPs and PIPs and adds a formal underpinning
to similar approaches to coordination [27] by using the history-based policy lan-
guage SANTA [51]. The network of DENARs which include multiple PDPs and
PIPs remove the single point of failure that is common in centralised enforcement
approaches i.e. that rely on the IETF model. The choice of a distributed PIP
overlay in the architecture provides a key contribution, which makes the decision
making more resilient to network failure.
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In Chapter 9 and 10, the implementation and evaluation showed that the Dis-
tributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) is feasible to enforce both static
and dynamic policies. DENARs’ manageability is discussed in Chapter 10, sec-
tion 10.4.3.





• Identify the security policy challenges in DENAR.
• Analyse the security policy dependencies.
• Identify the distributed policy enforcements challenges.
• Analyse the distributed policy enforcements collaboration.
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6.1 Introduction
The distribution of enforcement mechanism in the Decentralised PBM and the
conception and development of static and dynamic policies are an essential part
of DENAR’s design.
This Chapter addresses the analysis of dependencies in security policy to meet
policy decomposition requirements. In addition, the analysis of distributed policy
enforcements resilience significantly extends this approach, allowing the collabo-
rative DENARs to enforce static and dynamic policies in a decentralised manner.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 analyses the
security policy enforcement challenges and dependencies in DENAR. Section 6.3
identifies the domain scope for DENARs in subsection 6.3.1 and analyses the col-
laborative DENARs decision in subsection 6.3.2. Finally, section 6.4 summarises
the Chapter.
6.2 Security Policy Analysis in DENAR
In this section, we identify policy dependency challenges facing distributed policy
enforcements needs. The dependency between policies in dynamic policy (History
Based Policy (HBP)) [3] is analysed and classified to be involved in the decompo-
sition model in Chapter 7.
6.2.1 Security Policy Challenges
A common approach is to distribute the policy to localised policy decision points
(LPDPs) that may well form a part of the PEP itself [38] [62] [100]. However,
this is not always possible, depending on the policy that is to be enforced by the
PDP. When policy is static (Access Control List (ACL)) [2], the distribution of
this sort of policy is straightforward and represents essentially the decomposition
of an access control matrix into a set of access control lists (object-based distri-
bution) or capability lists (subject-based distribution) [13]. This decomposition is
well understood and implemented in many systems [2]. On the other hand, it is
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impossible with dynamic policies where there is no collaborative enforcement be-
tween those LPDPs, i.e. one of LPDPs need for its current enforcement a previous
decision result of the other LPDPs.
More recently the decomposition of dynamic policies (History Based Policy (HBP))
[3] have received attention, paying attention to the subject or object attributes
that are required for the policy decision making. The decomposition then does
entail an analysis of the attributes that are referenced in the policy and distributing
these attributes to various localised Policy Information Points (PIPs) that store
the attribute information.
In [68] and [91], the notion of policy decomposition is provided. In [68], the pol-
icy decomposition is based on the sensitivity of attribute information necessary
for access control and/or user defined constraints at each PDP. In [91], however,
policy decomposition is guided by the resource type hierarchy. Their model con-
siders refining a high-level access control policy into sub-policies that are specific
to a resource instance and then sub-policies are deployed at the PDPs controlling
each resource. In comparison, our policy decomposition approach is not guided
by the resource type hierarchy or the sensitivity of attribute information but ob-
ject domains, thus, not every domain has its PDP where that is based on policy
dependency analysis.
A major challenge is how a central (simple) policy that includes both static policy
(e.g. ACL [2]) and dynamic policy (e.g HBP [3]) are deployed into collaborative
enforcements and then interpreting and efficiently enforcing these policies. To
shift the computational mechanism towards distributed systems and enforcements,
we propose a policy decomposition that finds the dependency between rules in
the central policy and then decomposes them into sub-policies based on their
object-domains and dependency if they have to be ready for the deployment into
enforcements.
Our policy analysis and dependencies address the analysis of the policy specifi-
cation into static policy (independent policy) and dynamic policy (dependent),
in which policy decisions are based on the history of events. To ensure correct
enforcement, the policy decomposition is designed to take into account enforcing
a policy into a single PDP or collaborative enforcements (PDPs). We propose
that the policy is decomposed into sub-policies according to rules’ object domains
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and then send these sub-policies to corresponding DENARs which are deployed in
deployment mechanism (described in this Chapter, section 6.3).
In the following example, we illustrate how our policy decomposition for static
policy (independent policy) (e.g Access Control List (ACL) [2]) is being simple.
Nevertheless, the situation becomes complicated when dynamic policy (dependent
policy) (e.g History based policy(HBP) [3]) has to decompose into sub-policies.
An illustrative example: Suppose a company has two categories of employees
(fulltime staff and agency workers). Further, we distinguish two types of re-
sources representing documents available in the system requirements; these are
(operational and strategic). For this example, we concern ourselves with an action
(read), representing all types of access that allow subjects to retrieve information
from the documents.
The policy denotes that only fulltime staff can read strategic documents whereas
operational documents are readable by both fulltime staff and agency workers.
Also, the fulltime staff can delete the strategic and operational documents with a
condition of (if and only if any of fulltime members has read the strategic docu-
ment).
We here have the set of subjects (S = fulltime, agency); the set of objects (O =
operational, strategic). Let fulltime staff be (Fiona and Fred), agency workers be
(Alice and Adam). Operational documents are (open.txt, transfer.txt and close.txt)
and strategic document is (regulation.txt). These requirements can be formalised
in a central policy that captures these requirements as rules.
As we illustrated before, the general form of a rule in SANTA is:
consequence (S,O,A) when premise
The consequence of a rule distinguishes the class of requirements that can be
expressed in that rule. The triplet (S,O,A) references the subjects (S), objects
(O) and action (A) to which the rule applies. Finally, the premise of the rule
describes the condition under which the rule fires.
The formalisation for the example requirements above in SANTA is given below.
There is no condition in rule1 and rule2, thus, the premise is stated as True but
in rule3 where there is condition is stated in:
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sometime done (S,O, read)
Example 6.1
rule1 :
allow (S,O, read) when true where S := {Fiona, Fride} and
O := {regulation.txt}
rule2 :
allow (S,O, read) when true
where S := {Fiona, Fride, Adam,Alice} and
O := {open.txt, close.txt, transfer.txt}
rule3 :
allow (S,O, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S := {Fiona, Fride} and
O := {open.txt, close.txt, transfer.txt, regulation.txt}
The central policy above has three rules where rule1 and rule2 show the static
(independent) policy and the rule3 illustrates the dynamic (dependent) policy.
Rule1 and rule2 can be implemented in matrix or (ACL) as shown in Figure 6.1
but rule3 cannot for the reason that the decision for the rule3 is based on the past
decision of the rule1. Therefore, decomposing the central policy into sub-polices
is being complicated for the (History Based Policy) reason.
Figure 6.1: Access Control Matrix.
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The orange colour shows the rule1 and the green colour shows the rule2. However,
the rule3 cannot be implemented in this matrix where the decision for the rule3
is based on the past decision of the rule1 that indicated in its condition.
The enforcement execution for rule1 and rule2 are shown the Figure 6.2 where
no conditions are included. The event means that subject(s) perform a particular
action on object(s). The enforcement decision for rule1 and rule2 are fully inde-
pendent of each other, thus, no matter if each of them are in a different system to






Figure 6.2: The Enforcement Decision for no Condition Rule.
However, conditions’ branches in the rule are conceivable to question for subject
attributes’, object attributes’ or environment attributes. In addition, they may
question for values of decisions that are taken at some point in the past as it is
shown in rule3. Clearly, Figure 6.3 shows the dependency between rule1 and rule3
where the enforcement execution for rule3 that restricts performing its action on
the past decision of the rule1.
At the end of this Chapter, the result of the our policy decomposition for the above
policy is shown where the rule1 remains as it is and the rule2 is decomposed into
sub-policies based on fragmenting the object scope and then are deployed and
enforced in their domains’ enforcements. Finally, rule3 is decomposed into sub-
policies based on the rule’s object-domains and its dependency with rule1 and then
are deployed and enforced in their domains’ enforcements. Therefore, the challenge









Figure 6.3: The Enforcement Decision with Past Decision Condition.
that is illustrated in this Chapter is showing how these rules are decomposed
appropriately to be enforced and result in the same decision by distributed PDPs
in comparison with a centralised PDP.
6.2.2 Policy Dependency Scope
A policy analysis and dependencies on the structure of the system requirements
are the key for Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR). Policy analysis
identifies dependencies between policy and the access control in information sys-
tems (particularly, for dynamic policies). The second aspect is the analysis of the
enforcement for both static and dynamic policies in DENAR to meet collaboration
enforcement requirements.
In order to enforce a policy, all relevant observations must be available to a PDP
and the PDP must control the interaction with the protected resources. In dy-
namic policies (History Based Policy (HBP)) [3], for example, the Chinese-Wall
policy [25] between two resources in a system requires the PDP to control inter-
actions with both resources. The techniques presented in this section are however
independent of the policy language chosen and can easily be adapted to other
policy languages that allow for the expression of history-based policies (e.g. [51]).
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In some cases, an access to a resource must be restricted to satisfy the IT man-
agement requirements. On the other hand, no restrictions are required as well to
meet the IT requirements.
The general form of a rule is:
consequence (s, o, a) when premise
The consequence of a rule distinguishes the class of requirements that can be
expressed in that rule. The triplet (s,o,a) references the subject, object and action
to which the rule applies. Finally, the premise of the rule describes the condition
under which the rule fires.
Premise in a rule describes a set of conditions that presents these restrictions.
Empty or none existed conditions in premise expresses no restrictions for subject(s)
to access resource(s) where it is the simplest rule in ACL model [2]. However, when
the access to resource(s) must be restricted, this could be expressed in premise with
one or multiple conditions.
Regarding access control requirements, we can classify the premise into basic
premise (no condition) or conditional premise (has non empty condition) where we
classify it as independent or dependent premise based on a conditions’ structure.
The following subsection shows these classifications.
Basic Premise ( No condition)
Definition 6.2 :- an event (either an explicit message being passed between two
points, or a change of state) triggers the execution of an action.
The basic premise can be authorising for the event to trigger the action without
any restrictions. Figure 6.2 depicts this process. Moreover, a system may allow
different events to trigger the action. Based on a policy language that used to
support subject scope or objects scope, viz. only one subject or a set of subjects
and a one or a set of objects can be used in the event.
The basic premise can be formalised in as follows:
consequence (s, o, a) when true
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Conditional Premise
The conditional premise is supporting set conditions to be evaluated before the
action is taken. The conditional premise is more complicated in that it can be
nested and iterated. In addition, the action is executed only when the event










Figure 6.4: Conditional Premise Rule Decision.
The different decision of a rule can be determined by only the conditions they
evaluated. If none of the conditions evaluate to true, no action is performed.
The conditional premise is conceivable to hold one or more of subjects’ attribute,
objects’ attributes, environments’ attributes, values of decision that are taken at
some point in the past (past events) or hypothetical rule condition. Subjects’,
objects’ and environments’ attributes are involved in the conditional premise to
be evaluated to true where they question for subject, object or environment at-
tributes’ themselves. The examples 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 describe these sort of
conditional premise sequentially.
Example 6.2 (Subjects’ attributes condition) A subject can be any actor that deal
with the system ( e.g. user, software. etc.) Each subject in a system has some
identified attributes those required to verify and recognise a particulate subject
rather than other subjects in the system. The below rule shows the subjects’
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attribute condition when the age of a subject that perform an action on an object
must be greater than 30 years.
consequence (s, o, a) when (s.age > 30)
Example 6.3 (Objects’ attributes condition) A object can be any resource (target)
that a subject deal with ( e.g. file, door. etc.). Each object in a system has some
identified attributes those required to verify and recognise a particulate object
rather than other objects in the system. The below rule shows the Objects’ at-
tribute condition when the size of an object that perform an action on by a subject
must be greater than 10kb.
consequence (s, o, a) when (o.size > 10000)
Example 6.4 (Environments’ attributes condition) The environments’ attributes
indicate to the system attributes, e.g. the current date. The below rule shows
the date of the event must be at 01.01.2012 to perform an action.
consequence (s, o, a) when (system.date = 01.01.2012)
Example 6.5 (Event condition) Another important IT management requirement is
a consideration of the specification of history-based policies [51]. For example, the
requirement “if a user at some point in the past has read file (A) that is secret
then the same user cannot write to file (B), otherwise the user can write on file
(B)” can be expressed by the use of a conditional in premise. This is considered in
the expression of a large class of security requirements, including dynamic policies
such as the Chinese Wall Policy [25]. These sorts of conditions express as the past
event conditions. Thus, considering event condition on the state of the system
or on the history of the execution is essential (e.g. in military system). The
below rule shows the event condition when the subject (Alice) had read the object
(open.txt), a subject (s) in the rule can then perform an action (a) on an object
(o).
consequence (s, o, a) when (done(Alice, open.txt, read))
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Example 6.6 (hypothetical rule condition) Hypothetical access is also important
IT management requirement. For example, the requirement “if a user can read
file (A) that is secret then the same user cannot write to file (B), otherwise if not
can write on file (B)” can be expressed by the use of a condition in premise. This
is considered in the expression of a large class of security requirements, including
dynamic policies such as the Chinese Wall Policy [25]. These sorts of conditions
express as the hypothetical rule conditions. Thus, considering hypothetical rule
condition is essential in such systems. e.g. military system. The below rule
shows hypothetical rule condition when the subject (Alice) can read the object
(open.txt), a subject (s) in the rule can then perform an action (a) on an object
(o).
consequence (s, o, a) when (allow (Alice, open.txt, read))
Independent and Dependent Condition
The premise context is conceivable for the classifying independent or dependent
rules. The premise classification is involved to be used for the policy decompo-
sition [See Chapter 7, Section 7.2]. We classify a rule to be independent, when
no condition is involved in the rule or all conditions in condition set are being
independent conditions. On the other hand, when one dependent condition in
premise is found the rule is classified as dependent rule. The subject and envi-
ronment attribute conditions are always classified in our analysis as independent
conditions where these attributes can be found internally (in the same domain).
In this case, the local PIP in a DENAR can provide these attributes and then
make the authorisation decision. However, in case of object and event attribute
and hypothetical rule condition’s evaluation, these attribute values can be located
in the same or different domains thus, the conditions evaluation may involve two
or more DENARs in the network. [For more detailed see Section 6.3.3]
6.3 Collaborative DENAR Analysis
In the centralised enforcement approach all interactions between users and sys-
tem resources are controlled and observable by the centralised PDP where there
is no coordination. However, in the network of DENARs where multiple PDPs
Chapter 6. Analysis 97
are involved, the coordination is a key to collaborate PDPs for an enforcement
decision. The collaborative DENARs can be synchronised which is important
when controlling usage limits for resources across the distributed system, or dy-
namic constraints, such as the mutual exclusion requirements found in the well
known Chinese Wall policy [25] and dynamic separation of duty constraints [83].
In the following, we addresses how a domain scope can indicate to subsystems and
logically how the collaborative DENARs is achieved.
6.3.1 Domain Scope
In large-scale systems, domains provide a practical solution for PBM system where
specifying a policy for individual object is difficult to be managed in PBM system
[41]. Sloman et. al [41] define a domain as a group of objects in a large system
based on geographical boundaries, object type, responsibility or authority. For
large-scale systems, therefore, specifying a policy for a particular domain (a group
of objects that share the same interest) propagates scalability for managing PBM.
In decentralised access control when multiple domains are involved, the access
control in a domain is independently maintained from other domains (one PDP is
involved for each domain but there is no collaboration between PDPs). Specifying
policies based on this technique results in difficulties for solving a policy conflict
between domains especially when Bell-LaPadula Model (Multilevel Security) [66]
or Chinese-Wall [25] policies are involved and are not enforced correctly. Ideally,
a PBM system may involve multiple PDPs to improve the access control decision
making performance.
Definition 6.1. A domain is a collection of objects governed by the same geographi-
cal boundaries, object type, responsibility or the level of security or authority those
may grouped from different systems.
Grouping objects in a large system into domains is useful. Unlike Ponder policy
language, in our Decentralised PBM, we use the domain scoping in the policy
decomposition where it being after all policies are specified and all dependency
between policies are detected as well and then the policy decomposition that based
on the objects domains is performed. In Ponder policy language, the specification
is based on the objects domains.
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In addition, we can configure one PDP in DENAR to be responsible for enforcing
the policies for one or more domains. The Decentralised PBM that has collab-
orative DENARs can share a single decision by multiple PDPs in the system.
Therefore, according to our Decentralised PBM framework, policy decomposition
step is after the policy specification to solve the policy conflicts from policy ab-
straction level and then the domain consideration being in policy decomposition.
Clearly, our Decentralised PBM framework does not solve the policy conflation
where it must be solved in the policy specification step.
Figure 6.5: Network Domains.
The Figure 6.5 shows distributed domains in a network by circles where each circle
contains one or more objects those grouped in same interest. Network administra-
tors manage a distributed hierarchy of domain objects and support the efficient of
controlling access by involving DENAR. The domain service can be implemented
in our Decentralised PBM as in Ponder [32] using Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol [43] .
6.3.2 Collaborative DENAR Decision
In this section, we show how the enforcement of static and dynamic policies can
impact the potential problems that can occur when multiple PDPs are imple-
mented. Also, we extend the approach in [53] to define sufficient constraints on
the concurrency of the distributed PDPs to avoid conflicts.
In order to coordinate DENARs, the access control policy firstly defines the con-
ditional attributes which need to be coordinated. Finally, it specifies the param-
eters for the conditional attribute updation - that specifies when the conditional
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attribute should be updated. The above be achieved by rules refinement to com-
plement each rule that needs coordination in this manner. We introduce Pull
Model for retrieving the conditional attribute and Push Model for updating the
conditional attribute by an obligation. [See Chapter 7, Section 7.2. for policy
refinement]
We base DENAR coordination on the UCON model [78], allowing for per, on-
going and post authorisation control of long standing interactions. In addition,
we provide a semantics in Interval Temporal Logic [74] for the dynamic policies
in a motivation example [See Chapter 6, Section 6.4] for the Chinese Wall [25]
policy. We use the controller that presented in [53] for the static policy to avoid
the conflicts with the respect of DENAR’ decision. Additionally, we involve the
concept of obligations discussed earlier wherein a PDP sends a PEP instructions
on obligations that need to be necessarily fulfilled on execution of the request.
The obligation element specifies the actions to be taken by the PEP, rather than
the PDP, since it is at the PEP that the action is actually executed.
The development of a semantic model to express dynamic policies, viz. policy that
can change over time and on the occurrence of event (e.g the Chinese Wall Policy
[25]), and their distributed enforcements in distributed systems are the underpin-
nings of our research. Our collaborative DENARs is built on the formal policy
model investigated in [53] and [55]. To meet the challenges, a sound theory of
policy decomposition is developed, taking into account the limitation of involving
multiple PDPs without considering the coordination for the dynamic policy en-
forcement where a PDP in DENAR may require conditional attributes from other
DENARs in different domain.
The enforcement in access control system must to be stateful and maintain at-
tributes that influence future control decisions to meet the requirements especially
when some policies are involved, such as the Chinese Wall Policy [25] or Clark-
Wilson [28]. Park et.al. [78] provide in Usage Control (UCON) model far reaching
flexibility for access control specifications where the notions of mutable attributes
are proposed. Using mutable attributes for these policies can be expressed, or the
number of users concurrently accessing a resource can be limited where attributes
can change their values based on the previous accesses that are initiated by users
[53]. [See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.5 Usage Control (UCON) for more details].
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6.3.2.1 Independent Rule Decision
In UCONA, preA0 (pre-authorisation) policy is specified to be enforced without
pre-updates attribute. Therefore, we can classify this sort of policy as the indepen-
dent policy where immutable attributes are evaluated. Therefore, the enforcement






Figure 6.6: Static PDPcontroller.
The state check evaluates the request against a particular policy.
6.3.2.2 Dependent Rule Decision
preA1 (pre-authorisation) policy is specified to be enforced with attribute on-
updates (mutable attributes) before the access takes place. In addition, preA3
(pre-authorisation) policy is specified to be enforced with attribute post-updates
(mutable attributes) after the access is taking place. We design Pull Model to
retrieve these attributes to the PDP [See Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1 for Pull Model].
Therefore, we can classify this sort of policy as the dependent policy. The PDP
that enforces the dependent policy can also perform update action for these at-
tributes to the same PDP or other PDPs for the access decision in Push Model
[See Chapter 8, Section 8.3.2 for Push Model]. Therefore, the PDP will be stated
as the Figure 6.7 below illustrate.
The states of the PDP are states PDPcontroller = idle, check, allowed. The
behaviour of a PDPcontroller is then defined as:








Figure 6.7: Dynamic PDPcontroller.
ϕ idle,p =̂ PDPcontrollerp(idle, {Einitp , Edenyp , Erdyp}, {Ereqp}) (1)
ϕ check,p =̂ PDPcontrollerp(check, {Ereqp}, {Epullp}∗, {Epushp}∗,
{Epermitp , Edenyp}) (2)
ϕ allowed,p =̂ PDPcontrollerp(allowed, {Epushp}∗, { Erdyp}) (3)
ϕ PDPcontrollerp =̂ StatesPDPcontrollerp = idle ∧ (ϕidle,p; ϕcheck,p;




In equation 2, the state check does explicitly perform pre-update actions for preA1
to modify the mutable attributes of the policy in the push event where these may
located in same domain or different domains. These update actions are part of
UCON policies and are defined as an obligation event on the state check. The
example of this case is a check of bank account balance before withdrawing.
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However, in equation 3, the state allowed does explicitly perform post-update
actions for preA3 to modify the mutable attributes of the policy in the push event
where these may located in same domain or different domains. The example of
this case is watching movies online where the access control is based on the usage
time against the credit balance.
The choice of involving push event in check or allowed state is based on the system
requirement where the push event does not occur in both states.
However, we take the view that the mutable attributes updates can be expressed
as the assignment for a set of attributes to new values. More complex update
activities can be introduced, which however complicates the model and its anal-
ysis when attributes can be shared between the DENARs for the various usage
processes.
6.4 Summary
This Chapter presented the DENAR analysis which is based on ITL. The analysis
presented in this work addresses these issues by providing analysis policy depen-
dency and the semantics of distributed PDPs. The DENAR analysis presented
here significantly extends approach [51], allowing for the enforcement of static and
dynamic policies in a decentralised manner where multiple PDPs can be coordi-
nated. We illustrated the syntax of ITL in terms of collaborative decisions for
dynamic policy, we explained the semantics, and demonstrated some examples.
As part of our contribution, we demonstrate how collaborative DENARs enforce
UCON (preA0, preA1 and preA3) pre-authorisation policies in a decentralised
manner where those policies may decompose into DENARs.
In Chapter 10, the evaluation shows that the policy classification into independent
and dependent policy rules and implementing the domain scope to enforce security
policies results in more efficient enforcement.
In the next Chapter, we propose a novel policy decomposition model for both






• Describe the policy decomposition.
• Provide a policy deployment model.
• Present algorithms for policy decomposition and deployment.
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7.1 Introduction
The policy decomposition and deployment are described in this Chapter. The
decomposition will make use of the policy analysis results (Chapter 6) and describe
the method to decompose a central policy into sub-policies and refine them to be
enforced in the collaborative DENARs. The policy deployment provides a way
of distributing sub-policies to different policy repositories based on the domains
scope.
The decomposition will make use of the policy analysis results (Chapter 6) and
describe
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 describes the pol-
icy decomposition. Subsection 7.2.1 explains a rule fragmentation and subsection
7.2.2 rule refinement. Section 7.3 describes the policy deployment to distributed
DENARs in the Decentralised PBM system. Finally, section 7.4 summarises the
Chapter.
7.2 Policy Decomposition
This section describes the method to decompose a central policy into sub-policies.
The policy decomposition is achieved by the rule fragmentation phase and the
rule refinement phase. In the rule fragmentation phase, the fragmentation is pro-
cessed which output the fragmented-rule where each rule controls only one object.
Moreover,in the rule refinement phase, the dependent and independent rules are
recognised and refined to be enforced in DENAR where the DENARs collabora-
tion are required in dependent rules enforcing. The rule refinement phase outputs
the sub-policies.
Once the decomposition is complete, the sub-policies are deployed into their cor-
responding DENARs. In Figure 7.1 illustrates the central policy is being input in
the policy decomposition. The green rectangles show the output of each phase.
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Figure 7.1: Policy Decomposition Phase and Policy Deployment Phase.
7.2.1 Rule Fragmentation
The specification of policy is being a prerequisite and input for the proposed rule
fragmentation. The rule is fragmented according to object set that is reference in
a policy scope. The fragmentation method is achieved by the idea of controlling
only one object in a fragmented-rule that is generated from the rule.
According to the SANTA policy language we are used, the policy scope in defines
to which subjects, objects and actions the policy applies to. The scope of a policy
is presented in the syntax using the keywords S, O and A, that represent the set
of subjects, the set of objects and the set of actions of a policy. The scope of a
policy affects the rules contained in that policy. The subject, object and action in
each rule definition must be within the scope of the policy (s ∈ S, o ∈ O and a ∈
A).
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Often rules apply to more than one subject, object or action. To achieve the ob-
jective of the policy decomposition, fragmenting the rules for the different objects
in the O can be used to reference only one object per rule. For example, given
that the scope of the policy is:
S = {s} and O = {o1, o2, ..., on} and A = {read}
The requirement to unconditionally grant subject(s) in the scope of the policy the
right to perform read on all objects , would require the definition of n rules:
rule :
∀o ∈ O [[ allow (s,O, read) when true]]
Using the keyword O is instantiated to mean the conjunction of:
rule :
[[ allow (s, o1, read) when true]] ∧
[[ allow (s, o2, read) when true]] ∧
/. . . . . . / ∧
[[ allow (s, on, read) when true]]
on is the last object in the object set.
Also, the objects set may include all objects in the rule which are controlled
or required. For example, given that a CONTROLS(x) of the policy and a
REQUIRES(Y ) are:
rule :
allow (S, x, read) when done (S, y, read)
where S = {s} and O = {x, y}
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The object x is controlled and object y is required in this rule where no fragmen-
tation is applied here. The use of the rule fragmentation has the advantage that
it allows the decomposition for the same rule into sub-policies based on the object
domain.
Case1, A one object is isolated in the object set and therefore no fragmentation
for this case. The rule is ready for the next phase (refinement phase) in the policy
decomposition. Thus, according to early example 6.1 [in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1],
rule1 can be expressed in SANTA without fragmentation as:
rule1 :
allow (S,O, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride} and O = {regulation.txt}
The fragmentation result for rule1 :
allow (S, regulation.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
No fragmentation just matching object O with its object set in the policy scope.
Case2, for the set of objects, the set of objects is defined and includes a number
of objects those located in a same domain or different domains in the system.
Thus, the object set can be fragmented based on their domains. In following, we
eliminate the object set by the fragmentation method which generates new rule
for each object in the object set for the policy scope.
rule2 :
allow (S,O, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride, Adam,Alice} and
O = {open.txt, close.txt, transfer.txt}
The fragmentation result for the rule2 is:
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rule2.1 :
allow (S, open.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride, Adam,Alice}
rule2.2 :
allow (S, close.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride, Adam,Alice}
rule2.3 :
allow (S, transfer.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fiona, Fride, Adam,Alice}
Based on the object set in the policy scope for this rule that include three objects,
the fragmentation method produces three rules where each rule controls only one
object.
Case3, for the set of objects that includes CONTROLS (O) and REQUIRES (o)
objects, the fragmentation method eliminates the object set by generates new rule
for each controlled object in the object set for the policy scope.
rule3 :
allow (S,O, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona, Fride} and
O = {open.txt, close.txt, transfer.txt, regulation.txt}
The fragmentation result for rule3 is:
rule3.1 :
allow (S, open.txt, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
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rule3.2 :
allow (S, close.txt, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
rule3.3 :
allow (S, transfer.txt, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
rule3.4 :
allow (S, regulation.txt, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
Algorithm for fragmentation based on the cases above, a simple fragmentation
algorithm is given, as outlined by the following pseudo-code:
Algorithm 1 Rule Fragmentation
Require: central policy (P )
1: Begin
2: Load P
3: for each r in P do
4: r′ = r
5: for each o in {O} for r′ do
6: obj = o
7: remove all objects in {O}
8: insert obj in {O}
9: RuleID = sequential number
10: add RuleID into r′
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The above algorithm performs the fragmentation of rules for the central policy
(P). According to the number of objects in object-set (O), the fragmented rules
are produced. Moreover, the RuleID is added as identifier of the new rules. The
algorithm output copies the new rules into fragmented-rule repository where each
rule controls only one object in its object-set to be ready for the next phase (Rule
Refinement).
7.2.2 Rules Refinement
According to the discussion in Chapter 6, the IT requirements meet the impor-
tance of involving the dependent (dynamic) and independent (static) policies. The
needs of dependency between rules is explored in Chinese-Wall [25] and highlighted
in the example 6.1 (in particular rule3 ). The conditions’ context (premise) is con-
ceivable for the classifying independent or dependent rules. Clearly, refinement
analysis classifies subject attributes’ and environment attributes’ that structured
in a conditional premise into an independent condition. On the other hand, the
rule that its conditional premise asking for object or past event attributes’ is
considered as the independent or dependent condition based on objects domain
location. The conditional premise classifications are involved to be used for the
refinement rule method [See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2 for the conditional premise
classification].
7.2.2.1 Refinement Analysis
The analysis in this section is expressed to only one rule that loaded from the
fragmented policies sequentially that is going to be refined. Refinement algorithms
follow two goals: first, to ascertain that the condition premise (condition context)
does in fact match the condition premise classification in question. If it does,
the algorithms proceed to refine the rule into independent or dependent rule.
Consequently, each condition in the independent or dependent rule must show
the type of signalling, viz. where the condition attribute values are founded and
retrieved in local or remote domain. If the condition premise does not match the
first condition premise class, the next condition premise class can then be tried.
In the following subsection we show how our refinement analysis is processed in
steps. [See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2 for the independent or dependent rule].
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• Matching Condition Premise Class
The first step in the rule refinement method is to load the first rule from the
fragmented-rule repository (the output of the rule fragmentation phase) to
the refinement algorithm. [See Section 7.2.2.2 and Section 7.2.2.3]. Then, the
matching of condition premise class (independent or dependent) is the recog-
nition procedure that required for choosing appropriate refinement method.
Basically, to identify the condition premise class matched for condition in a
rule, the condition premise is compared to every the condition premise class
till the match is found or until there are no further classes to compare to.
Based on the policy language is used, the order of the condition premise in
a rule may be presented differently.
For all rules fragmented-rule repository, the condition premise must be matched.
However, in the case of unmatched condition premise, human intervention
becomes essential. The unmatched condition premise possibly may be caused
by errors in the policy specification or a new condition premise class those
not defined. The refinement algorithms show how condition premise can
match its corresponding condition premise class. [See Section 7.2.2.2 and
Section 7.2.2.3]
• Mapping Objects’ Domain
Mapping objects’ domain is the process for pointing into the domain for a
particular object by querying a reference table that reference objects’ do-
mains information. The domain can be a collection of objects governed by
the same geographical boundaries, object type, responsibility or the level
of security or authority. The query must only return one result domain or
nothing. An object that does not belong to any domain in the system will
result null for the query. Therefore, the null result drops the current rule and
loads the next rule from the fragmented-rule repository and then notifies the
system administrator about that rule.
The assumption that every object is located in a domain where:
Mapping Objects′ Domain
Domainof : object(1) 7→ domain(D1)
Domainof : object(6) 7→ domain(D3)
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Figure 7.2: Network Domains.
Domains′ PIPs
PIPof : domain(D1) 7→ PIP (PIP1)
PIPof : domain(D3) 7→ PIP (PIP3)
Therefore, each rule in fragmented-rule repository has a single object and
is therefore mapped to a single domain and also each domain maps a single
Policy Information Point (PIP).
Thus, realising the object-domain for early stage is involved to determine if
the condition is classified as independent or dependent condition and also
recognise the Policy Information Point for a particular domain.
7.2.2.2 Refinement Independent Rule Method
In such cases, the conditions inside condition premise in question can split into
branches those are based on the sort of the condition attributes. Without changing
the execution flow, the subject and environment attribute conditions are repre-
sented by local condition signal, viz. finding these attributes internally (in the
Policy Information Point PIP within same domain). Thus, in those cases, only
enforcement process is obtained for the local condition signals and the decision,
thus, these conditions referenced as default conditions in our method i.e. no coor-
dination. The example 7.2 and 7.3 show this result.
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Example 7.2: Suppose a rule that saying the subjects (Adam and Alice) can
read the resource (open.txt) without any restrictions so the rule is expressed in
SANTA as:
allow (S, open.txt, read) when true
where S = {Adam,Alice}
Example 7.3: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fiona, Fride) can read
the resource (open.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject age must be above 30
years. 2) The access must be at the first day of 2012. So the rule is expressed in
SANTA as:
allow (S, open.txt, read) when ((S.age > 30) and (system.date =′′ 01.01.2012′′))
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
Moreover, in some cases, an object that is controlled in a rule is located in the
same or different domain location of the object attribute that is required in the
condition. Thus, by mapping the object-domain for both controlled and required
objects and comparing the domains, in one hand, if they are same, it is processed
as independent condition; otherwise, it is processed as dependent condition.
Clearly, a condition that asking for the past event that happen on particular object
where this object can in the same or different domain of the controlled object in
the rule. Thus, by comparing the domain of the object for the past event and the
domain for the object that is controlled in the rule, in one hand, if they are same,
it is processed as independent condition. On the other hand, it is processed as
dependent conditional.
Example 7.4: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fiona, Fride) can read
the resource (close.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject has read (open.txt)
resource in the past. 2) The (open.txt) resource size must be greater than 10000
bytes. So the rule is expressed in SANTA as:
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allow (S, close.txt, clear) when
sometime done (S, open.txt, read) and ((open.txt).size > 10000))
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
We show in the example 7.4 the refinement of independent condition where the
condition premise has two conditions. The first condition branch is match the
event condition attribute where it is might be dependent or independent condition.
In addition, the second condition branch is match the object condition attribute
where it is might be dependent or independent condition. However, by comparing
the object domain location for the object (close.txt) of the rule and the object
domain location that required in the condition (open.txt), we assume these objects
are located in a same domain, thus, the two conditions are classified as independent
condition i.e. default condition.
Therefore, our model can rewrite the rule as shown below to illustrate the signaling.
The symbol (@) indicates to the local signal and default condition where the PIP
(PIP5 ) is presented to reference the located PIP for the attribute. The refinement
of independent condition for above policy is:
allow (S, close.txt, read) when
(@PIP5 sometime done (S, open.txt, read)) and
(@PIP5 (open.txt).size > 10000))
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
Algorithm for refinement Independent Rule Method: Based on the dis-
tinction between condition premise classifications in a rule, refinement rule algo-
rithm for independent rule is first match the condition premise (in line 6) and
adds default indicator (@) for the subject and environment conditional (in line
7). Moreover, for object and past event conditional (in line 8), it checks the do-
main location for the object that controlled (o) in the rule and the object for each
condition premise (requiredObj ) (in line 13). Therefore, if object and past event
conditional is independent, adding the default indicator into its condition with
the PIP for the domain (in line 15). Finally, it copies the rule (r’) into the sub-
policies repository. The condition that does not include the indicator means that
is dependent conditional which is refined in the next algorithm for the dependent
rules. The algorithm is outlined by the following pseudo-code :
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Algorithm 2 Rule Refinement (Independent Rule)
Require: fragmented− rule repository
1: Begin
2: Load rules from fragmented− rule repository
3: for each r in fragmented− rule repository do
4: r′ = r
5: for each condition branch c in r′ do
6: if c match subject or environment class then
7: add @ before c
8: else
9: o = the controlled object in r′
10: controlledObjDomain = findDomain(o)
11: requiredObj= the required object in c
12: requiredObjDomain = findDomain(requiredObj)
13: if controlledObjDomain = requiredObjDomain then
14: controlledObjPIP = findPIP (controlledObjDomain)




19: copy r′ into sub− policies repository
20: end for
21: End
7.2.2.3 Refinement Dependent Rule Method
The object attribute condition is represented by local or remote condition signals.
The remote condition signals signify to object attributes where object attribute
condition is located in different domain from the object that controlled in the
rule. The condition attribute values are retrieved by a coordination process, viz.
communicated with other PIPs to get the values.
Moreover, according to the importance of the consideration of history-based poli-
cies [3] for the IT management in previous section, the past event conditional
attribute is proposed as the object conditional attribute that can be independent
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or dependent based on the domain location for the object that controlled in the
rule and the domain that the past event happened in.
Example 7.5: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fiona) can read the re-
source (close.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject has read (regulation.txt)
resource in the past. 2) The (regulation.txt) resource size must be greater than
10000 bytes. So the rule is expressed in SANTA as:
allow (S, close.txt, clear) when
(sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read) and ((regulation.txt).size > 10000)))
where S = {Fiona}
We show in example 7.5 the refinement of dependent condition where the condition
premise has two conditions. The first condition branch is match the past event
condition attribute where it is can be dependent or independent condition. In
addition, the second condition branch is match the object condition attribute
where it is can be dependent or independent condition. However, by comparing
the object domain location for the object (close.txt) of the rule and the object
domain location that required in the condition (regulation.txt), we assume these
objects are located in different domains, thus, the two conditions are classified as
dependent condition.
Therefore, our method rewrites the rule as shown below to illustrate the signaling.
The symbol (#@) indicates to the remote signal where the PIP (PIP9 ) is presented
to reference the located PIP for its domain. The refinement of dependent condition
for above policy is:
allow (S, close.txt, clear) when
(#@PIP9 sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read))) and
(#@PIP9 (regulation.txt).size > 10000)))
where S = {Fiona}
The coordination process leads us to propose Push and Pull Models that involved
to query the objects’ or past events’ attributes those are presented as remote
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signal in the condition premise. (Push and Pull Models are provided in Chapter
8, section 8.3)
However, the independent condition is classified as default condition where only
enforcement process is obtained the local condition signal and the decision. In our
decision making, the default conditions (local condition signal) are always being
checked first before dependent conditions are evaluated, thus, to avoid the over-
head communications. The dependent conditions attributes always be founded in
different domains (different PIPs), thus, it requires coordination process to retrieve
those attributes for the evaluation. Moreover, if any of independent condition at-
tributes’ are evaluated to false then no need for the coordination process (remote
condition signals) to be run for evaluating dependent condition attributes’. The
coordination process is run for both Pull and Push Models which are described in
(Chapter 8, section 8.3, Coordination Mechanism).
Algorithm for Refinement Dependent Rule Method:
Based on the distinction between condition premise classifications in a rule, refine-
ment rule algorithm for the dependent rule is first load rules from the sub-policies
repository (in line 2). Then, it checks if the indicator (@) does not exist that
means it is dependent so be refined in this algorithm (in line 5). Thus, it checks
the domain location for the object that controlled in the rule and the object for
each condition premise. If they are not similar (in line 10), the condition is depen-
dent and then find a PIP for the domain (in line 11 and 12). Then, it provides the
choice for the Pull or Push Models where in Pull adding remote indicator (#@)
before the condition (in line 14), on the other hand , adding obligation in Push
Model (in line 17). The algorithm is outlined by the following pseudo-code :
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Algorithm 3 Rule Refinement (Dependent Rule)
Require: sub− policies repository
1: Begin
2: Load rules from sub− policies repository
3: for each r in sub− policies repository do
4: for each condition branch c in r do
5: if c not include @ then
6: o = the controlled object in r
7: controlledObjDomain = findDomain(o)
8: requiredObj= the required object in c
9: requiredObjDomain = findDomain(requiredObj)
10: if controlledObjDomain ! = requiredObjDomain then
11: controlledObjPIP = findPIP (controlledObjDomain)
12: requiredObjPIP = findPIP (requiredObjDomain)
13: if coordination mechanism is Pull then
14: add #@ requiredObjPIP before c
15: else
16: requiredObjPDP = findPDP (requiredObjDomain)








Strictly speaking, deployment does not constitute a part of the decomposition
method. However, deployment of the sub-policies is great importance to the ap-
proach as a whole. After policy decomposition has been completed, the sub-policies
are distributed to their domains. Thus, for the Decentralised PBM, the generated
sub-policies are being activated and the central policy is deactivated. On the other
hand, for the other reason for switch to Centralised PBM approach, the central
policy is activated for the DENAR that configured to be the central enforcement in
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case of reconfiguring a system or on longer need for Decentralised PBM. Therefore,
re-propagation and recovery can be achieved. [See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3].
However, rules deployment is based object domain location where the decompo-
sition method eliminates the object set to control only one object in each rule.
Consequently, finding the object domain location and deploying a rule in its do-
mains’ policy repository (PR) is become uncomplicated. Deployment algorithm is
outlined by the following pseudo-code:
Algorithm 4 Policy Deployment
Require: sub− polices repository
1: Begin
2: Load r from sub− polices repositry
3: for each r in sub− polices repositry do
4: obj = o of r
5: domain = FindObjectLocation(obj) {f}inding the domain location for the
object.
6: PR = FindPolicyRepository(domain) {f}inding the policy repository for
the domain.
7: if PR = null then
8: create new Policy Repository for the domain and then store r in Policy
Repository
9: else





We proposed in this Chapter that the central policy is decomposed into sub-policies
according to object domains and then distributed to corresponding DENARs
in policy deployment. Fragmentation and refinement methods are described in
SANTA syntax and algorithms for the policy decomposition. The fragmentation
method described for decomposing the policy into sub-policies where each rule
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controls only one object. The refinement method refines the rule to indicate the
location of PIPs those store conditional attributes. The local indicator shows the
local condition signal to find these attributes internally in the same domain. The
remote indicator shows the remote condition signal to find these attributes remote
domains. In addition, the policy deployment is detailed in algorithm.
The implementation and evaluation of policy decomposition and deployment are
not implemented in the DENAR prototype; therefore, not evaluated. The policy
decomposition and deployment algorithms are easy to develop in any programming
languages. Instead the algorithms where applied manually to decompose and refine
the policies used for evaluation.
In the next Chapter, the DENAR enforcement and coordination mechanism in-
volve the output of this Chapter where the sub-policies are decomposed and de-
ployed in their DENARs. The next Chapter describes the DENAR enforcement





• Show how the network of DENARs interacts to enforce policies.
• Provide a coordination mechanism for DENAR enforcement.
• Identify the DENAR properties.
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8.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents the DENAR enforcement and coordination models. Enforc-
ing security policy in distributed PDPs can not meet the security access control re-
quirements without considering the need of coordination between these distributed
PDPs. The coordination need is clear in involving History Based Policy (HBP) in
Decentralised PBM for access control decision. For enforcing History Based Policy
(HBP), DENAR is required to have the ability to observe events and previous de-
cisions in order to make a current decision which are in some cases being enforced
by other DENARs. Thus, the access control decision making can be improved by
identifying a local domain decision and remote domain decision.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 describes the
policy enforcement model in DENAR. Subsection 8.2.1 models the local domain
decision where the subsection 8.2.2 models the remote domain decision. Section
8.3 describes DENAR coordination mechanisms. Subsection 8.3.1 describes a Pull
Model decision where the subsection 8.3.2 describes Push Model those fulfill the
coordination needs between collaborative DENARs). Section 8.4 highlights the
DENAR’s properties and show how these are achieved (in particular synchronisa-
tion, concurrency and security). Finally, section 8.5 summarises the Chapter.
8.2 Policy Enforcement in DENAR
In this section, we present a simple scenario that shows the relevant dependent
(dynamic policy) and independent policy (static policy) enforcement in our Dis-
tributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) and its components interac-
tions to make a policy decision.
There are two types of policy decision which are local domain decision and remote
domain decision. The local domain decision details the interaction between the
DENAR components where no need for communicate other DENARs in the net-
work. The remote domain decision details the interaction between the DENAR
components themselves and other DENARs components where communicating
other DENARs in the network is essential to make policy decisions. During the
authorisation process, the DENAR receives an authorisation request from a PEP.
Then, a PDP retrieves the policy for that request from the local PR. Thus, the
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local domain decision or remote domain decision can be made based on the rule
type (dependent or independent rule).
Sequence diagrams are used to explain both local decision where one DENAR
make the decision and also collaborative DENARs in the network those share the
decision.
8.2.1 Local Domain Decision
There are four cases to make a decision locally based on the independent rules
which are illustrated below.
Case1: when a rule has no restrictions (no condition premise). [See Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.2 for more details]
Example 8.1: Suppose a rule that saying: subject (Adam and Alice) can read the
resource (open.txt) without any restrictions. The rule is:
allow (S, open.txt, read) when true
where S = {Adam,Alice}
This rule is enforced locally by one DENAR because there is no condition premise.
Case2: a rule has restrictions (conditional premise) but the rule is an independent
rule where restrictions on subjects and environments only. [See Chapter 6, Section
6.2.2 for more details].
Example 8.2: Suppose a rule that saying: subjects (Fiona, Fride) can read the
resource (open.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject age must be above 30
years. 2) The access must be at the first day of 2012. The rule is:
allow (S, open.txt, read) when ((S.age > 30) and (system.date =′ 01.01.2012′))
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
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Case3: a rule has restrictions (conditional premise) and the rule is independent
rule where restrictions on objects, past events and hypothetical rule and those
conditional attributes can be found in local PIP, i.e. in the same DENAR. [See
Chapter 8, Section 8.3.2 for more details].
Example 8.3: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fiona, Fride) can read the
resource (close.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject has read (open.txt) re-
source in the past. 2) The (open.txt) resource size must be greater than 10000
bytes. The object domain location for the object (close.txt) of the rule and the
object domain location that evaluated in the condition (open.txt) are located in a
same domain, thus, these conditional attributes be founded in local PIP (let say
PIP1 ). The rule is:
allow (S, close.txt, read) when
(@PIP1 sometime done (S, open.txt, read)) and(@PIP1 (open.txt).size > 10000)
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
Case4: when a rule has no restriction but indicate to an obligation after the
decision made and the action is taking place. The decision value must be stored in
local PIP where this value is needed for other future decision in same DENAR (let
say is enforced and needed for PDP1 so stored in PIP1). This sort of enforcement
is detailed in Push Model. [See Chapter 6, Section 8.2.1.2 for more details]
Example 8.4: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fride) can read the resource
(open.txt) without any restrictions. The rule is:
rule1.1 :
allow (S, open.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fride}
rule1.2 :
oblig (PDP1, P IP1, S.read.open = true) when
always done (S, open.txt, read)
where S = {Fride}
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The below sequence diagram in Figure 8.1 is used to explain local decision where
one DENAR can make the decision locally.
Figure 8.1: Local Decision Sequence Diagram.
8.2.2 Remote Domain Decision
There are three cases to make a decision remotely based on the dependent rules
which are illustrated below.
Case1: a rule has restrictions (conditional premise) where the main rule is based
on another hypothetical rule that located in different DENAR (in a remote PR).
[See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2 for more details].
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Example 8.5: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fiona, Fride) can read the
resource (open.txt) with one restriction:-
the subject has authorisation to read the resource (open.txt) if and only if he/she
has the authorisation to read the resource (regulation.txt). In this case, the re-
source (regulation.txt) is located in different domain and the hypothetical rule
is deployed in remote PR and must evaluated by the remote PDP in different
DENAR. The rule is:
rule1 :
allow (S, open.txt, read) when allow (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Adam,Alice}
Case2: a rule has restrictions (conditional premise) and the rule is a dependent
rule where restrictions on objects and past events and those conditional attributes
can be found in Remote PIPs, i.e. in the different DENAR. This sort of enforce-
ment is detailed in the Pull Model. [See Chapter 8, Section for more details 8.3.1
].
Example 8.6: Suppose a rule that saying: subjects (Fiona, Fride) can delete the
resource (close.txt) with two restrictions:- 1) the subject has read (regulation.txt)
resource in the past. 2) The (regulation.txt) resource size must be greater than
10000 bytes. The object domain location for the object (close.txt) of the rule
and the object domain location that evaluated in the condition (regulation.txt)
are located in a different domain, thus, these conditional attributes be founded in
remote PIPs (let say PIP2 ). The rule is:
allow (S, close.txt, delete) when
(#@PIP2 sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read))) and
(#@PIP2 (regulation.txt).size > 10000)))
where S = {Fiona, Fride}
Case3: when a rule has no restriction but indicate an obligation after the decision
made and the action is taking plase. The decision must be stored in remote PIPs
where this value is needed for other future decision in different DENARs (let say
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is enforced by PDP2 and needed for PDP1 so stored in PIP1 ). This sort of
enforcement is detailed in Push Model. [See Section for more details 8.3.2 ]
Example 8.7: Suppose a rule that saying the subject (Fride) can read the resource
(regulation.txt) without any restrictions. The rule is:
rule1.1 :
allow (S, regulation.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fride}
rule1.2 :
oblig (PDP2, P IP1, S.read.regulation = true) when
always done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fride}
The below sequence diagram in Figure 8.2 is used to explain how collaborative
DENARs share information to make a decision.
8.3 DENAR Coordination Mechanisms
Realisation of IT management processes by means of policy rules relies on local
condition and coordination signals to acquire a particular decision. Hence, some
features of the coordination signal that is implicit to the local condition signal
definition need to be treated in a special manner. Thus, we propose Push and Pull
Models to the coordination signal that run to check the value located in different
DENARs. However, the Push and Pull Models are the coordination signals that
run when the local condition signal is running to communicate with remote PIP(s)
(in different DENARs) to check the value that needed to evaluate the condition.
However, to control rule enforcement for both techniques, the termination of the
action must be detected, and continuation of this enforcement must be facilitated
either the coordination signal is succeed to get the value or fail.
As these are not “local condition” signal but runtime-dependent messages originat-
ing in the policy enforcement infrastructure, they are called coordination signal.
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:PEP :Local PDP
1. send Auth_Request()
9. return Auth_Responce (decision)
2. find policy()
3. return policy
4.check policy has collaborative rules
4.1. call local PDPcoordinator remote decision
7.evaluate the policy against Auth_Request
10.check policy has obligation
10.1. log obligation in log file
8.perform the Auth_Responce
11. notify accessing()
11.1.check notification against obligation in log file
11.2. store notification locally
:Local PDPcoordinator :Local PIPcoordinator
4.3. return remote decision
4.2.contact PDPcoordinator remote 
PDPcoordinators for remote decision
5.check policy has conditions
6.1. find local attributes for conditions
6.2. return local attributes
6.3. call local PIPcoordinator to find remote attributes for conditions
6.4.contact PIPcoordinator remote 
PIPcoordinators for remote attributes
6.5. return local attributes
11.3. store notification remotely
Local PR Local PIP
Figure 8.2: Remote Decision Sequence Diagram.
Hence, an remote signal is used to signify the dependent condition in a rule. The
following Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 depict the difference between the local con-
dition signal and coordination signal where the refinement rules involves remote








Figure 8.3: Local Condition Signal.







Figure 8.4: Coordination Signal.
This is achieved by allowing the conditional attributes to have reference that indi-
cate to the local or remote signal where that based on the condition classifications
and attribute in question. Moreover, the conditional attributes that have remote
signal always use a Pull Model. However, the Push Model can be presented as
obligation that is added in a rule.
The acknowledgement is required to provide coordination for either Push or Pull
Model to request or provide some values those are evaluated in condition where
may be distributed over several PIPs. In essence, in the Push Model, the coor-
dination mechanism must be able to detect the execution of an action as well as
sending the acknowledgement of this execution to DENARs that needs this value
or associates with their enforcement. For the Pull Model, the coordination mech-
anism must be able to find the required attributes located in several PIPs, thus,
one or more signals are run and then they are evaluated in the condition premise.
Therefore, the execution of action is being made when these values are returned
back and evaluated.
The policy decision and enforcement process are based on information that orig-
inates inside or outside the process by the local condition or coordination signal.
Thus, this process and the policy action must be connected.
8.3.1 Pull Model
The Pull Model is used by a PDP to ask remote PIPs (those not located in the
same DENAR of the PDP) about a value that required in dependent condition to
complete the decision for a particular rule. By coordination mechanisms, remote
signal must be introduced in a condition premise for dependent conditions where
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the remote signal is introduced in the rule refinement method (See Chapter 7,
Section 7.2.2). This signal can be issued to mark the completion of requesting and
receiving all dependent conditional attributes, i.e. all conditional attribute must
be received and evaluated to true and then the action can be executed otherwise
the action cannot be executed.
Example 8.8 Suppose that there are dependent rules:
The subject (Fride) can read the resource (regulation.txt). In addition, the subject
(Fride) can delete the resource (close.txt) only if he has read the resource (regula-
tion.txt). According our refinement method, for rule1, the object (regulation.txt)
is located in (domain1 ), thus, rule1 should deployed into the policy repository
(PR1 ) for the (DENAR1 ) where it is enforced by (PDP1 ). Also, when the rule1
enforced and the subject (Fride) read the resource (regulation.txt), the decision
value is stored in (PIP1 ). In addition, for rule2, the object (close.txt) is located in
(domain2 ), thus, rule2 should deployed into the policy repository (PR2 ) for the
(DENAR2 ) where it is enforced by (PDP2 ). However, rule2 decision cannot made
without evaluating its condition where the attribute value is located in different
domain.
This rule1 and rule2 in Pull Model can be formalised in SANTA as:
rule1 :
allow (S, regulation.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fiona}
rule2 :
allow (S, close.txt, delete) when sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fiona}
In Figure 8.5, during the enforcement of rule2 by (PDP2 ), the reference (indicator)
in its condition premise shows that the value for condition context is existed in
(PIP1 ). The coordination signal is run (in step 3) to request the past event
attribute by (@PIP1) indicator. As the result of rule1 enforcement in the past
(in step 1), the PIPcoordinator for DENAR2 runs remote coordination signal to
return the decision value that made by (PDP1 ) in the past to (PDP2 ) in step 4.
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Actually, (PDP2 ) hold the decision till the requested value is returned in step 2.
Then, the action is executed if and only if the condition is evaluated to true.
Figure 8.5: Pull Model.
8.3.2 Push Model
The Push Model is used by a PDP to send a decision value that might be requesting
in future by other PDPs to save the overhead of communications between PDPs.
Thus, the obligation should be concerned to all such rules to coordinate this value
with other rules. To account for all remote signals in the Push communications
technique with other PDPs, either any policy language can support the obligation
be using (if available), or a synthetic, coordination signal must be introduced. This
signal can be issued to mark the completion of enforcing a rule, i.e. the action has
to be executed and then all values have to be sent to all PIPs those their PDPs
need the result of this event.
Example 8.9
By going back to the same example 8.7 scenario, the formalisation in SANTA in
the Push Model will be change to:
The rule1 is remain as its in rule1.1 and also a new obligation rule is produced in
rule1.2 that saying if the action of rule1.1 is performed then notify PIP2 about
this decision where the PDP2 will need it in the future.
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rule1.1 :
allow (S, regulation.txt, read) when true
where S = {Fride}
rule1.2 :
oblig (PDP1, P IP2, S.read.regulation = true) when
done (S, regulation.txt, read)
where S = {Fride}
rule2 :
allow (S, close.txt, delete) when
(@PIP2 sometime done (S, regulation.txt, read))
where S = {Fride}
In Figure 8.6, rule1 is enforced by PDP1 and then PDP1 obligates its decision to
the PIP2 by a coordination signal via PIPcoordinators (in step 1). The PIPcoor-
dinator for DENAR2 stores the value in PIP2 (in step 2). Therefore, when rule2
is enforcing, the PDP2 can find the value locally in PIP2 (in step 3) so that there
is no need to communicate the DENAR1 at the decision time of rule2.
8.4 DENARs Properties
DENAR’s properties are introduced in this section. Synchronisation and concur-
rency in enforcement describe the coordination and collaboration between DENARs.
Finally, the secrecy property describes the secure technologies that can be involved
in the DENAR.
8.4.1 DENAR’s Coordination and Synchronisation
As with all distributed systems, synchronisation and concurrency are major con-
siderations in the distributed enforcements design. The two terms are overlapping
and are almost synonymous. Synchronisation refers to the simultaneous access and
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Figure 8.6: Push Model.
updating of shared data between two threads or processes. Concurrency on the
other hand, refers to the efficiency with which a thread or process handles multi-
ple simultaneous requests made from one access control request. The Distributed
Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) is designed to be synchronised and
concurrent. [See Section 8.4.2 for concurrency]
When an access to a specified resource is requested, a policy that retrieved by the
PDP may first consult evaluation for object attributes or past decision against the
current values before make an access decision as restrictions (conditions).
Object and past decision attributes may stored in centralised repository (PIP),
thus, all PDPs access the repository to retrieve the conditional attributes value
but this idea in fact make the enforcement still centralised. On the other hand,
distributed repositories (PIPs) may be designed. In the first case, the conditional
attributes may be replicated across all PIPs on the network which would necessi-
tate the PDPs to continuously coordinate the values of their resources and past
decision attributes with each other. In other case, the conditional attributes may
be only deployed into a particular PIP that being configured for a particulate do-
main. The last case is being more efficient for less communication and resources
capacity.
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However at this point, the conditional attributes those located in the local PIP
(at DENARs’ PDP) are available to the PDP but other conditional attributes
are not. Therefore, we design PIPcoordinator component that instruct a PDP
to retrieve the remote conditional attributes from other PIPs. Moreover, the
component coordinates these values, where a decision is based on originating of
these values between PIPcoordinators in DENARs, viz. a sub-policy can be located
in a domain for which decision are being derived from a subject rights on other
objects located in another domain or decisions that have been made in the past
by other PDPs. Thus, the coordination can be done only by the PIPcoordinator
component. Remotely retrieving or coordinate conditional attribute values for
PDPs proposed to be done through Push and Pull Models those are designed in
(Section 8.3.1). Additionally, locally and remotely storing and updating of these
values in PIPs are proposed to be done through an obligation. Obligations are the
set of actions which a PEP is required to perform either before it has executed a
request, after it has executed a request or along with request execution. In this
case, an obligation updates a proper conditional attribute value once access has
been granted to a resource.
8.4.2 DENAR’s Concurrency
As we mentioned in previous section that concurrency refers to the efficiency
with which a thread or process handles multiple simultaneous requests made from
one access control request. Our Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture
(DENAR) is designed to be concurrent.
When an access to a specified resource is requested, a policy that is retrieved
by the PDP may consult for collaborative decision (e.g. hypothetical rule, see
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2) for more than one decisions those made in multiple
PDPs. In this case, the PDP that received the request from a PEP is being the
main decision point to make the final decision for the main request and other
PDPs those involved make other requests. Therefore, we design PDPcoordinator
component that instruct a PDP to communicate the remote PDPs for shared
decision. Moreover, the component act as requester for access decision where a
main decision is based on multiple decisions those made in remote PDPs and
originating to the PDPcoordinator component. Thus, the decision concurrency
can be done only by the PDPcoordinator component.
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8.4.3 DENAR’s Security
Each DENAR must be secure and also the communication between DENARs is
the network must be secure. The sub-policies in all PRs and conditional attributes
in PIPs may be encrypted. In addition, the communication between DENAR com-
ponents can be secured (e.g. using LDAP, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
for retrieving policy from PRs and retrieving conditional attributes from PIPs).
Finally, for the communication between PEPs and PDPs, the network adminis-
trator can implement a secure tunnel (e.g. using COPS protocol). Though COPS
provides for message level security for message integrity and protection, existing
protocols for security such as IPSEC [14] or TLS [35] may optionally be utilised
as a security measure to secure communications between the PDP and the PEP.
The COPS protocol also specifies certain requirements for fault tolerance which is
essential from a distributed application point of view. In order to achieve this, both
the PEP and the PDP are expected to communicate with each other periodically
using connection Keep Alive messages. If the PEP detects failure in the PDP it
should try to reconnect to a backup PDP and in the absence of a connection, should
revert to local decision making in order to minimise disruption. Once a connection
is re-established with a PDP, the PEP should synchronise all decisions taken in
its absence with it. Alternatively, the PDP may request this synchronisation. It
is desirable for the PEP to cache details of previous request decisions so that in
the event of the PDP failing it may continue to use these previous decisions for a
limited period of time till the PDP becomes active again.
However, hacking any DENAR does not affect other DENARs where each DENAR
access to its PR and its PIP.
8.5 Summary
This Chapter presented the enforcement and coordination models in DENAR. De-
signing the enforcement and coordination models, using the policy decomposition
and the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR), that enable en-
forcement of static and dynamic policies is one of the research objectives. Details
of their design and implementation, together with algorithm are given.
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Push and Pull models are proposed and detailed that provide the coordination and
collaboration between DENARs. The access control decision making is improved
by identifying local domain decision and remote domain decision. In addition, this
Chapter showed DENAR’s properties. Performance is improved by localised and
remote decision making, saving time during enforcement.
In Chapter 9 (section 9.3.3), the implementation of the enforcement and coordina-
tion models is provided. In Chapter 10, the evaluation showed that the Distributed
Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) is feasible to the enforcement of both static
and dynamic policies. The Push model was not evaluated in this research because
it would required design of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) to notify the PDP
for enforces an obligation which was not presented in the scope of this thesis.
The following Chapter shows the Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR)




• Develop a network of DENARs.
• Implement the DENAR prototype.
• Support the evaluation of the research.
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9.1 Introduction
The Distributed Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) prototype is developed to
test the security, performance, manageability and resilience of DENAR to enforce
access control policy. It consists of two parts; the DENAR network lab, software
design and implementation modules. It also describes how these interact to achieve
the research objectives.
The DENARs network lab at a technical level describes how the DENARs network
is created and configured. The second part describes how the XACML architecture
and the Sun XACML library are implemented in DENAR. In addition, it describes
how the server-client application that is simulating usage scenarios works and
how the DENAR (server) deals with the users (clients) request. Finally, enforce-
ment and coordination are implemented where DENARs can seamlessly handle
all communications and synchronisation among the various DENAR components
connected in the network.
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 introduces DENARs
network lab. Section 9.2.1 describes the design of DENARs network topologies in
Netkit and DENARs network domains and configuration is described in section
9.2.2. Section 9.3 describes the software design and implementation of DENAR.
Subsection 9.3.1 provides XACML architecture. In subsection 9.3.2, the server-
client application describes how the DENAR (server) deals with the users request
(client). Finally, subsection 9.3.3 describes all classes in the DENAR for the en-
forcement and coordination in DENARs network. Finally, section 9.4 summarises
the Chapter.
9.2 DENARs Network Lab
Setting up a network requires various equipment such as routers, switches, cables,
and machines. Facilities and utilities, installing and maintaining all these devices
in one lab is costly.
To avoid this expenditure and to create additional flexibility in the set up, this
research opted to simulate these devices and save time, effort and money. Network
simulation software is one solution to imitate the working of computers network.
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Netkit [81] is free and open source networks simulator. Netkit [81] was developed
by Roma Tre University and the Linux User Group LUG Roma. In Netkit, a vir-
tual network lab can be created by writing simple configuration files that describe
the topology and configurations of that network to be emulated on a single host
machine. The topology is the layout pattern that shows how the machines are
connected with each other in that network.
The DENARs network lab is created using Netkit package 2.8. This software con-
sists of; Netkit core package, Netkit file system package and Netkit kernel package.
These packages were obtained from (wiki.netkit.org/index.php/DownloadOfficial)
and installed on Ubuntu (Debian GUN/Linux) operating system. The Installation
instructions can be found in: (wiki.netkit.org/download/netkit/INSTALL).
We choose Netkit as it meets the requirements for our prototype implementa-
tion and can model the network at various levels of detail, allowing to run the
components of DAENAR implemented in Java.
9.2.1 Building DENAR Topologies in Netkit
DENARs network is divided into sub-networks or LANs (Local Area Network).
LAN refers to a group of computers connected together so that users can share
some resources such as files, printers etc. In this network, each LAN comprises
one DENAR (server), multiple resources and client machines. When a client re-
quests accessing to a resource, a (DENAR) enforces a authorisation policy for the
authorisation decision to the resource before performing the access action.
Figure 9.1 illustrates LAN1 in DENARs network. In this LAN, DENAR1 is the
server machine and pc1-1 is a client machine. The machines are connected with
each other using central router. This type layout represents a star topology. In
this topology, each machine is connected with the router with a cable. Failure in
any cable or any machine except the main router will not take down the entire
LAN [89].
In Netkit simulation software, configuring DENARs network topology requires
creating a file that describes the topology. The file that describes the topology of
the entire network lab is called (lab.conf) and it is provided in (Appendix A.1.2).
For each virtual machine in Netkit, there is an entry of two lines written in that
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Figure 9.1: LAN1 (Local Area Network) in DENARs Network.
file. For example, entry;
1 PC1 -1[mem ]=128
2 PC1 -1 [0]= lan1
Listing 9.1: Client (PC1-1) and LAN (LAN1) Configuration in Netkit
The entry creates a virtual machine PC1-1 with network interface eth0, and allo-
cates 128MB of memory for that machine to operate. Netkit also creates a virtual
router for that LAN and connects that machine to one port on that router.
In the DENARs network, the set up of virtual machines are provided in the “vir-
tual machine”.stratup files that echo the virtual machines and connect them to
the network.
1 pc1 -1. startup file
2 --------------------
3 echo ’send host -name "pc1 -1";’ >> /etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf
4 dhclient eth
5
6 and so on for other PCs
Listing 9.2: Virtual machine (PC1-1) set up in Netkit
9.2.2 DENARs Network Configurations
The client machines IP address can be configured manually. For each machine,
IP address is written in machines’ (.startup) file. This is not the best solution
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as it takes time. The network lab is designed to be scalable so that it can be
expanded with the most minimum configuration files editing. Using Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) can achieve that goal and provides more
realistic and professionalism to the network lab. It automatically assigns dynamic
IP address to the client machines whenever they connect to a DENAR (server).
For each DENAR machine, the DHCP configuration file is (dhcpd.conf). The
DHCP configures to allocates IP addresses within the range of IP addresses in
a LAN. These address ranges can be modified at any time to accommodate any
increase in the lab clients. Along with IP address, DHCP informs the clients
about their default gateway and name server. It offers an IP address for any
machine requesting IP address. If the machine accepts that offer, DHCP becomes
responsible for maintain that IP address for that machine as long as it is connected
to it [93]. Figure 9.2 illustrates the DENARs network that will be used in Chapter
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Figure 9.2: The DENARs Network.
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9.2.2.1 Domain Configuration
Domain Name System (DNS) provides naming service that translates IP addresses
to names, and vice versa [72]. For each LAN, there is a Name Server (NS) that
runs name series. Each LAN represents a domain or zone that can be represented
hierarchly. Figure 9.3 illustrates the hierarchy domain structure of the DENARs
network lab:
• .project represents the top domain which is served by the Gateway.
• .d1.project represents the subdomain (domain1) which is served by Router1.
• .d2.project represents the subdomain (domain2) which is served by Router2.
• .d3.project represents the subdomain (domain3) which is served by Router3.
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.d1.project Domain .d2.project Domain .d3.project Domain .d4.project Domain
.project Domain
Figure 9.3: The DENARs Network domains.
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Netkit configures and manages network domains by three files which are named.conf.local,
named.conf.option and db.root. [See Appendix A.1.1 for those files.]
9.3 Software Design and Implementation of DENAR
In this section, DENAR software is presented which involves the XACML frame-
work and policy language [76] in order to integrate a network of stateful, connected
DENARs which involve multiple PDPs, with XACML policy language [76] to en-
force a security policy.
While the network lab represents the infrastructure of DENARs network, we
choose XACML policy language for our implementation. The Sun XACML imple-
mentation is well known in business and widely used. Given the extensibility of
the DENARs prototype, it can possibly be implemented in far more complex and
industry relevant applications. The XACML policy is a stateful policy language
that is a subset of the SANTA language in terms of expressiveness.
The DENARs software is based on Sun’s XACML implementation [92] of the Oa-
sis Markup language (OASIS) [76]. Sun’s XACML Implementation [92] in Java
library of the OASIS standard allows a user to easily program a stateless stan-
dalone PDP which accepts requests encoded in the XML language and provides
a response based on the conditions specified in a relevant policy. This library im-
plements all the standard XACML features specified in the OASIS specification.
The programmers guide to the XACML implementation [92] provides an in-depth
account of how to work with and set up the XACML library. The core PDP used
in DENAR implementation is adapted from Sun’s sample implementation package
(which also contains the sun.xacml library) and adapted for use with the other
DENARs classes.
The class diagram in Figure 9.4 shows all classes in the system and the relation-
ships between these classes where all classes are presented and described in below
subsections.
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Figure 9.4: DENAR prototype class diagram.
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9.3.1 XACML Architecture
OASIS standard XACML architecture (See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3) was mod-
ified by [15] in a way that PDPs become easy to be deployed in the DENARs
network lab. Figure 9.5 depicts the DSP XACML framework that presented in
[15]. In Figure 9.5, the PDP becomes at the heart of the architecture instead
of context handler, context handler is moved inside the PDP [15]. This, on one
hand, increases the performance of handling authorisation requests, querying the
attributes, evaluating decisions, and providing authorisation responses. On the
other hand, this makes PDP to become portable and easy to be moved from one
location to another across the network [15]. Moreover,in [7], we modified XACML
architecture to provide synchronisation between multiple PDPs those enforce dy-
namic policies.
Figure 9.5: DSP XACML framework [15].
The PEP, in Figure 9.5, appears in the server application to be as close as possible
to the resources. User requests initially come from client to the server application.
PEP picks up the requests, sends them to the context handler in the PDP, and
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waits for the decisions. Decisions are sent from PDP to PEP wrapped inside
XACML response.
Sun XACML implementation consists of several packages for implementing PDP,
PEPs and any other XACML related component. The most important packages
are:
• com.sun.xacml is the core package. It contains PDP class, policy and
policy set handling, rule evaluation and target matching.
• com.sun.xacml.ctx is the package that defines XACML context schema
types such as request and response. It contains classes for encoding and
parsing XML context. The PEP can be built based on these classes.
• com.sun.xacml.combine is the package that supports all of the standard
combining algorithms. It also contains standard interfaces and abstract
classes for creating new combining algorithms. The combining algorithm
specifies the final access control decision of a policy. In SANTA, the combin-
ing algorithm is provided in term of decision rule. [See Chapter 3, Section
3.2.1.2]
• com.sun.xacml.attr is the package that supports all the standard XACML
attribute data types. It also contains standard interfaces and abstract classes
to define new attribute types.
• com.sun.xacml.finder represents the PAP and PIP. It contains classes for
retrieving policies, attributes not provided in the request for PDP.
DENAR software is implemented using Sun XACML implementation [92] and
the DSP XACML framework [15] and additional classes we built. However, DSP
XACML framework implements multiple PDPs but does not involve the PIPs
where as the DENAR prototype does.
9.3.1.1 Policy File, Request and Response
In order for PDP to evaluate authorisation decisions, policies must be available
in policy repository all the time for the PDP. DENAR enforces only one rule per
request from policy files, i.e. those stored in policy repository (PR). According to
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our decomposition model in Chapter 7, for each object in the system, there is a
rule that represents its authorisation statement. Rules in the policy file that are
implemented in our prototype are very simple. That is, each rule allows a user to
perform download action on the directory that he owns only. For example, user
(ali) can perform download action on (/hosthome/XACML-Project/users/ali) file.
Listing 9.2 shows the rule corresponding to user (ali). That rule has an ID (in first
line), which is an identifier used by PAP and PDP to classify the rules. It also has
an effect, which is Permit. The rules’ effect is the authorisation decision for the
requested authorisation access. The subject attribute, (in line 6), represents the
user name. The resource attributes, (in line 16 and 17), represents the resource to
be accessed. The actions attribute, (in line 26), specifies action.




5 <SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:string -equal">
6 <AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">ali
7 </AttributeValue >
8 <SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string"






15 <ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:string -equal">
16 <AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
17 /hosthome/XACML -Project/users/ali </ AttributeValue >
18 <ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string"






25 <ActionMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:string -equal">
26 <AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">Download
27 </AttributeValue >
28 <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string"
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Listing 9.3: Policy File in XACML
In a request, (ali) is the subject, (/hosthome/XACML-Project/users/ali) is the
resource, i.e. the object to be accessed, and (download) is the action to be per-
formed on that resource. The PEP passes these three values to the context handler
in the PDP.
The context handler generates a standard XACML request similar to that one
in Listing 9.3. The request must contain subject, resource and action attributes.
Then, it forwards the request to the PDP. The PDP uses subject attribute to
search for any applicable rule. If any applicable rule is found, the PDP compares
the resource and action attribute values of the applicable rule with the resource
and action attribute values of the request. If all values are matched, the request
is evaluated to true and the rule effect is returned. Otherwise, the PDP found no
applicable rule and in this case it returns NotApplicable.
1 <Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: context"
2 mlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance">
3 <Subject >
4 <Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: subject:subject -id"
5 DataType ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: data -type:rfc822Name">




10 <Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: resource:resource -id"
11 DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">




16 <Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: action:action -id"
17 DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">




Listing 9.4: Request File in XACML
According to the rule above, this request will be evaluated to true. The rule will
return its effect to the policy. The policy will return that value to the PDP which
in turn wraps it into an XACML response and sends it to the context handler.
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Since the applicable rule effect is Permit, this value will be placed in the decision
attribute of the XACML response and returned to the PEP to be enforced. Listing
9.4 shows the standard XACML response. In that response the decision attribute




3 <Decision >Permit </Decision >
4 <Status >




Listing 9.5: Response File in XACML
9.3.2 Client-Server Application
Client-Server application is a simple distributed Java application that allows users
to download files. It consists of two parts; server part (DENAR.java file, Appendix
A.2.3) and client part (client.java file , Appendix A.2.2).
The implementation in the paper [7] provides a library in Java which creates and
links a network of PDP’s in a peer to peer implementation. The library is provided
for the maintenance of state even for PDP’s that are stateless. The library also
contains classes for the generation of PEP nodes that automatically link with the
Overlay Network created and manage communication to and from the PDP. The
PEP is capable of connecting to more than one PDP if required and automatically
queries the backup PDP’s for a decision if the main active PDP fails. For the PEP,
the PDP’s appear to be one coherent system and the distribution and coordination
between the various PDP’s are completely hidden from it by the Overlay Network.
The chief characteristic of the overlay network is that it can be used to easily
convert existing standalone, stateless PDP’s into a network of stateful networked
PDP’s with minimal alteration in the existing PDP code.
By the same technique in [7], the network of DENAR can be implemented for the
event of any DENAR failing, thus, the library will dynamically reconfigure itself
to distribute the load among the other DENAR’s in the network. The reason for
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not undertaking the peer to peer implementation in this work is that we have
done that in [7]. However, in this work, we implements the network of DENAR by
client-server technique to evaluate the efficiency of enforcing static and dynamic
policy in distributed setting where integrating this work with the work in [7] would
be useful for the future work to offer more resilience in policy enforcement.
9.3.2.1 Client Class
The client part enables users to request (downloading) files after being authen-
ticated. The client application asks for username and password before allowing
users to make request. If the user is authenticated; he/she can perform the action
(download) to resources from the server (DENAR).














-- Connecting to the server
-- Requesting dwenload file
Figure 9.6: Client class.
Figure 9.7 illustrates flow chart process in the client class for the authorisation
request to download a file.
The client application requires a username or subject, action and resource which
is the destination file. It sends all these data to the DENAR (server) and waits for
authorisation decision. If NotApplicable or deny is returned, this means that the
user has no permission to perform the action on the destination file. Otherwise,
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Figure 9.7: Client class flow chart.
Permit will be returned and the user will be able to perform the action on that
file.
9.3.2.2 DENAR Class
The DENAR part, on the other hand, is responsible for; authenticating users, au-
thorising their request and enforcing authorisation decisions. This part is designed
to be a multi-threading application. Because it is acting as a server, it has to be
able to serve clients concurrently.
Using multi-threading, the server application is designed to create a connection
with each client, and keeps that connection alive as long as the client remains
connected. These connections must be reliable. That is, data must not be dropped
and must not arrive late on the client or out of order. This can be achieved using
sockets. A Socket is a bidirectional end point between two applications on the
network. Each program binds a socket to its end of the connection using local and
remote IP address and port numbers [44].
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-- Accepting client connection
-- Authentication
-- Calling PDP
Figure 9.8: DENAR Class.
Figure 9.9 illustrates a flow chart process in the DENAR class for the authorisation
response to download request. In order to connect the client to DENAR, a user has
to type the DENARs IP address (i.e. 192.168.20.1). The client application asks
the user to type his username and password. If this authentication information
was entered correctly, the user can now request access his files. (See Appendix
A.2.4 for tester class)
Instead of manually generating requests from each user, tester class is an auto-
matic code used to generate 50 requests from each user machine. This, on one
hand, saves time and efforts. On the other hand make the test more effective by
sending requests from each user to the PDP at the same time. It must be started
in conjunction with client application as follow:
1 java tester [server address] [username] [password] [seed] | java client
Listing 9.6: Connecting the client to DENAR
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Figure 9.9: DENAR class flow chart.
This command makes tester class to start the client application, and supply con-
nection, authentication and requests data to the client application on behalf of the
user. Since this application generates requests randomly, the seed value makes it
generate the same set of request by generating the same set of random numbers.
9.3.3 DENARs Enforcement and Coordination
In this subsection, the SimplePDP, ConstraintCheckerFunction, PIPcoordinator,
RemotePIPcoordinator and PIP classes are described where they provide the
DENARs policy enforcement and coordination.
9.3.3.1 SimplePDP Class
The SimplePDP class is the main class in the DENAR enforcement implementa-
tion. It extends the PDPConfig class. The SimplePDP class variables, operations
and responsibilities are shown in Figure 9.10.




+getXACMLDecision(subjectString: String ,resourceString: String ,actionString: String ): String
Responsibilities
-- Calling Sun XACML Library. 
-- Creating request.
-- Evaluating access request against a policy.
-- Creating response and send it back to the server.
-- Calling ConstrintCheckerFunction to evaluate conditions .
Figure 9.10: SimplePDP class.
SimplePDP.java file (Appendix A.2.5) represents the PDP of DENAR. Policy
Repository (PR) is the first component of the PDP to be created.
The SimplePDP extends the original PDPConfig class in order to implement a cus-
tom function getXACMLDecision(). This function is required to setup a policy
and attribute finders where they are imported from (com.sun.xacml.finder). Also,
it creates a PDP, receives a request file and creates a response file where being the
start task of the policy enforcement in DENAR. Since PDP understands XACML
requests in XML format only, the context handler is implemented to format such
requests. It is designed to formulate XACML request. It uses a template made of
string with three spaces; subject, resource and action. The context handler fills
these spaces with the values that come from the PEP to generate the XACML
request in XML format. An alternative way is by an XML file represents the stan-
dard XACML request. The context handler reads that file and replaces subject,
resource and action attributes with the same values come from the PEP. Instead of
receiving a request file, the function receives request attributes (subject, resource
and action) and creates the request which save a network bandwidth.
Sun XACML [92] defines a finder module (i.e. FilePolicyModule) to implement
the repository. This module specifies the location of policies which is usually XML
file. Instead of that, module is created and loaded with the DENAR policy file
Policy.xml.
The PolicyFinder represents the PAP. It is loaded by FilePolicyModule which rep-
resents the repository of policy. Effectively, it loads DENAR policy file. A brief
description of SimplePDP functions are as follows in below listing:
1 // Initialise and start PDP
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2 PDP pdp = new PDP(new PDPConfig(attrFinder , policyFinder , null ));
3 // load the policies
4 FilePolicyModule policyModule = new FilePolicyModule ();
Listing 9.7: Starting PDP and loading policy in DENAR
The SimplePDP class also calls the specially designed ConstraintCheckerFunction
class to evaluate conditional attributes from a policy against their values from
distributed PIPs.
1 FunctionFactoryProxy proxy = StandardFunctionFactory.getNewFactoryProxy ();
2 FunctionFactory factory = proxy.getConditionFactory ();
3 factory.addFunction(new ConstraintCheckerFunction ());
4 FunctionFactory.setDefaultFactory(proxy );
5 decisionValue = ConstraintCheckerFunction.PolicyChecker(subjectString , resourceString ,
6 actionString );
7 // create xacml request and response
8 RequestCtx request = RequestCtx.getInstance(requestNode );
9 ResponseCtx response = pdp.evaluate(request );
Listing 9.8: Enforcing a policy In DENAR
Once the request is ready, the PDP uses the method evaluate(); to evaluate the
request, and return XACML response which contains the result of evaluation to
the context handler. The response consists mainly of decision attribute which is
the actual value that the PEP uses to enforce the decision. The context handler is
also developed to process the XACML response instantly in the memory instead
of writing it to XML file so that the PEP read it. The context handler returns the
decision value which is either Permit for authorisation or NotApplicable or Deny
for no authorisation.
1 // create xacml request and response
2 RequestCtx request = RequestCtx.getInstance(requestNode );
3 ResponseCtx response = pdp.evaluate(request );
Listing 9.9: Creating authorisation response In DENAR
9.3.3.2 ConstraintCheckerFunction Class
The ConstraintCheckerFunction is a special class (Appendix A.2.6) designed ex-
clusively to evaluate the conditional attributes when a policy is enforced by a PDP.
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The ConstraintCheckerFunction class variables, operations and responsibilities are










+PolicyChecker(subjectRequest: String , objectRequest: String , actionRequest: String): String
Responsibilities
-- Calling PIPcoordinator to find conditions values.
-- Evaluating condition attributes in the policy against condition values in PIPs and send result 
back to SimplePDP.
Figure 9.11: ConstraintCheckerFunction class.
The ConstraintCheckerFunction is invoked by the SimplePDP whenever there is
a call to evaluate condition in a policy file. It uses one main method to arrive at
a decision for any request.
1 String PolicyChecker(String subjectRequest , String objectRequest ,
2 String actionRequest )
Listing 9.10: Evaluating conditions In DENAR
The syntax and semantics of the PolicyChecker, we are more concerned with, are
the list of inputs. The ConstraintCheckerFunction retrieves these inputs from the
actual policy file those meet the same attributes from request. It has to be sup-
plied with all the parameters required by the coordination PIP of the DENAR.
These parameters as declared in the ConstraintCheckerFunction are:
1 String subjectPolicy = "";
2 String objectPolicy = "";
3 String actionPolicy = "";
4 String conditionPolicy = "";
5 String subjectCondition = "";
6 String objectCondition = "";
7 String environmentCondition = "";
8 String eventCondition = "";
Listing 9.11: Main conditional attributes in a policy
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Examples of policy files are provided in Appendix A.2.1. Of special interest is the
’LimitedAccessPolicy.xml’ (in Listing A.18) policy which is designed specially to
demonstrate the capabilities of the DENAR coordination PIP using the custom
ConstraintCheckerFunction. The ConstraintCheckerFunction is invoked by the
’LimitedAccessPolicy’ policy. Listing 9.11 shows the rules’ conditions those being
evaluated before making a decision as defined in the policy.
1 <Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
2 <SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">Research
3 </SubjectCondition >
4 <ObjectCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">Secret
5 </ObjectCondition >
6 <EnvironmentConditionDataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string ">01 Jan2012
7 </EnvironmentCondition >
8 <EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">has allowed
9 </EventCondition >
10 </Condition >
Listing 9.12: Example of conditional attributes in a policy
As can be seen, all the conditional attributes required by the policy to be eval-
uated first against condition values in PIPs. Calling the PIPcoordinator class is
designed to access PIPs in DENARs using the PIPcoordinatorTask function. The
PolicyChecker in the ConstraintCheckerFunction class returns the condition eval-
uation result for those conditional attributes in the policy against those condition
values in PIPs if they are evaluation result equal to true where the result return
back to the SimplePDP class.
1 String conditionEvaluationResult = "";
2 PIPcoordinator = new PIPcoordinator ();
3 conditionEvaluationResult = PIPcoordinator.PIPcoordinatorTask(PIPfind , job ,
4 subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy , subjectCondition , objectCondition ,
5 environmentCondition , eventCondition , nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
Listing 9.13: Calling PIPcoordinator class for add/update/find condition val-
ues
Once the access is done by receiving that for PEP, the PolicyChecker determines
if new condition values need to be added or current condition values need to be
updated where that enforced by obligation context in a policy. Thus, it simply
creates a new entry for a new condition value in a PIP. Adding and updating con-
dition values in PIPs is performed by the PolicyChecker if the obligation context
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indicates that in the policy, the DENAR ensures that all the coordinated condition
values across the DENARs network are updated.
However, unlike the implementation in [27] where the coordinated condition values
are updated before the access. In the DENAR, PDP updates the coordinated
condition values after permitting access to the PEP. The updating can easily
be incorporated by changing the ConstraintCheckerFunction and implementing a
custom method in the PEP for acknowledging execution of the request. This could
potentially be a consideration in future revisions of the prototype to achieve the
objective of the Push Model in the coordination mechanism.
9.3.3.3 PIPcoordinator Class
The main function of the PIPcoordinator class (Appendix A.2.7) is to act as bridge
between DENARs for the coordination. The SimplePDP class in the DENAR can
communicate with other PIPs in the DENARs network only via PIPcoordinators
class. In case of enforcing policies, the PDP communicates with local PIP and
remote PIPs in other DENARs to evaluate conditional attributes.
The PIPcoordinator is being the coordinator between the PDP and PIPs to add
a new condition values or update condition values.
The PIPcoordinator class can determine if the condition values are located in the
local PIP or remote PIPs from the condition context (condition attributes) in the
policy. According to our decomposition model that is described in the Chapter
7, the conditional attributes that begin by indicator “#@” that indicates to the
remote PIPs and followed by the PIP name so those condition values can be
founded in the remote PIPs otherwise condition values can be founded in local
PIP.
In addition, PIPcoordinator calls local PIP via PIP class (presented in Section
9.3.3.5) to add a new condition value, update condition value and fetch a required
condition value for a decision. Also, the PIPcoordinator calls RemotePIPcoordi-
nators class (presented in next section) to connect PIPs in different DENARs.
The PIPcoordinator class variables, operations and responsibilities are shown in
Figure 9.12.













+PIPcoordinatorTask(PIPfind: String , job: String , subjectPolicy: String , objectPolicy: String , 
  actionPolicy: String , subjectCondition: String , objectCondition: String ,
  environmentCondition: String , eventCondition: String , nodeAttribute: String , 
  oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String ): boolean
+addToLocalPIP(PIPadd: String , subject: String , resource: String , action: String ,
  subjectAttribute: String , objectAttribute: String , environmentAttribute: String , 
  eventAttribute: String )
+updateLocalPIP(PIPupdate: String , subject: String , resource: String , action: String ,
   nodeAttribute: String , oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String ): void
+getAttributeLocalPIP(subjectPolicy: String , objectPolicy: String , actionPolicy: String , 
  subjectCondition: String , objectCondition: String , environmentCondition: String , 
  eventCondition: String ): boolean
+connectionToRemotePIP(): void
+addToRemotePIP(PIPadd:String , job: String , subject: String , resource: String , 
  action: String , subjectAttribute: String , objectAttribute: String , 
  environmentAttribute: String , eventAttribute: String ): void
+updateRemotePIP(PIPupdate: String , job: String , subject: String , resource: String , 
 action: String , nodeAttribute: String , oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String): void
+getAttributeRemotePIP(PIPfind: String , job: String , subjectPolicy: String , 
  objectPolicy: String , actionPolicy: String , subjectCondition: String , objectCondition: String , 
  environmentCondition: String , eventCondition: String ): boolean
Responsibilities
-- calling local PIP to find local condition values.
-- calling local PIP to add new condition values.
-- calling local PIP to update condition values.
-- calling RemotePIPcoordinator to find remote condition values.
-- calling RemotePIPcoordinator to add new remote condition values.
-- calling RemotePIPcoordinator to update remote condition values.
Figure 9.12: PIPcoordinator class.
9.3.3.4 RemotePIPcoordinator Class
The RemotePIPcoordinator class (Appendix A.2.8) acts as bridge for transmitting
condition values between PIPcoordinator and remote PIPs, i.e. those located in
different DENARs.
PDPs can communicate with other PIPs in the DENAR network only via Re-
motePIPcoordinator class which is invoked by PIPcoordinator class. The Re-
motePIPcoordinator is involved to add new condition values, update condition
values and query a required condition value for a decision when those values are
located in remote PIPs.












+connectionToRemotePIP(PIPtoConnect: String , job: String , subject: String , resource: String , 
  action: String , subjectAttribute: String , objectAttribute: String , 
  environmentAttribute: String , eventAttribute: String , 
  nodeAttribute: String , oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String ): boolean
+addToLocalPIP(PIPadd: String , subject: String , resource: String , action: String ,
  subjectAttribute: String , objectAttribute: String , environmentAttribute: String , 
  eventAttribute: String ): void
+updateLocalPIP(PIPupdate: String , subject: String , resource: String , action: String ,
  nodeAttribute: String , oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String ): void
+getAttributeLocalPIP(subjectPolicy: String , objectPolicy: String , actionPolicy: String , 
  subjectCondition: String ,  objectCondition: String , environmentCondition: String , 
  eventCondition: String ): boolean
Responsibilities
-- accepting connection from mutiple PIPcoordinator.
-- calling local PIP to find local condition values.
-- calling local PIP to add new condition values.
-- calling local PIP to update condition values.
Figure 9.13: RemotePIPcoordinator class.
The RemotePIPcoordinator class variables, operations and responsibilities are
shown in Figure 9.13.
9.3.3.5 PIP Class
The main function of the PIP class (Appendix A.2.9) is to open its defined repos-
itory and add, update and query condition values. The PIP class accepts modifi-
cation and searching for condition values in a defined repository (PIP) either via
PIPcoordinators class (locally) or via RemotePIPcoordinators class (remotely).
The PIP class variables, operations and responsibilities are shown in Figure 9.14
below.
As we can see, the new implementations of the ConstraintCheckerFunction, the
PIPcoordinators and the RemotePIPcoordinators classes can be supplied as pa-
rameters to the DENARs Network so that they are seamlessly integrated into the
network. The coordination is achieved by PIPcoordinator and RemotePIPcoordi-
nator classes where they can seamlessly handle all communications and synchro-
nisation among the various DENARs connected in the network.









+getSubjectCondtionAttribute(subjectValue: String , objectValue: String , 
  actionValue: String ): String 
+getObjectCondtionAttribute(subjectValue: String , objectValue: String , 
  actionValue: String ): String 
+getEnvironmentCondtionAttribute(subjectValue: String , objectValue: String , 
  actionValue: String ): String 
+getEventCondtionAttribute(subjectValue: String , objectValue: String , 
  actionValue: String ): String 
+addAttributesToDB(PIPadd: String , subject: String , resource: String , 
  action: String , subjectAttribute: String , objectAttribute: String , 
  environmentAttribute: String , eventAttribute: String ): void 
+updateAttributesDB(PIPupdate: String , subjectValue: String , objectValue:String , 
  actionValue: String , nodeAttribute: String , oldAttribute: String , newAttribute: String ): void
Responsibilities
-- opening the PIP repository to find the needed condition values.
-- opening the PIP repository to add new condition values.
-- opening the PIP repository to update condition values.
Figure 9.14: PIP class.
9.4 Summary
This Chapter introduced a high level design and some key aspects of the imple-
mentation prototype developed for policy enforcement in a network of DENARs
and the coordination between DENARs.
The DENAR network is developed in the Netkit [81] simulation software. The
DENAR software is implemented in Java where it is integrated with Sun XACML
implementation library [92]. The Chapter also described how these parts work with
each other to achieve the research objectives. In addition, The Chapter described
how the access control request received, a policy enforced and the authorisation
response is made in DENAR. Finally, the PIPcoordinator class is implemented to
retrieve and update a local conditional attributes and the RemotePIPcoordinator
class is implemented to retrieve and update a remote conditional attributes where
these two classes are designed for the coordination task.
In Chapter 10, the evaluation showed that the implementation of Distributed
Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) is feasible to the enforcement of both static
and dynamic policies.
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The following Chapter introduces the Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM
simulators. Moreover, the performance, security, manageability and resilience fac-
tors for this research are evaluated through the case studies in Decentralised PBM
simulator against the Centralised PBM simulator.
Chapter 10
Case Study and Evaluation
Objectives
• Give appropriate network simulators that show how a security policy is en-
forced in both Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM systems.
• Give appropriate case studies of static and dynamic policies showing policy
enforcement in both Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators.
• Demonstrate the practical applicability of the presented research.
• Evaluate the Decentralised PBM approach against the Centralised PBM
approach.
163
Chapter 10. Case Study and Evaluation 164
10.1 Introduction
This Chapter introduces the Decentralised Policy Based Management (PBM) sim-
ulator that allows for the enforcement of both static [65] and dynamic [3] policies.
In addition, the Chapter provides three case studies to illustrate the practical ap-
plicability for both static and dynamic policies, i.e those enforced in Centralised
PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators. Finally, this Chapter evaluates the Cen-
tralised PBM and Decentralised PBM approaches based on the research success
criteria. [See Chapter 1, Section 1.6]
The Decentralised PBM simulator is designed to support the static and dynamic
policy enforcement and is used to establish the enforcement functional behaviour
of the Decentralised PBM approach. Enforcement functional behaviour is defined
as the replication of policy decisions that would have been made by a Centralised
PBM in the same scenario. Other success criteria such as performance, security,
manageability and resilience are evaluated in this Chapter based on the case studies
and in Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators to show the feasibility
of the Decentralised PBM implementation.
The Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators are described in Section
10.2. Section 10.3 provides the three case studies for static and dynamic policies.
Section 10.4 evaluates the Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM approaches
in the provided case studies and the simulators.
10.2 Policy Based Management (PBM) Simula-
tion
The aim of this section is to describe the PBM simulation of the centralised and de-
centralised approaches. The two simulators are designed and configured in Netkit
[81]. Both simulators were deployed on a host machine which has the following
specifications:
• Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU E7500 @ 2.93GHz.
• Memory: 3GB.
• Operating System: Ubuntu GNU/Linux 3.20-35-generic kernel.
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10.2.1 First Simulator: Centralised PBM
In Centralised PBM, the network includes four LANs with four routers and main
getaway. Also, each LAN includes four client machines (PCs). One Policy Decision
Point (PDP) is deployed on LAN2 server machine. The PDP is involved in the
server application so that running the application will automatically run the PDP
on the same machine (CentralPDP). Users can use the client application on client
































































































































































































































Figure 10.1: First Simulator: Centralised PBM.
Figure 10.1 shows the authorisation traffic flow, viz. authorisation requests and
responses traffic, for the first simulator. The PDP is operating on LAN 2 server
machine. Authorisation requests from all the clients in LAN1, LAN2, LAN3 and
LAN4 are sent to the PDP where the authorisation response is sent back to the
client that sent the request.
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The Centralised PBM simulator screen is shown in Figure 10.2. Each LAN is
shown in a corner of the screen with their client windows machines (PCs) and its
window router. The centralPDP is shown in the middle of the screen.
Figure 10.2: Centralised PBM Simulator Screens.
10.2.2 Second Simulator: Decentralised PBM
In Decentralised PBM, four DENARs are deployed where each DENAR involves
one PDP. The first PDP is deployed on LAN1 DENAR machine and similarly for
other LANs.
Unlike the first simulator where all users (clients) are sending their requests to one
PDP, requests are distributed across DENARs. In each LAN, one client sends its
requests to the local DENAR and the other three clients send their requests to
the remote DENARs which are on different LANs.











































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10.3: Second Simulator: Decentralised PBM for DENARs.
Figure 10.3 shows how the authorisation traffic flow is distributed over the DENARs
network. one client (PC1-1) in LAN1 sends requests to the DENAR1 of LAN1,
and the client (PC2-1) sends requests to DENAR2 of LAN2 and so on for the
other clients in LAN1.
The Decentralised PBM simulator screen is shown in Figure 10.4 where each LAN
is shown in a corner of the screen with client windows machines (PCs) and window
DENAR for that LAN.
10.3 Case Study
Our case studies consider a university exam system. Modules’ lecturer prepares a
modules’ exam in the online module directory. Student can download exams with
no restriction or with some restriction based on policies in the case studies below.
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Figure 10.4: Decentralised PBM for DENARs Simulator Screens.
Each student is doing four modules per semester where each module belongs to a
different school. Figure 10.5 shows these requirements.
Scenario: Suppose students (Ali and Adam) are doing modules (Math1, Com-
puter1, Accounting1 and Research1 ). Each student can download modules’ exams
which is called (exam1 ) from the online module directory. The (Math1 ) module
belongs to Science School and (Computer1 ) module belongs to Technology School.
The (Accounting1 ) module belongs to Management School and (Research1 ) mod-
ule belongs to Art School.
The above requirements are formalised in a central policy where it is suitable for
the Centralised PBM system. On the other hand, the central policy is decomposed
according our decomposition model [See Chapter 7] based on object domains.
Suppose there are four domains where the domain means the school that the
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Figure 10.5: Central Policy.
module belongs to. According to the decomposition model the central policy is
decomposed into four sub-policies as shown in Figure 10.6.
Figure 10.6: Decomposed sub-policies.
The below case studies show the different restrictions for the above central policy
and sub-policies.
The policy :- Allowing (ali) to (download) resources ((Math1/exam1 ), (Com-
puter1/exam1), (Accounting1/exam1) and (Research/exam1)) without restriction
(condition). [See Appendix A.2.1, Listing A.10 for the central policy for Cen-
tralised PBM] [See Appendix A.2.1, Listing A.11, A.12, A.13 and A.14 for decom-
posed sub-policies for Decentralised PBM]
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10.3.1 Case Study 1 (Static Policy)
Students (ali) is doing module (Math1 ). Student can download modules’ exam
(exam1 ) from the module directory. In addition, for this case there is no restriction
for the student to download the exam.
Case study 1 policy :- Allowing student (ali) to (download) resource (Math1/exam1 )
without restriction (condition). [See Appendix A.2.1, Listing A.15 for the case
study 1 policy]
In Centralised PBM, the policy is enforced in the centralised PDP in LAN2 where
the resource (Math1/exam1 ) is located in a different domain to the client location
domain (Science School, LAN1 ). Therefore, the traffics of authorisation request










































































































































Case study 1 authorisation
Figure 10.7: Case Study 1 (Static Policy) in Centralised PBM.
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However, in Decentralised PBM, the policy is enforced in the DENAR1 in LAN1
where the resource (/Math1/exam1 ) is located in the same domain (Science School,
LAN1 ). Therefore, the traffics of authorisation request and authorisation response















































































































































Case study 1 authorisation
Figure 10.8: Case Study 1 (Static Policy) in Decentralised PBM.
10.3.2 Case Study 2 (Local Domains’ Dynamic Policy)
In this case, a policy is enforced with condition of restricting access (download) to
the (Computer1 ) exam. The condition shows the requirements that must evaluate
to true before performing the action (download). The main objective restricting
the access is that all conditional attributes must be evaluated in a PDP against
their values which are located in a Policy Information Point (PIP).
Case study 2 policy :- Allowing (ali) to (download) resource (Computer1/exam1 )
with restriction (condition) where (ali) belongs to Foundation group, the (Com-
puter1/exam1) is classified as OpenBook, the download must be done before 01/Jan/13
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and the (Computer1/exam1) has not been downloaded before. [See Appendix A.2.1,
Listing A.16 for the case study 2 policy].
Listing 10.1 illustrates conditional attributes that are involved in the policy for
this case study.
1 <Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
2 <SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">Foundation
3 </SubjectCondition >
4 <ObjectCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
5 (/ Computer1/exam1 )=OpenBook </ ObjectCondition >
6 <EnvironmentCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
7 01/ Jan /2013 </ EnvironmentCondition >
8 <EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
9 NotDone(ali ,(/ Computer1/exam1), Download)</EventCondition >
10 </Condition >
Listing 10.1: Case study 2 policy in XACML
In Listing 10.1, the SubjectCondition attribute means that the student (ali) be-
longs to Foundation group and ObjectCondition attribute means that exam file
(/Computer1/exam1 ) must be classified as OpenBook. Moreover, the Environ-
mentCondition attribute means that exam must be downloaded before 01/Jan/2013
and EventCondition attribute means that exam (/Computer1/exam1 ) must not
be done before by the same student.
In Centralised PBM for this case, the policy is enforced and also all conditional
attributes in the policy are evaluated against their values in the centralised PIP
by the CentralPDP. Figure 10.9 shows the authorisation traffic where it crosses
LAN1 to LAN2 to be enforced in CentralPDP.
However, in Decentralised PBM for this case, the policy is enforced by the DENAR1
and also all conditional attributes are evaluated against their values in the local
PIP (PIP1 ) for domains’ DENAR (DENAR1 ). In this case, the student (ali) re-
quests downloading the exam (/Computer1/exam1 ) where it is located in (Tech-
nology domain), thus, this policy is enforced by PDP2 in DENAR2 that is con-
figured for the Technology domain. The conditional attributes (ObjectCondition)
and (EventCondition) values are retrieved from the local PIP for DENAR2 be-
cause they are located in the same domain as the object (/Computer1/exam1 ).
Figure 10.10 shows the authorisation traffic where it crosses LAN1 to LAN2 to
be authorised in DENAR2.









































































































































Case study 2 authorisation
Figure 10.9: Case Study 2 (Dynamic Policy) in Centralised PBM.
10.3.3 Case Study 3 (Remote Domains’ Dynamic Policy)
In this case, a policy is enforced with condition involving restricting the access
(download) to the (Accounting1 ) exam. Listing 10.2 illustrates conditional at-
tributes involved in a policy.
Case study 3 policy :-Allowing (ali) to (download) resource (Accounting1/exam1 )
with restriction (condition) where (ali) belongs to Foundation group, the (Re-
search1/exam1) is classified as MutipleChoice, the download must be done before
01/Jan/13 and the exam (Research1/exam1) is downloaded before by the same
student. [See Appendix A.2.1, Listing A.17 for the case study 3 policy].
1 <Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
2 <SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">Foundation
3 </SubjectCondition >
4 <ObjectCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
5 (Research1/exam1)= MutipleChoice </ ObjectCondition >
6 <EnvironmentCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">















































































































































Case study 2 authorisation
Figure 10.10: Case Study 2 (Dynamic Policy) in Decentralised PBM.
7 01/ Jan /2013 </ EnvironmentCondition >
8 <EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
9 Done(ali ,( Research1/exam1), Download)</EventCondition >
10 </Condition >
Listing 10.2: Case study 3 policy in XACML
In listing 10.2, the SubjectCondition attribute means that the student must belong
to Foundation group and ObjectCondition attribute means that exam file (Re-
search1/exam1 ) must be classified as MutipleChoice. Moreover, the Environment-
Condition attribute means that exam must be downloaded before 01/Jan/2013
and EventCondition attribute means that exam (Research1/exam1 ) must be done
before by the same student.
In Centralised PBM, the policy is enforced in the CentralPDP and all conditional
attributes in the policy are evaluated against their values in the centralised PIP.
Figure 10.11 shows these traffics.









































































































































Case study 3 authorisation
Figure 10.11: Case Study 3 (Remote Domains’ Dynamic Policy) in Centralised
PBM.
However, in Decentralised PBM, the policy is enforced by the DENAR3 and all
conditional attributes must be evaluated against their values in the remote PIP
(PIP4 ) of DENAR4. In this case, the student (ali) requests downloading exam
(Accounting1/exam1 ) where it is located in (Management domain), thus, this pol-
icy is enforced by the PDP3 in DENAR3 that is configured for the Management
domain. The conditional attributes (ObjectCondition) and (EventCondition) val-
ues are retrieved from the remote PIP4 for DENAR4 because they are not located
in the same domain of the object (Research1/exam1 ). Therefore, there are two
traffic the first one (in green arrow) for authorisation request and response between
the subject and the PDP3 in DENAR3. The second traffic (in orange arrow) for
the coordination for retrieving condition values where it is between the PDP3 in
DENAR3 and the PIP4 in DENAR4. Figure 10.12 shows the above traffics.
To meet the efficiency target for enforcing the history-based policy [3] (dynamic
policy) which is involved in this case study, we design the Pull Model that is























































































































































































































Case study 3 authorisation
Case study 3 coordnation
Figure 10.12: Case Study 3 (Remote Domains’ Dynamic Policy) in Decen-
tralised PBM.
designed for retrieving any condition value that is located in remote PIPs. [For
Pull Model see Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1].
On the other hand, In Push Model, DENAR can ”push” a new condition value
for the current decision to other PIPs required for future decisions [this is done by
obligation, for Push Model see Chapter 8, Section 8.3.2].
Decentralised PBM can involve Pull or Push Models in the policy for the coordi-
nation. Pull Model is designed for retrieving condition values where they are being
in the PIP4. On the other hand, the Push Model is designed to push condition
values to be stored in PIP4 i.e. in this case study, the EventCondition value is
updated and stored in PIP4 after the subject (ali) downloads (Research1/exam1 )
and this is done by the obligation.
Moreover, for the Push Model in this case study, storing EventCondition value
in PIP3 saves authorisation time and traffic for the next authorisation decision.
This technique is modelled in this research but not implemented and evaluated.
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Therefore, this could potentially be a consideration in future work and revisions
of the prototype.
10.4 Evaluation
This section evaluates the Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM approaches
in the provided case studies and the simulators. Following subsection discusses the
evaluated factors for the DENARs’ prototype that is designed for the Decentralised
PBM approach. Performance, security, manageability and resilience are the factors
in following subsections. The
10.4.1 DENARs’ Performance
While the security in the access control systems is essential, the performance
of enforcing security policy is also essential. The efficiency is currently based
on the number of authorisation traffic. The authorisation traffic is discussed by
a comparison between the Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators.
The time of access control decision making is one of the important factors in critical
systems (e.g. Military) where it is recommended as a future work. The reason for
not measuring the response time and delays for the access control decision making
is that the experiment simulated and evaluated in a single machine where virtual
machines are simulated by Netkit.
10.4.1.1 Network Traffic
The network of DENARs reduces the network traffic bottlenecks for access control
decision making in comparison with a centralised PDP. According to the case
studies mentioned in section 10.3, this section discusses the network traffic in both
Centralised PBM and the Decentralised PBM simulators identified at in section
10.2.
In the following we present two network traffic measurements for the first case
study and the second case study mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter.
Each client (PC) sends 50 requests to download a file with size (2 bytes) where
each request is being authorised first before the action (download) is performed.
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The network traffic measures the request, response hence small file transfer traffic
between the client and its proper PDP. We show the network traffic comparison
by the number of packets and the number of bytes for each client and PDP in
both Centralised PBM and the Decentralised PBM simulators.
• Static Policy (Case Study 1)
Traffic for Centralised PBM: In the Centralised PBM simulator, the en-
forcement of the first case study (Static Policy) is analysed where all autho-
risation requests from all clients in the network are sent to the centralised
PDP to enforce the first case study policy and respond back with the au-
thorisation decision. The static policy in this case study means there is no


































































































































Traffic in each PC
Figure 10.13: Centralised PBM Traffic for Case Study 1 (Static Policy).
Traffic for Decentralised PBM: In the Decentralised PBM simulator,
the enforcement of the first case study (Static Policy) is analysed. The first
clients (PC1) (those in the orange line) for each LAN send their requests to
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DENAR1 and also the second clients (PC2) (those in the green line) for each
LAN send their requests to the DENAR2. The third clients (PC3) (those
in the blue line) for each LAN send their requests to the DENAR3 and also
the fourth clients (PC4) (those in the pink line) for each LAN send their







































































































































































Figure 10.14: Decentralised PBM Traffic for Case Study 1 (Static Policy).
Figure 10.13 shows the traffic result on the CentralPDP machine in LAN
2 for the Centralised PBM similator. The clients (PCs) sent in total 800
requests to the CentralPDP machine which produce 3915 packets (304915
bytes) those are enter and exit to/from the CentralPDP machine. On the
other hand, in Figure 10.14, the authorisation traffic is distributed between
the DENARs which decrease the number of packets on LAN2 to 850 (67650
bytes). While each DENAR in the Decentralised PBM processes in total 200
requests, there is no traffic overload in a particular LAN or machine.
• Dynamic Policy (Case Study 2)
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Traffic for Centralised PBM: In the Centralised PBM simulator, the en-
forcement of the second case study (Dynamic Policy) is analysed where all
authorisation requests from all clients in the network are sent to the cen-
tralised PDP to enforce the second case study policy and response back
the authorisation decision. The dynamic policy in this case study means
there are restrictions (conditions) for performing the action. The condition
shows that the requirements must be evaluated to true before performing
the action. The main objective restricting the access is that all conditional


































































































































Traffic in each PC
Figure 10.15: Centralised PBM Traffic for Case Study 2 (Dynamic Policy).
Traffic for Decentralised PBM: In the Decentralised PBM simulator,
the enforcement of second case study (Dynamic Policy) is analysed. All con-
ditional attributes must be evaluated by a PDP against their values which
are located in the PIP of the same DENAR.
Measurements Discussion:







































































































































































Figure 10.16: Decentralised PBM Traffic for Case Study 2 (Dynamic Policy).
Figure 10.15 shows the traffic result on the CentralPDP machine in LAN
2 for the Centralised PBM similator. The clients (PCs) sent in total 800
requests to the CentralPDP machine which produce 2913 packets (238498
bytes) those are enter and exit to/from the CentralPDP machine. On the
other hand, in Figure 10.16, the authorisation traffic is distributed between
the DENARs which decrease the number of packets on LAN2 to 756 (61910
bytes). While each DENAR in the Decentralised PBM is processing in total
200 requests, there is no traffic overload in a particular LAN or machine.
10.4.2 DENARs’ Security
The main objective of this research is providing the Decentralised PBM approach
the same security level as the Centralised PBM. The correct enforcement of se-
curity policy and involving the dynamic policy are essential in the current access
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control systems. The following discusses the enforcement functional behaviour and
the ability of involving dynamic policy in our Decentralised PBM approach.
10.4.2.1 Enforcement Functional Behaviour
For Decentralised PBM, enforcement functional behaviour is defined as the repli-
cation of policy decisions that would have been made by a Centralised PBM in
the same scenario.
During the access control testing of the three case studies (Section 10.3) in both
Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM network simulators (Section 10.2), the
same tests were carried out.
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Table 10.1: Enforcement Functional Behaviour of Enforcement for Centralised
PBM and Decentralised PBM
Simulator Case study Result
* The policy is deployed in the centralised PR for
the centralised PDP.
1
* The policy is enforced by the centralised PDP.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
* The policy is deployed in the centralised PR for
the centralised PDP.
Centralised PBM 2
* The policy is enforced by the centralised PDP.
* The condition values are retrieved from the
centralised PIP for the centralised PDP.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
* The policy is deployed in the centralised PR for
the centralised PDP.
3
* The policy is enforced by the centralised PDP.
* The condition values are retrieved from the
centralised PIP for the centralised PDP.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
* The policy is deployed in PR1 for DENAR1.
1
* The policy is enforced by PDP1 in DENAR1.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
* The policy is deployed in PR2 for DENAR2.
Decentralised PBM 2
* The policy is enforced by PDP2 in DENAR2.
* The condition values are retrieved from PIP2
in DENAR2.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
* The policy is deployed in PR3 for DENAR3.
3
* The policy is enforced by PDP3 in DENAR3.
* The object and event condition values are
retrieved from PIP4 in DENAR4 thus the
coordination between DENAR3 and DENAR4
is required to evaluate object and event
condition values.
* The policy is enforced correctly.
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All results satisfy the enforcement functional behaviour which mean both ap-
proaches result in the same enforcement decision for those policies in the case
studies. The table 10.1 shows the functional behaviour of the policies enforce-
ments in both simulators.
10.4.3 DENARs’ Manageability
According to the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) (Chap-
ter 5), we consider qualitatively administrative cost and resource utilisation prop-
erties of the DENAR architecture.
10.4.3.1 Resource Utilisation
DENARs in our project can arrive at decisions locally and thus save time and
network resources.
However, given the number of policies that may be present in the Centralised PBM,
the PDP, PIP, PR must have sufficient computing and storage resources to store
and enforce these policies, which may become a bottleneck. In our Decentralised
PBM, the distribution of PDPs, PIPs and PRs in a collaborative DENARs opti-
mise the policy enforcement and network resource utilisation functionality based
on available bandwidth and computing infrastructure.
10.4.3.2 Administrative Cost
• Simplicity: In DENAR, administration of Decentralised PBM policies is
eliminated. According to our case studies above, changing policies over
semesters is by school staff who are familiar with the school rules and regula-
tion. Thus, managing policy repositories (PRs) individually by schools staff
will save time and effort in comparison with the Centralised PBM system.
Also, it provides privacy for a policy that located in a domain (school), thus,
no disclosure from other administrators in other domains.
• Consistency: DENARs network topology remains consistent in case a new
policy is added or changed in any particulate domain. The policy can be
analysed and decomposed without changing of DENARs network topology.
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A centralised backup DENAR can be configured by a system administrator
in case of the reconfiguring the DENARs network with new policies adding or
changing. Clearly, the DENARs network operates one centralised DENAR
(backup DENAR) only during the reconfiguration and that for a short time.
The backup DENAR has its PR that stores the central policy (all rules
before the decomposition into sub-policies), its PIP that stores condition
values. [See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1]
• Flexibility: Adding or removing resources from the system does not affect
the DENARs network topology. Therefore, only adding a new policy for
that resource has been added and its attribute without reconfiguring the
DENARs network topology.
10.4.4 DENARs’ Resilience
Our research proposes mechanisms that improve the resilience against network
failures in access control for distributed information systems.
In case of the failure of the policy enforcement in centralised PDP, all the devices on
the network may cease to function. Clearly, an authorisation request to a particular
resource or service does not respond. In practice, this is rarely the case as there is
at least one alternate backup provided in . The problem is indeed if centralised PIP
is involved where it remains the centralised authorisation decision making which
still has the performance drawback. Moreover, conditional attributes are no longer
observable due to failure of the centralised PIP. Finally, involving distributed PDPs
and PIPs without coordination between PDPs to retrieve dynamic attributes from
other PIPs where enforcing dynamic policies is a bottleneck.
In Figure 10.17 and table ??, we discuss some potential failure scenarios in the
centralised PDP network that may affect authorisation.
Table 10.2: Enforcement and Coordination Failures for Centralised PBM net-
work
Failure No. Case study Enforcement and Coordination Affection
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f1 1, 2 and 3
f1 affects only authorisations sent from LAN1
machines where the failure isolates all resources in
LAN1 to reach the centralised PDP.
f2 1, 2 and 3
f2 affects authorisation in the entire network where
there is no communication with the centralised PDP
because all resources in LAN2 are unreachable.
(LAN2 is down)
f3 1, 2 and 3 f3 affects authorisation in the entire network
because the centralised PDP is down or unreachable.
f4 1, 2 and 3
f4 does not affect the authorisation for all
mentioned case studies. However, f4 affects only
authorisations sent from LAN4 because all
resources in LAN2 are unreachable. (LAN4 down)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Case study 1 authorisation
Case study 2 authorisation









































Figure 10.18: Failures in Decentralised PBM.
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The collaborative DENARs are designed to fulfill resilience in less policy enforce-
ment failure and resource utilisation. The collaborative DENARs means that
DENARs query each other for authorisation decision purpose (coordination).
Figure 10.18 and table 10.3 show the supposed failures in the DENARs network
that may effect the authorisation.
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Table 10.3: Enforcement and Coordination Failures for Centralised PBM net-
work
Failure No. Case study Enforcement and Coordination Affection
1
f1 does not affect case study 1 authorisation because
the DENAR1 responsible for the requested
authorisation based on the location of the resource
(Math1/eaxm1)
f1 2
f1 affects authorisation because the authorisation
request is sent from LAN1 and the resource
(Computer1/exam1) is located in LAN2. Therefore,
the policy is enforced by DENAR2 where the
DENAR2 is unreachable.
3
f1 affects authorisation because the authorisation
is sent from LAN1 and the resource
(Accounting1/exam1) is located in LAN3. Therefore,
the policy is enforced by DENAR3 where the
DENAR3 is unreachable.
1 f2 and f3 do not affect authorisation for the case
study 1 because it is enforced locally by DENAR1.
f2 and f3 2
f2 and f3 affect authorisation for case study 2
because the authorisation is sent from LAN1 and
the resource (Computer1/exam1) is located in LAN2.
Therefore, the policy is enforced by DENAR2 where
DENAR2 is unreachable.
3
f2 and f3 do not affect authorisation for case
study 3 because the policy is enforced by DENAR3
and the coordination values are being remotely in
DENAR4.
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1 f4 does not affect authorisation for case study 1
because it is enforced locally in DENAR1.
f4 2 f4 does not affect authorisation for case study 2
because it is enforced by DENAR2.
3
f4 affects authorisation for case study 3 because
the policy is enforced by DENAR3 and the
coordination values are requested by DENAR3 from
DENAR4 where the DENAR3 is down.
1 f5 and f6 do not affect authorisation for case
study 1 because it is enforced locally by DENAR1.
f5 and f6 2 f5 and f6 do not affect authorisation for case
study 2 because it is enforced by DENAR2.
3
f5 and f6 affect authorisation for case study 3
because the policy is enforced by DENAR3 and the
coordination values are requested by DENAR3 from
DENAR4 where the DENAR4 is unreachable.
In DENARs network, a backup DENAR can be configured by the system admin-
istrator. The backup DENAR is utilised in case of DENARs failure. In addition,
it can be used in case of reconfiguring the DENARs network with new adding or
changing DENARs topology. Clearly, the network operates one centralised PDP
only during the reconfiguration which is the backup DENAR for access control.
The backup DENAR has its PR that stores the central policy (all rules before the
decomposition into sub-policies), and its PIP that stores conditional attributes.
The centralised Policy Based Management (PBM) is more efficient when the length
of the authorisation decision and the authorisation traffic to performing any service
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are not critical and the service can be provided later, e.g. banking services. On the
other hand, in such systems, when the authorisation decision response time and
the traffic are being important, the Decentralised PBM becomes more efficient,
e.g. Military and National Security systems.
10.5 Summary
This Chapter described the simulators of the Centralised PBM and Decentralised
PBM for both static and dynamic policies. The simulators are currently avail-
able as a prototype implementation that shows the feasibility of the enforcement
involved.
The Chapter discussed three case studies that describe how static and dynamic
policies are enforced in Centralised PBM and Decentralised PBM simulators. The
first case study was provided to show how the static policy (independent policy)
is enforced. The second case study showed the enforcement of the dynamic policy
(locally domain dependent policy) where the coordination values are located in
the same PIP of DENAR that enforce the policy. The third case study showed
enforcement of dynamic policy (remote domain dependent policy) where the co-
ordination values are located in different PIPs of the DENARs that enforce the
policy.
The core aim of this work was to provide a Decentralised PBM framework for
enforcing static and dynamic policies. This Chapter analysed and evaluated the
proposed framework against the Centralised PBM approach.
The first factor, performance was evaluated by measuring the authorisation net-
work traffic. The authorisation traffic is analysed to show how the centralised
approach is affected by the traffic and can be a bottleneck for the authorisation
response. Thus, we can observe that the decentralise approach is more efficient
and does avoid a single point of failure.
The second evaluation factor discussed is the functional behaviour of enforcing
the case studies policies in both centralised and decentralise approaches and the
ability of involving the dependent policy in the decentralised approach.
Thirdly, the discussion of the administrative cost and resource utilisation are pro-
vided in the manageability factor. The Decentralised PBM is more efficient and
manageable in contrast with the centralised approach. The Decentralised PBM
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provides re-propagation and recovery techniques that improve the authorisation
decision making to avoid the delay and failure.
Finally, the resilience of involving a network of DENARs in Decentralised PBM
approach illustrated the effectiveness countermeasure of some network failures, i.e
those facing the centralised approach.
The following Chapter introduces the final results, conclusion of our research and
views for future work.
Chapter 11
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter provides a summary of the work presented in this thesis, and identifies
what has been achieved. We conclude with future work.
11.1 Summary of the Thesis
The thesis presented a new framework for Decentralised Policy Based Management
(PBM) that supports the distribution of Policy Decision Points (PDPs) to enforce
static and dynamic policies. The framework illustrated a practical workflow to
achieve the enforcement of security policy enforcement for distributed systems
(Chapter 4). The Distributed Enforcement Architecture (DENAR) is designed to
include multiple PDPs and other DENAR components. The components, their
function and interaction are described. The deployment of DENARs in Decen-
tralised PBM is introduced where the collaboration between them is facilitated by
the PIPcoordinator and PDPcoordinator. In addition, re-propagation and recov-
ery techniques are described for DENARs network (Chapter 5).
Chapter 6 presented the DENAR analysis which is based upon ITL. The DENAR
analysis provided policy dependency and the semantics of distributed policy en-
forcements, viz. allowing for the enforcement of static and dynamic policies in
decentralised manner where multiple enforcements can be coordinated. As part
of the research contribution, we demonstrated how DENARs collaborate to en-
force static and dynamic policies in a decentralised manner to provide resilient
enforcement.
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Chapter 7 detailed the policy decomposition model that considers both static and
dynamic policies. Fragmentation and refinement methods are described in SANTA
syntax and the algorithms for the policy decomposition. The policy deployment
model is detailed in algorithm. The advantage of this policy decomposition model
is that it allows the coordination and collaboration between DENARs that provides
enforcement functional behaviour of security policy with respect to centralised
enforcement.
The DENAR enforcement and coordination models were presented Chapter 8. The
coordination need is clear for dynamic policy in distributed DENARs for access
control decision. Push and Pull models are proposed and detailed to implement
the coordination and collaboration between DENARs. The access control decision
making is improved by identifying and proposing local domain decision and remote
domain decision.
The prototype implementation of the presented approach is based on XACML pol-
icy language and Netkit simulator. The Decentralised Policy Based Management
(PBM) framework is however largely language independent and can potentially be
applied to other policy languages.
Finally, the thesis demonstrated that distributed PDPs can be achieved by De-
centralised PBM in which the presented framework supports the collaboration
between DENARs as enforcement requirements (Chapter 8).
11.2 Revisiting Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a novel Decentralised Policy Based Man-
agement system (PBM) based on a distributed Policy Decision Points PDPs for
enforcing static and dynamic policies in distributing setting, so the access control
can be provided with efficient performance, security, manageability and resilience
support. The performance, security, manageability and resilience are achieved by
the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR), where static and dy-
namic policies are enforced. This section revisits the four original contributions as
follows:
1. Decentralised PBM framework has been developed. The Decentralised
PBM framework has described the methodology of the framework workflow
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to apply DENAR. The workflow illustrated how to achieve the enforcement
of static and dynamic policies in distributed systems. In Chapter 6, the
analysis of policies has provided to identify dependencies between policy and
the access control requirements those involved in dynamic policy. Moreover,
it identifies and analyses the enforcement challenges in distributed PDPs
where a collaboration of PDPs is required.
2. Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR) has been
designed. It has five components, including Local Policy Decision Point
(PDP), Local Policy Repository (PR), Local Policy Information Point (PIP),
and PIPcoordinator and PDPcoordinator components. The LPDP, LPIP
and LPR aim to improve the performance (network traffic) of security policy
enforcement and their resilience against enforcement failures when a decision
is made locally. The PIPcoordinator and PDPcoordinator components are
designed for the coordination mechanism.
3. Policy Decomposition and Policy Deployment Techniqes have been
provided with the respect of independent and dependent rules. The policy
decomposition results in sub-policies according to object domains that are
then distributed to corresponding DENARs. In the policy decomposition,
fragmentation and refinement methods have been developed. The fragmen-
tation algorithm described for decomposes the policy into sub-policies. The
refinement method refines the rule to indicate the location of PIPs that store
conditional attributes where located in local or remote domain. In addition,
the policy deployment is detailed algorithmically.
4. Coordination and Collaboration Enforcement Model, using the pol-
icy decomposition of and the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture
(DENAR), those enable Decentralised PBM to deploy and enforce static and
dynamic policies for large-scale systems. The PIPcoordinator component in
the DENAR responsible of the Push and Pull models. The performance is
achieved by identifying local domain decision (that done by one DENAR)
and remote domain decision (that done by collaborative DENARs).
The proposed Decentralised PBM framework and the Distributed Policy Enforce-
ments Architecture (DENAR) enforce static and dynamic policies in distributing
setting. The approach presented here provides efficient performance, security,
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manageability and resilience to the enforcement of the policies. The DENAR was
designed, implemented, and evaluated using a test-bed.
11.3 Achieving Success Criteria
To answer the research questions that were set in Section 1.3, the Decentralised
PBM framework and the Distributed Policy Enforcements Architecture (DENAR)
has been designed, implemented and evaluated throughout this thesis.
Involving the local domain decision and remote domain decision in DENARs within
PBM framework allows static and dynamic policies to be enforced and coordinated.
Enforcing independent policies for local domain decision using the one DENAR
supports the performance aspect. The remote domain decision in collaborative
DENARs provides the ability of the enforcing the dependent policies. A set of
criteria of success and research objective factors have been defined in Section 1.3.
These predefined research objective factors are revisited as follows:
• Performance, a discussion of improving the enforcement will be
provided and some experiments will be used to measure the net-
work traffic in both centralised PDP and a network of DENARs.
The research has shown how performance can be improved effectively in
terms of the network traffic. As described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, the
research work showed how local domain decisions supports the performance
by using the one DENAR to enforce independent rules. Moreover, in the net-
work of DENARs, the authorisation traffic is distributed between DENARs
which distributed the number of packets over the network instead of direct
these traffic into a particular part of the network or machine.
• Security, some experiments will be used to discuss the ability of
enforcing both static and dynamic policies in both centralised PDP
and the network of DENARs.
The evaluation of our approach, as presented in Chapter 10, has shown
that the DENAR can enforce static and dynamic policies by the replication
of policy decision that would have been made by a Centralised PDP in the
same scenario. The coordination mechanism offers the Push and Pull models
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those are proposed for the collaborative DENARs to enforce dependent rules
[See Chapter 8, Section 8.3].
• Manageability, a discussion of the resource utilisation and admin-
istration in the DENAR will be provided.
Chapter 5 showed that the DENAR configuration, deployment, re-propagation
and recovery techniques are described where the resource utilisation and
administrative cost are discussed in Chapter 10, Section 10.4.3. The De-
centralised PBM offers sufficient computing and storage resources to store
and enforce policies. The administrative cost showed that DENAR is simple
and flexible in its configuration and reconfiguration which can configure as
Centralised PBM during the re-propagation and reconfiguration.
• Resilience, Network simulators for both centralised PDP and the
network of DENARs will be used to discuss the resilience in some
potential failures scenarios.
Chapter 10 illustrated that the DENAR has resilience against network fail-
ures in access control for distributed information systems. The bottleneck is
indeed if centralised PDP, PIP or PR is involved where it remains the autho-
risation decision making centralised which still has performance drawbacks
and potential failures.
11.4 Future Work
Several issues for further work have been identified throughout the thesis. We list
the most important of them in this section.
• The Policy Decomposition and Deployment Prototype.
The most immediate need in DENAR prototype is the implementation of
policy decomposition and deployment algorithm. The DENAR prototype
implementation needs to concentrate on the enhancement of the analysis
and decomposition of policy that can be enforced in collaborative DENARs.
• Push Model Implementation for Usage Control.
Usage control is a largely open research area in computer security. There
is still a lot of work to be done to cover usage control requirements. Usage
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control in PBM system has to be scrutinised by starting from specification
and up to enforcement mechanisms and implementation. The Decentralised
PBM which involves distributed enforcements must be able to coordinate
mutable attributes that presented in [79] to be updated during the enforce-
ment execution. For this purpose, we provided the Push Model that would
require an implementation of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) to notify
the distributed enforcements about the mutable attributes changes. Another
not well understood aspect is the continuous monitoring of processes and the
impact that UCON decisions have on the integrity of ongoing processes.
• Sequential and Parallel Policies.
PDPcoodination component is deigned in DENAR to act as bridge for shar-
ing collaborative decision between multiple DENARs. In case of enforcing
sequential and parallel policies that presented in [53] multiple DENARs com-
municate to make the final decision where one of these DENARs is being the
synchroniser DENAR that received the authorisation request from a PEP
and make this final decision. This is not currently implemented in this work
and represents an additional level of abstraction from the policy specification
side. However, it is likely that any composed policy containing sequential
and parallel policies can be expressed as a normal form compatible with
the DENAR architecture. This requires further investigation and also has
potential impacts on the coordination model.
• Dynamic Reconfiguration Based on Traffic Mining.
Push and Pull models are proposed and detailed that provide the coordina-
tion and collaboration between DENARs. Pull model is designed for retriev-
ing any conditional attribute value that is located in local or remote PIPs.
[For Pull Model see Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1]. In Push model, DENAR can
”push” a new condition value for the current decision to other PIPs those
required for future decision [this is done by obligation, for Push Model see
Chapter 8, Section 8.3.2]. However, refining a rule for the choice of Push
or Pull model by mining the authorisation traffic saves authorisation time
and traffic for the next authorisation decision e.g. PDPx requires a condi-
tional attribute value (α) frequently from remote PIP (PIPy), thus, pushing




For the temporal permissions, i.e. permissions that lasts for a certain amount
of time, the enforcement can make use of DENARs coordination features.
If the authorisation decision is occurred, the enforcement timer is reset to
result the same authorisation decision for a defined period. This would allow
authorisation rules depending on hypothetical decisions to cache some of the
results from remote DENARs. Thus, caching the authorisation decision
history for the current authorisation request without a need of enforcement
process would improve the performance. Another aspect of this research
avenue is the ability to identify fix-points in the enforcement of history-based
access control rules [See [53]].
For example:
Coordination Fixpoints
sometime ϕ @PDPy ; always not µ @PDPx
remote local
The coordination is only needed unless ϕ is observed once.
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Appendix A
Source Code
The following listings present source code of the classes of the DENAR proto-
type implementation. The implementation presents only the DENAR prototype
to evaluate the functionalities of the DENAR components work to achieve our
approach objectives. However, It is not implemented to a level at which it could
be readily commercially utilised.
A.1 DENARs Network Labs
A.1.1 Network Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------







route add default gw 10.0.0.254
route add -net 192.168.10.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 172.16.100.1 dev eth0
route add -net 192.168.20.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 172.16.100.2 dev eth0
route add -net 192.168.30.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 172.16.100.3 dev eth0
route add -net 192.168.40.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 172.16.100.4 dev eth0
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source 10.0.0.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.10.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.20.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 172.16.100.254
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#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.30.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.40.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 172.16.100.254
echo "domain project" >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo "search project" >> /etc/resolv.conf











0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.project.










0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.project.
ns IN A 172.16.100.254
maingw IN CNAME ns
gw IN CNAME maingw
d1 IN NS ns.d1.project.
ns.d1 IN A 192.168.10.1
d2 IN NS ns.d2.project.
ns.d2 IN A 192.168.20.1
d3 IN NS ns.d3.project.
ns.d3 IN A 192.168.30.1
d4 IN NS ns.d4.project.







allow -update { 127.0.0.1; };
notify yes;
};
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zone "100.16.172.in -addr.arpa" {
type master;
file "/etc/bind/db .100.16.172";
allow -update { 127.0.0.1; };
notify yes;
};
Listing A.1: maingw Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------








route add default gw 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source 192.168.10.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 172.16.100.254 -j DNAT --to -destination 192.168.10.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.20.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.10.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.30.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.10.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.40.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.10.1
echo "domain d1.project" > /etc/resolv.conf
echo "search d1.project" >> /etc/resolv.conf












0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d1.project.





@ IN SOA ns.d1.project. d1 -admin.d1.project. (
2011021801 ; serial
8h ; refresh
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2h ; retry
1w ; expire
0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d1.project.
ns IN A 192.168.10.1
router1 IN CNAME ns




































ddns -update -style interim;
ddns -updates on;
ddns -domainname "d1.project ";
ddns -rev -domainname "in-addr.arpa";
deny client -updates;
key "localhost -ddns" {
algorithm hmac -md5;
secret q0qvEmpG9jSqNNgpa+dJfA ==;
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};
option domain -name "d1.project ";
option domain -name -servers 192.168.10.1; # local DNS
default -lease -time 300;
max -lease -time 600;
update -static -leases on;
authoritative;
subnet 192.168.10.0 netmask 255.255.255.0
{
option subnet -mask 255.255.255.0;














Listing A.2: router1 Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------








route add default gw 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source 192.168.20.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 172.16.100.254 -j DNAT --to -destination 192.168.20.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.10.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.20.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.30.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.20.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.40.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.20.1
echo "domain d2.project" > /etc/resolv.conf
echo "search d2.project" >> /etc/resolv.conf
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$TTL 8h





0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d2.project.










0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d2.project.
ns IN A 192.168.20.1
router2 IN CNAME ns







allow -update { key localhost -ddns; };
notify yes;
};
zone "20.168.192.in -addr.arpa" {
type master;
file "/etc/bind/db .20.168.192";
























ddns -update -style interim;
ddns -updates on;
ddns -domainname "d2.project ";
ddns -rev -domainname "in-addr.arpa";
deny client -updates;




option domain -name "d2.project ";
option domain -name -servers 192.168.20.1; # local DNS
default -lease -time 300;
max -lease -time 600;
update -static -leases on;
authoritative;
subnet 192.168.20.0 netmask 255.255.255.0
{
option subnet -mask 255.255.255.0;














Listing A.3: router2 Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------
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ifconfig eth1 172.16.100.3
route add default gw 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source 192.168.30.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 172.16.100.254 -j DNAT --to -destination 192.168.30.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.40.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.30.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.20.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.30.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.10.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.30.1
echo "domain d3.project" > /etc/resolv.conf
echo "search d3.project" >> /etc/resolv.conf












0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d3.project.










0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d3.project.
ns IN A 192.168.30.1
router3 IN CNAME ns







allow -update { key localhost -ddns; };
notify yes;
};
zone "30.168.192.in -addr.arpa" {
type master;
file "/etc/bind/db .30.168.192";
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ddns -update -style interim;
ddns -updates on;
ddns -domainname "d3.project ";
ddns -rev -domainname "in-addr.arpa";
deny client -updates;




option domain -name "d3.project ";
option domain -name -servers 192.168.30.1; # local DNS
default -lease -time 300;
max -lease -time 600;
update -static -leases on;
authoritative;
subnet 192.168.30.0 netmask 255.255.255.0
{
option subnet -mask 255.255.255.0;
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}
}
Listing A.4: router3 Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------








route add default gw 172.16.100.254
#iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --to-source 192.168.40.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 172.16.100.254 -j DNAT --to -destination 192.168.40.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.30.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.40.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.20.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.40.1
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.10.1 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.40.1
echo "domain d4.project" > /etc/resolv.conf
echo "search d4.project" >> /etc/resolv.conf












0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d4.project.










0 ; negative cache ttl
)
@ IN NS ns.d4.project.
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ns IN A 192.168.40.1
router4 IN CNAME ns




































ddns -update -style interim;
ddns -updates on;
ddns -domainname "d4.project ";
ddns -rev -domainname "in-addr.arpa";
deny client -updates;




option domain -name "d4.project ";
option domain -name -servers 192.168.40.1; # local DNS
default -lease -time 300;
max -lease -time 600;
update -static -leases on;
Appendix A. Source Code 221
authoritative;
subnet 192.168.40.0 netmask 255.255.255.0
{
option subnet -mask 255.255.255.0;














Listing A.5: router4 Configuration
A.1.2 Centralised PBM
/* --------------------------------------------------------





























































pc1 -1: router1 router2
pc2 -1: router1 router2
pc3 -1: router1 router2
pc4 -1: router1 router2
pc1 -2: router1 router2
pc2 -2: router1 router2
pc3 -2: router1 router2
pc4 -2: router1 router2
CentralPDP: router1 router2
pc1 -3: router3 router4
pc2 -3: router3 router4
pc3 -3: router3 router4
pc4 -3: router3 router4
pc1 -4: router3 router4
pc2 -4: router3 router4
pc3 -4: router3 router4
pc4 -4: router3 router4
Listing A.6: Centralised PBM Configuration
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/* --------------------------------------------------------






echo ’send host -name "CentralPDP ";’ >> /etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf
dhclient eth0
--------------------
pc1 -1. startup file
--------------------
echo ’send host -name "pc1 -1";’ >> /etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf
dhclient eth
and so on for other PCs
Listing A.7: CentralPDP and PCs Configuration in Centralised PBM
A.1.3 Decentralised PBM
/* --------------------------------------------------------



































































pc1 -1: router1 router2
pc2 -1: router1 router2
pc3 -1: router1 router2
pc4 -1: router1 router2
DENAR1: router1 router2
pc1 -2: router1 router2
pc2 -2: router1 router2
pc3 -2: router1 router2
pc4 -2: router1 router2
DENAR2: router1 router2
pc1 -3: router3 router4
pc2 -3: router3 router4
pc3 -3: router3 router4
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pc4 -3: router3 router4
DENAR3: router3 router4
pc1 -4: router3 router4
pc2 -4: router3 router4
pc3 -4: router3 router4
pc4 -4: router3 router4
DENAR4: router3 router4
Listing A.8: Decentralised PBM Configuration
/* --------------------------------------------------------





















echo ’send host -name "DENAR4";’ >> /etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf
dhclient eth0
--------------------
pc1 -1. startup file
--------------------
echo ’send host -name "pc1 -1";’ >> /etc/dhcp3/dhclient.conf
dhclient eth
and so on for other PCs
Listing A.9: DENARs and PCs Configuration in Decentralised PBM
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A.2 DENAR Software
A.2.1 XACML Policy and Request
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/







<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Math1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/




<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Computer1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/




<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
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function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Accounting1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/




<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Research/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/











Listing A.10: XACML Policy (Policy.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/








<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Math1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/











Listing A.11: XACML Policy (sub-policy1.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Computer1/exam1
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</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/











Listing A.12: XACML Policy (sub-policy2.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Accounting1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/












Listing A.13: XACML Policy (sub-policy3.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Research/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
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Listing A.14: XACML Policy (sub-policy4.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Math1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/











Listing A.15: The Case Study 1 Policy (PolicyCS1.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
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* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Computer1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/








<Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
<SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
Foundation </ SubjectCondition >
<ObjectCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
(/ Computer1/exam1 )=OpenBook </ ObjectCondition >
<EnvironmentCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
01/ Jan /2013 </ EnvironmentCondition >
<EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">





Listing A.16: The Case Study 2 Policy (PolicyCS2.xml)
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/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema -instance" xsi:schemaLocation ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy
cs-xacml -schema -policy -01. xsd" PolicyId =" Policy0000" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:first -applicable">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">/hosthome/XACML -Project/Accounting1/exam1
</AttributeValue >
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/








<Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
<SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
Foundation </ SubjectCondition >
<ObjectCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
(Research1/exam1)= MutipleChoice </ ObjectCondition >
<EnvironmentCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
01/ Jan /2013 </ EnvironmentCondition >
<EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">
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Listing A.17: The Case Study 3 Policy (PolicyCS3.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: policy" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org/
2001/ XMLSchema -instance" PolicyId =" LimitedAccess" RuleCombiningAlgId ="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :1.0:rule -combining -algorithm:ordered -permit -overrides">
<Target />




<SubjectMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">ali </ AttributeValue >
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType ="http :// www.w3.org/
2001/ XMLSchema#string" AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:






<ResourceMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">




"http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string" AttributeId=






<ActionMatch MatchId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">Download </ AttributeValue >
<ActionAttributeDesignator DataType ="http ://
www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string" AttributeId ="urn:
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<Condition FunctionId =" PDPOverlay_Constraint_Checker">
<SubjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">Research </ SubjectCondition >
<ObjectCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">Secret </ ObjectCondition >
<EnvironmentCondition DataType ="http :// www.w3.org/
2001/ XMLSchema#string ">01 Jan 2012
</EnvironmentCondition >
<EventCondition DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/





Listing A.18: XACML Policy (LimitedAccessPolicy.xml)
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8" ?>
<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: context" xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org/
2001/ XMLSchema -instance">
<Subject >
<Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: subject:subject -id"
DataType ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: data -type:rfc822Name">




<Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: resource:resource -id"
DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">




<Attribute AttributeId ="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: action:action -id"
DataType ="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">




Listing A.19: XACML Request
A.2.2 Client Class
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/* --------------------------------------------------------








public class client {
Socket clientsocket = null;
PrintWriter ToServer = null;
BufferedReader FromServer = null;
InputStream input = null;
OutputStream output = null;
String serverip = null;
String username = null;
String password = null;
String challenge = null;
String hashedpasswd = null;
String Line = null;
String delims = "[ ]+";
String delims1 = "/";
String [] tokens = null;
File F1 = null;
String fname = null;
String [] tokens1 = null;
String outFileName = null;
int fileNameadd = 1;
public client () throws Exception {
String UserInput = null;
System.out.println (" Please type the server address ");
BufferedReader FromUser = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in));
Console console = System.console ();
serverip = FromUser.readLine ();
try {
clientsocket = new Socket(serverip , 5555);
ToServer = new PrintWriter(clientsocket.getOutputStream (), true);
FromServer = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(clientsocket.
getInputStream ()));
input = clientsocket.getInputStream ();
output = clientsocket.getOutputStream ();
System.out.println (" Connected to the server " + serverip );
} catch (Exception e) {




challenge = FromServer.readLine ();
System.out.println (" Enter Username :");
username = FromUser.readLine ();
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password = FromUser.readLine (); // new String (console.readPassword
("Enter password: "));
hashedpasswd = SHA1(challenge + password );
ToServer.println(username + ":" + hashedpasswd );
if (( FromServer.readLine ()). equals ("1")) {
System.out.println("--------------- SUCCESSFUL AUTHENTICATION
[ " + username + " ]---------------");
System.out.println (" Usage: \n To download a file ---> Download {file}
\n To upload a file -----> Upload {file} {Destination Directory}
\n To delete a file -----> Delete {file} \n To list a directory -->
List {directroy} \n To quit , Quit \n");
UserInput = FromUser.readLine ();
while (! UserInput.equals ("Quit ")) { // compare by reference
toTokenise(UserInput );
UserInput = FromUser.readLine ();
}// end of while
System.out.println ("Bye .........!");
clientsocket.close ();
} //end of if
else {
System.out.println (" Authentication failure. Exiting ..........");
clientsocket.close ();
}
} //end of client constructor
public void toTokenise(String s1) {
tokens = s1.split(delims );
if (tokens [0]. equals (" Download ")) {
try {
F1 = new File(tokens [1]);
if (!(F1.isDirectory ())) {
System.out.println (" Trying to download " + tokens [1]
+ "..........");
ToServer.println(tokens [0] + " " + tokens [1]);
try {
Line = FromServer.readLine ();
if (Line.equals (" NotApplicable ")) {
System.out.println (" " + Line);
} else {
fname = tokens [1];
tokens1 = fname.split(delims1 );
outFileName = tokens1 [( tokens1.length - 1)];
int bytesRead = 0;
byte[] mybytearray = new byte[Integer.parseInt(Line )];
System.out.println ("File size " + mybytearray.length );
int current = 0;
// Receive file
bytesRead = input.read(mybytearray , 0, mybytearray.length );
if (bytesRead == 0) {
System.out.println (" Failed .[0 Bytes] Downloaded , the
file is either empty or does not exist ");
} else {
FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(fileNameadd
+ outFileName );
current = bytesRead;
// thanks to A. C d i z for the bug fix
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do {
bytesRead = input.read(mybytearray , current ,
(mybytearray.length - current ));
if (bytesRead >= 0) {
current += bytesRead;
}
} while (bytesRead > 0);
fos.write(mybytearray , 0, current );










System.out.println (" ERROR: " + tokens [1] + " is a directory.
You can download files only ");
}
} catch (ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException e) {
System.err.println (" ERROR: Make sure that the Download command is
formated properly \n e.g. Download [File_location ]");
}
}// end of downloading file
else {
System.out.println (" ERROR: Unknow command ");
}
} //end of toTokenise
////////////// hashing the password /////////////
// This code was taken from
//http :// www.anyexample.com/programming/java/java_simple_class_to_compute
// _sha_1_hash.xml
private static String convertToHex(byte[] data) {
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer ();
for (int i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
int halfbyte = (data[i] >>> 4) & 0x0F;
int two_halfs = 0;
do {
if ((0 <= halfbyte) && (halfbyte <= 9)) {
buf.append ((char) (’0’ + halfbyte ));
} else {
buf.append ((char) (’a’ + (halfbyte - 10)));
}
halfbyte = data[i] & 0x0F;




public static String SHA1(String text)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException , UnsupportedEncodingException {
MessageDigest md;
md = MessageDigest.getInstance ("SHA -1");
byte[] sha1hash = new byte [40];
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md.update(text.getBytes ("iso -8859 -1") , 0, text.length ());
sha1hash = md.digest ();
return convertToHex(sha1hash );
}
////////////////// end of hashing ///////////////////////////////////////////
public static void main(String [] args) throws Exception {
client c1 = new client ();
} // end of main
} //end of class
Listing A.20: Client Class
A.2.3 DENAR Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------








class ClientInstance implements Runnable {
public boolean foundString = false;
private Socket csokt;
public String AB = "0123456789 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ";
ClientInstance(Socket clientsokt) {
this.csokt = clientsokt;
System.out.println ("New connection from " + csokt.getInetAddress () +
" on port " + csokt.getPort ());
} // end of ClientInstance constructor
public synchronized void run() { // assign thread for each client
String line;
String delims = "[ ]+";
String delims1 = "/";
String delims2 = ":";
String baseDir = null;
String [] tokens = null;
String [] baseDirTokens = null;
String username = null;
String password = null;
String challenge = null;
String hashedpasswd = null;
BufferedReader FromClient = null;
PrintWriter ToClient = null;
InputStream input = null;
OutputStream output = null;
File toBeDeleted = null;
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File toBeListed = null;
SimplePDP xacmlFram = new SimplePDP ();
String authorisationResult = null;
try {
FromClient = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(csokt.
getInputStream ()));
ToClient = new PrintWriter(csokt.getOutputStream (), true);
input = csokt.getInputStream ();
output = csokt.getOutputStream ();
} catch (IOException e) {





challenge = randomString (12);
ToClient.println(challenge );
line = FromClient.readLine ();
String [] tokens2 = line.split(delims2 );
String userRecord = search(tokens2 [0]);
if (! userRecord.equals ("0")) {
String [] frompassfile = userRecord.split(delims2 );
try {
hashedpasswd = SHA1(challenge + frompassfile [1]);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException nsae) {
}
if (tokens2 [0]. equals(frompassfile [0]) && tokens2 [1]. equals
(hashedpasswd )) {
username = frompassfile [0];
System.out.println ("[ " + username + " ] AUTHENTICATED
SUCCESSFULLY ");
ToClient.println ("1");
///////////// End of Authentication //////////////
while (true) {
try {
line = FromClient.readLine ();
System.out.println(line);
tokens = line.split(delims );
baseDirTokens = tokens [1]. split(delims1 );
baseDir = baseDirTokens [0];
for (int j = 1; j < baseDirTokens.length - 1; j++) {
baseDir += delims1 + baseDirTokens[j];
}
// reconstruct the base directory of user request
if (tokens [0]. equals (" Download ")) {
System.out.println (" Authorising " + username +
"’s requests to download " + tokens [1] +
" .............");
// baseDir = baseDirTokens [0] + "/" + baseDirTokens [1]
+ "/" + baseDirTokens [2] + "/" + baseDirTokens [3];
try {
authorisationResult = xacmlFram.getXACMLDecision
(username , baseDir , tokens [0]);
System.out.println(authorisationResult );
if (authorisationResult.equals (" Permit ")) {
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File myFile = new File(tokens [1]);
ToClient.println(myFile.length ());
byte[] mybytearray = new byte[(int)
myFile.length ()];
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream
(myFile );
fis.read(mybytearray , 0, mybytearray.length );






} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println (" Unable to donwload " + "("




ToClient.println (" Invalid request ");
}
} catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println ("Read failed ");
}




System.out.println (" Disconnected ");




System.out.println (" Disconnected ");
}
} catch (IOException e) {
} //end of try
} // end of run
//////////////////////// search passwords file ///////////////////////////////////
public String search(String s1) {
String filename = "passwords.txt";
BufferedReader inpass = null;
// I initialize the buffered reader to start at the begining every time
try {
inpass = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(new File(filename )));
} catch (IOException e) {
}
String searchFor = s1;
String lineContent = null;
int currentLine = 0;
// this will be set to true if the string was found
while (true) {
currentLine ++;
// get a line of text from the file
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try {
lineContent = inpass.readLine ();
} catch (IOException e) {
break;
}
// checks to see if the file ended (in.readLine () returns null if
the end is reached)
if (lineContent == null) {
break;
}





} //end of while
if (! foundString) {





} catch (IOException ioe) {
}
return "0";
} //end of search function
///////////////// random string generating //////////////////////////////////////////
// This method was developed by maxp at http :// stackoverflow.com/
//http :// stackoverflow.com/questions /41107/how -to -generate -a-random -alpha -numeric -
string -in-java
String randomString(int len) {
Random rnd = new Random ();
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(len);





//////////////////////////// hashing password /////////////////////////////////////
// This code was taken from http ://www.anyexample.com/programming/java/java_simple
_class_to_compute_sha_1_hash.xml
private static String convertToHex(byte[] data) {
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer ();
for (int i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
int halfbyte = (data[i] >>> 4) & 0x0F;
int two_halfs = 0;
do {
if ((0 <= halfbyte) && (halfbyte <= 9)) {
buf.append ((char) (’0’ + halfbyte ));
} else {
buf.append ((char) (’a’ + (halfbyte - 10)));
}
halfbyte = data[i] & 0x0F;
} while (two_halfs ++ < 1);




public static String SHA1(String text)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException , UnsupportedEncodingException {
MessageDigest md;
md = MessageDigest.getInstance ("SHA -1");
byte[] sha1hash = new byte [40];
md.update(text.getBytes ("iso -8859 -1") , 0, text.length ());
sha1hash = md.digest ();
return convertToHex(sha1hash );
}
///////////////// end of hashing ////////////
} // end of ClientInstance
public class server {
ServerSocket Serversocket = null;
server () {
} // end of server constructor
public synchronized void listenSocket () {
try { //try opening server socket
Serversocket = new ServerSocket (5555);
System.out.println ("The server is listening on port " + Serversocket
.getLocalPort ());
} catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println (" Server is unable to listen on port: 5555");
System.exit (-1);
}
while (true) { //try opening clinet socket
ClientInstance insClient;
try {
insClient = new ClientInstance(Serversocket.accept ());
Thread thread = new Thread(insClient );
thread.start ();
} catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println (" Unble to accept connections on port: 5555");
System.exit (-1);
}
} //end of while
} // end of listenSocket
protected void finalize () { // clean up and release the resources
try {
Serversocket.close ();
} catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println (" Could not close socket ");
System.exit (-1);
}
} //end of finalize
public static void main(String [] args) {




Listing A.21: DENAR Class
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A.2.4 tester Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------





public class tester {
public tester () {
}
public static void wait1sec () {
long t0, t1;
t0 = System.currentTimeMillis ();
do {
t1 = System.currentTimeMillis ();
} while (t1 - t0 < 100);
}










String Basedir = "/ hosthome/XACML -Project/users /";
String userNames [] = {"adam", "ali"};
for (int i = 0; i < 50; ++i) {
randomNumber = xRandom.nextInt (1);
randomUser = xRandom.nextInt (1);




toBeListed = new File(Basedir + "ali");
File[] dFiles = toBeListed.listFiles ();
randomFile = xRandom.nextInt(dFiles.length );





System.out.println ("\n This case is from 0 to 3\n");
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Listing A.22: tester Class
A.2.5 SimplePDP Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------




























public class SimplePDP {
ConstraintCheckerFunction ConstraintCheckerFunction;
public void SimplePDP () {
} ;
public String getXACMLDecision(String subjectString , String resourceString ,
String actionString) throws Exception {
ConstraintCheckerFunction = new ConstraintCheckerFunction ();
// load the policies
FilePolicyModule policyModule = new FilePolicyModule ();
policyModule.addPolicy (" LimitedAccessPolicy.xml ");
// setup the policy finder
PolicyFinder policyFinder = new PolicyFinder ();
Set policyModules = new HashSet ();
policyModules.add(policyModule );
policyFinder.setModules(policyModules );
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// module to provide the current date & time
CurrentEnvModule envModule = new CurrentEnvModule ();
// setup the attribute finder
AttributeFinder attrFinder = new AttributeFinder ();
List attrModules = new ArrayList ();
attrModules.add(envModule );
attrFinder.setModules(attrModules );
// load the constraint checker function designed to access the
// coordination object of the overlay network
FunctionFactoryProxy proxy = StandardFunctionFactory.getNewFactoryProxy ();
FunctionFactory factory = proxy.getConditionFactory ();
factory.addFunction(new ConstraintCheckerFunction ());
FunctionFactory.setDefaultFactory(proxy );
// create the PDP
PDP pdp = new PDP(new PDPConfig(attrFinder , policyFinder , null ));
// now work on the request
String xacmlRequest = "<?xml version =\"1.0\" encoding =\"UTF -8\"? >"
+ "<Request xmlns =\" urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: context \"
xmlns:xsi=\" http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instanc \"
xsi:schemaLocation =\" urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: context
cs-xacml -schema -context -01. xsd\">"
+ "<Subject >"
+ "<Attribute AttributeId =\"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
subject:subject -id\" DataType =\" http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string \">"




+ "<Attribute AttributeId =\"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
resource:resource -id\" DataType =\" http ://www.w3.org /2001/





+ "<Attribute AttributeId =\"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
action:action -id\" DataType =\" http :// www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string \">" +




// convert the string to xml
DocumentBuilderFactory docFactory0 = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder requestDocument = docFactory0.newDocumentBuilder ();
InputSource inputSourceReq = new InputSource ();
inputSourceReq.setCharacterStream(new StringReader(xacmlRequest ));
Document xacmlRequestDoc = requestDocument.parse(inputSourceReq );
Node requestNode = xacmlRequestDoc.getDocumentElement ();
//xacml request and response
RequestCtx request = RequestCtx.getInstance(requestNode );
ResponseCtx response = pdp.evaluate(request );
// re -create xacml response to extract only the decision values
ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream ();
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response.encode(baos);
String responseString = baos.toString ();
DocumentBuilderFactory docFactory1 = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder responseDocument = docFactory1.newDocumentBuilder ();
InputSource inputSourceRes = new InputSource ();
inputSourceRes.setCharacterStream(new StringReader(responseString ));
Document xacmlResponseDoc = responseDocument.parse(inputSourceRes );
xacmlResponseDoc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList nodeLst = xacmlResponseDoc.getElementsByTagName (" Result ");
Node resultNode = nodeLst.item (0);
String decisionValue = null;
if (resultNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element resultElmnt = (Element) resultNode;
NodeList decisionNodeLst = resultElmnt.getElementsByTagName (" Decision ");
Element decisionNodeElmnt = (Element) decisionNodeLst.item (0);
NodeList decisionNode = decisionNodeElmnt.getChildNodes ();
decisionValue = ((Node) decisionNode.item (0)). getNodeValue ();
getNodeValue ());
}
decisionValue = ConstraintCheckerFunction.PolicyChecker(subjectString ,




Listing A.23: SimplePDP Class
A.2.6 ConstraintCheckerFunction Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------
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import java.util.List;
public class ConstraintCheckerFunction extends FunctionBase {
/**
* The identifier for this function
*/












* Constructor that accepts mixed data type inputs as specified for Sun ’s
* XACML PDP implementation
*/
public ConstraintCheckerFunction () {
super(NAME , 0, attributes , areBags , BooleanAttribute.identifier , false );
System.out.println (" ConstraintCheckerFunction Function Starting ");
}
public String PolicyChecker(String subjectRequest , String objectRequest ,
String actionRequest) {
String ruleID = "";
String subjectPolicy = "";
String objectPolicy = "";
String actionPolicy = "";
boolean conditionEvaluationResult = false;
String conditionPolicy = "";
String subjectCondition = "";
String objectCondition = "";
String environmentCondition = "";
String eventCondition = "";
String decisionResult = "";
try {
DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(new File(" LimitedAccessPolicy.xml "));
// normalize text representation
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfPersons = doc.getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
int totalPersons = listOfPersons.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfPersons.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstPersonNode = listOfPersons.item(s);
if (firstPersonNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstPersonElement = (Element) firstPersonNode;
//-------
NodeList firstNameList = firstPersonElement.
getElementsByTagName (" AttributeValue ");
Element firstNameElement = (Element) firstNameList.item (0);
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NodeList textFNList = firstNameElement.getChildNodes ();
subjectPolicy = ((Node) textFNList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
NodeList listOfResources = doc.getElementsByTagName (" Resource ");
int totalResources = listOfResources.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfResources.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstResourceNode = listOfResources.item(s);
if (firstResourceNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstResourceElement = (Element) firstResourceNode;
//-------
NodeList firstObjectList = firstResourceElement.
getElementsByTagName (" AttributeValue ");
Element firstObjectElement = (Element) firstObjectList.item (0);
NodeList textFOList = firstObjectElement.getChildNodes ();
objectPolicy = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
objectPolicy );
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
////////////////-------------------------------
NodeList listOfActions = doc.getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
int totalActions = listOfActions.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfActions.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstActionNode = listOfActions.item(s);
if (firstActionNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstActionElement = (Element) firstActionNode;
//-------
NodeList firstActList = firstActionElement.
getElementsByTagName (" AttributeValue ");
Element firstActElement = (Element) firstActList.item (0);
NodeList textFAList = firstActElement.getChildNodes ();
actionPolicy = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
////////////////-------------------------------
NodeList listOfConditions = doc.getElementsByTagName (" Condition ");
int totalConditions = listOfConditions.getLength ();
// System.out.println ("Total no of Conditions : " + totalConditions );
for (int c = 0; c < listOfConditions.getLength (); c++) {
Node firstConditionNode = listOfConditions.item(c);
if (firstConditionNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionNode;
subjectCondition = getTagValue (" SubjectCondition",
firstConditionElement );
objectCondition = getTagValue (" ObjectCondition",
firstConditionElement );
environmentCondition = getTagValue (" EnvironmentCondition",
firstConditionElement );
eventCondition = getTagValue (" EventCondition",
firstConditionElement );
System.out.println (" Subject Condition : " + subjectCondition );
System.out.println (" Object Condition : " + objectCondition );
System.out.println (" Environment Condition : " +
environmentCondition );
System.out.println (" Event Condition : " + eventCondition );
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}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
////////////////-------------------------------
System.out.println (" subject Request = " + subjectRequest );
System.out.println (" subject Policy = " + subjectPolicy );
System.out.println (" object Request = " + objectRequest );
System.out.println (" object Policy = " + objectPolicy );
System.out.println (" action Request = " + actionRequest );
System.out.println (" action Policy = " + actionPolicy );
// System.out.println (" Calling PIP");
String y = "";
String g = "Alui";
} catch (SAXParseException err) {
System.out.println ("** Parsing error" + ", line "
+ err.getLineNumber () + ", uri " + err.getSystemId ());
System.out.println (" " + err.getMessage ());
} catch (SAXException e) {
Exception x = e.getException ();
((x == null) ? e : x). printStackTrace ();





PIPcoordinator = new PIPcoordinator ();
System.out.println (" Calling PIPcoordanitor ");
String PIPfind = "PIPdata.xml";
// PIPdata.xml is supposed value here but the value can be found in
obligation context
String job = "findAttribute ";
// can be sent form PEP , it maybe (" findAttribute" for authrisation)
or (" addAttribute" or "updateAttribute" for obligation ).
String nodeAttribute = "";
// this value is assigned in update attribute the node updated can
be found in obligation context to be updated in PIP
String oldAttribute = "";
// this value is the old value in PIP for the above node
String newAttribute = "";
// this value is the new value in PIP for the above node which can
be found in obligation context
conditionEvaluationResult = PIPcoordinator.PIPcoordinatorTask(PIPfind ,
job , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy , subjectCondition ,
objectCondition , environmentCondition , eventCondition ,
nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
System.out.println (" Policy decision Result = " + decisionResult );
System.out.println (" condition Evaluation Result = " +
conditionEvaluationResult );
if (conditionEvaluationResult == true) {
decisionResult = "Permit ";
System.out.println (" decisionResult = " + decisionResult );
} else {
decisionResult = "NotApplicable ";
}
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.print(" Connect to another PDP in network? (y or n): ");





private static String getTagValue(String sTag , Element eElement) {
NodeList nlList = eElement.getElementsByTagName(sTag).item (0). getChildNodes ();




public EvaluationResult evaluate(List inputs , EvaluationCtx context) {
System.out.println (" result =");
System.out.println(context );
System.out.println (" sssssssssssssssss ");
//Get the current value from the PDP Overlay coordination object
int[] x = new int [2];
try {
PIPcoordinator = new PIPcoordinator ();
System.out.println (" Calling PIPcoordanitor ");
String Attr = "";
System.out.println (" success = " + success );











System.out.println (" isPermitted = " + isPermitted );
} catch (Exception e) {
Constraint Checker ");
System.out.print(" Connect to another PDP in network? (y or n): ");
}





Listing A.24: ConstraintCheckerFunction Class
A.2.7 PIPcoordinator Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------
* @author Ali Alzahrani (STRL , DMU , UK)
* aalzahrani@dmu.ac.uk
-----------------------------------------------------------*/










public class PIPcoordinator {
public static PIP pip;
public static RemotePIPcoordinator remotePIPcoordinator;
///////////////////////
// Finding is PIPs local or remote
//////////////////////
public boolean PIPcoordinatorTask(String PIPfind , String job , String subjectPolicy ,
String objectPolicy , String actionPolicy , String subjectCondition , String
objectCondition , String environmentCondition , String eventCondition , String
nodeAttribute , String oldAttribute , String newAttribute) throws Exception {
String RemotePIPindicator = "@";
boolean RemoteAttributeSubject = false;
boolean RemoteAttributeObject = false;
boolean RemoteAttributeEnvironment = false;
boolean RemoteAttributeEvent = false;
boolean isPermitted = false;
if (subjectCondition.indexOf(RemotePIPindicator.charAt (0)) >= 0) {
RemoteAttributeSubject = true;
}
if (objectCondition.indexOf(RemotePIPindicator.charAt (0)) >= 0) {
RemoteAttributeObject = true;
}
if (environmentCondition.indexOf(RemotePIPindicator.charAt (0)) >= 0) {
RemoteAttributeEnvironment = true;
}
if (eventCondition.indexOf(RemotePIPindicator.charAt (0)) >= 0) {
RemoteAttributeEvent = true;
}
if (RemoteAttributeSubject == false || RemoteAttributeObject == false ||
RemoteAttributeEnvironment == false || RemoteAttributeEvent == false) {
if (job.equals (" addAttribute ")) {
addToLocalPIP(PIPfind , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy ,
subjectCondition , objectCondition , environmentCondition ,
eventCondition );
isPermitted = true;
} else if (job.equals (" updateAttribute ")) {
updateLocalPIP(PIPfind , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy ,
nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
isPermitted = true;
} else if (job.equals (" findAttribute ")) {
isPermitted = getAttributeLocalPIP(subjectPolicy , objectPolicy ,
actionPolicy , subjectCondition , objectCondition , environmentCondition ,
eventCondition );




if (job.equals (" addAttribute ")) {
addToRemotePIP(PIPfind , job , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy ,
subjectCondition , objectCondition , environmentCondition , eventCondition );
isPermitted = true;
} else if (job.equals (" updateAttribute ")) {
updateRemotePIP(PIPfind , job , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy ,
actionPolicy , nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
isPermitted = true;
} else if (job.equals (" findAttribute ")) {
isPermitted = getAttributeRemotePIP(PIPfind , job , subjectPolicy ,
objectPolicy , actionPolicy , subjectCondition , objectCondition ,








public static void addToLocalPIP(String PIPadd , String subject , String resource ,
String action , String subjectAttribute , String objectAttribute ,
String environmentAttribute , String eventAttribute) throws Exception {
pip.addAttributesToDB(PIPadd , subject , resource , action , subjectAttribute ,
objectAttribute , environmentAttribute , eventAttribute );
}
/////////////////////
public static void updateLocalPIP(String PIPupdate , String subject , String
resource , String action , String nodeAttribute , String oldAttribute , String
newAttribute) throws Exception { pip.updateAttributesDB(PIPupdate , subject ,
resource , action , nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
}
//////////////////////
public boolean getAttributeLocalPIP(String subjectPolicy , String objectPolicy ,
String actionPolicy , String subjectCondition , String objectCondition , String
environmentCondition , String eventCondition) {
boolean isPermitted = false;
String subjectPIP = subjectPolicy;
String objectPIP = objectPolicy;
String actionPIP = actionPolicy;
String subjectconditionPIP = "";
String objectconditionPIP = "";
String environmentconditionPIP = "";
String eventConditionPIP = "";
try {
System.out.println (" Calling PIP ");
subjectconditionPIP = pip.getSubjectCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,
objectPIP , actionPIP );
objectconditionPIP = pip.getObjectCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,
objectPIP , actionPIP );
environmentconditionPIP = pip.getEnvironmentCondtionAttribute
(subjectPIP , objectPIP , actionPIP );
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eventConditionPIP = pip.getEventCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,







// System.out.println ("PIP called ");






// Remote PIPs through remote PIPcoordinator
////////////////////////
public static void connectionToRemotePIP () throws Exception {
ServerSocket PIPcoordinatorSocket = null;
try {
PIPcoordinatorSocket = new ServerSocket (7777);
} catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println (" Could not listen on port: 7777.");
System.exit (1);
}
Socket PIPsocket = null;
try {
PIPsocket = PIPcoordinatorSocket.accept ();
} catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println (" Accept failed .");
System.exit (1);
}
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(PIPsocket.getOutputStream (), true);
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(
PIPsocket.getInputStream ()));
String inputLine , outputLine;
RemotePIPProtocol kkp = new RemotePIPProtocol ();
outputLine = kkp.processInput(null);
out.println(outputLine );
while (( inputLine = in.readLine ()) != null) {
outputLine = kkp.processInput(inputLine );
out.println(outputLine );










public static void addToRemotePIP(String PIPadd , String job , String subject ,
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String resource , String action , String subjectAttribute , String objectAttribute ,
String environmentAttribute , String eventAttribute) throws Exception {
connectionToRemotePIP ();
boolean addingNewAttribute = false;
String nodeAttribute = "";
String oldAttribute = "";
String newAttribute = "";
addingNewAttribute = remotePIPcoordinator.connectionToRemotePIP(PIPadd ,
job , subject , resource , action , subjectAttribute , objectAttribute ,




public static void updateRemotePIP(String PIPupdate , String job , String subject ,
String resource , String action , String nodeAttribute , String oldAttribute ,
String newAttribute) throws Exception {
connectionToRemotePIP ();
boolean updatingAttribute = false;
String subjectAttribute = "";
String objectAttribute = "";
String environmentAttribute = "";
String eventAttribute = "";
updatingAttribute = remotePIPcoordinator.connectionToRemotePIP(PIPupdate ,
job , subject , resource , action , subjectAttribute , objectAttribute ,




public boolean getAttributeRemotePIP(String PIPfind , String job , String
subjectPolicy , String objectPolicy , String actionPolicy , String
subjectCondition , String objectCondition , String environmentCondition ,
String eventCondition) throws Exception {
connectionToRemotePIP ();
boolean evaluatedAttribute = false;
String nodeAttribute = "";
String oldAttribute = "";
String newAttribute = "";
try {
evaluatedAttribute = remotePIPcoordinator.connectionToRemotePIP(
PIPfind , job , subjectPolicy , objectPolicy , actionPolicy ,
subjectCondition , objectCondition , environmentCondition ,
eventCondition , nodeAttribute , oldAttribute ,
newAttribute );






Listing A.25: PIPcoordinator Class
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A.2.8 RemotePIPcoordinator Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------












public class RemotePIPcoordinator {
public static PIP pip;
/////////////////
public boolean connectionToRemotePIP(String PIPtoConnect , String job , String
subject , String resource , String action , String subjectAttribute , String
objectAttribute , String environmentAttribute , String eventAttribute , String
nodeAttribute , String oldAttribute , String newAttribute) throws Exception {
boolean isPermitted = false;
Socket pipsocket = null;
PrintWriter out = null;
BufferedReader in = null;
try {
pipsocket = new Socket ("146.227.66.178" , 8888);
out = new PrintWriter(pipsocket.getOutputStream (), true);
in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(pipsocket.getInputStream ()));
} catch (UnknownHostException e) {
System.err.println ("Don ’t know about host: PIPcoordinator .");
System.exit (1);
} catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println ("Couldn ’t get I/O for the connection to: PIPcoordinator ");
System.exit (1);
}
BufferedReader stdIn = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in));
String fromPIPcoordinator;
String fromPIP;
while (( fromPIPcoordinator = in.readLine ()) != null) {
System.out.println (" PIPcoordinator: " + fromPIPcoordinator );
if (fromPIPcoordinator.equals ("Bye .")) {
break;
}
fromPIP = stdIn.readLine ();
if (fromPIP != null) {
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if (job.equals (" addAttribute ")) {
addToLocalPIP(PIPtoConnect , subject , resource , action , subjectAttribute ,
objectAttribute , environmentAttribute , eventAttribute );
}
if (job.equals (" updateAttribute ")) {
updateLocalPIP(PIPtoConnect , subject , resource , action , nodeAttribute ,
oldAttribute , newAttribute );
}
if (job.equals (" findAttribute ")) {
isPermitted = getAttributeLocalPIP(subject , resource , action ,











public static void addToLocalPIP(String PIPadd , String subject , String resource ,
String action , String subjectAttribute , String objectAttribute , String
environmentAttribute , String eventAttribute) throws Exception {
pip.addAttributesToDB(PIPadd , subject , resource , action , subjectAttribute ,
objectAttribute , environmentAttribute , eventAttribute );
}
/////////////////////
public static void updateLocalPIP(String PIPupdate , String subject ,
String resource , String action , String nodeAttribute , String oldAttribute ,
String newAttribute) throws Exception { pip.updateAttributesDB(PIPupdate ,
subject , resource , action , nodeAttribute , oldAttribute , newAttribute );
}
////////////////////////
public boolean getAttributeLocalPIP(String subjectPolicy , String objectPolicy ,
String actionPolicy , String subjectCondition , String objectCondition , String
environmentCondition , String eventCondition) {
boolean isPermitted = false;
String subjectPIP = subjectPolicy;
String objectPIP = objectPolicy;
String actionPIP = actionPolicy;
String subjectconditionPIP = "";
String objectconditionPIP = "";
String environmentconditionPIP = "";
String eventConditionPIP = "";
try {
System.out.println (" Calling PIP ");
subjectconditionPIP = pip.getSubjectCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,
objectPIP , actionPIP );
objectconditionPIP = pip.getObjectCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,
objectPIP , actionPIP );
environmentconditionPIP = pip.getEnvironmentCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP ,
objectPIP , actionPIP );
eventConditionPIP = pip.getEventCondtionAttribute(subjectPIP , objectPIP ,
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actionPIP );
if (subjectconditionPIP.equals(subjectCondition) && objectconditionPIP.
equals(objectCondition) && environmentconditionPIP.equals(environmentCondition)
&& eventConditionPIP.equals(eventCondition )) {
isPermitted = true;
}






Listing A.26: RemotePIPcoordinator Class
A.2.9 PIP Class
/* --------------------------------------------------------




















public class PIP {
String x;
public static String getSubjectCondtionAttribute(String subjectValue , String
objectValue , String actionValue) {
String conditionValue = "";
String SubjectPIP = "";
String ObjectPIP = "";
String ActionPIP = "";
try {
DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
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newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(new File(" PIPdata.xml "));
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfRules = doc.getElementsByTagName ("rule ");
int totalRules = listOfRules.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfRules.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstRuleNode = listOfRules.item(s);
if (firstRuleNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstRuleElement = (Element) firstRuleNode;
//-------
NodeList subjectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
Element subjectConditionElement = (Element) subjectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFSList = subjectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
SubjectPIP = ((Node) textFSList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList objectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Object ");
Element objectConditionElement = (Element) objectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFOList = objectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ObjectPIP = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList actionConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
Element actionConditionElement = (Element) actionConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAList = actionConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ActionPIP = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
if (subjectValue.equals(SubjectPIP) && objectValue.equals(ObjectPIP)
&& actionValue.equals(ActionPIP )) { NodeList firstConditionList =
firstRuleElement.getElementsByTagName (" SubjectAttribute ");
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFNList = firstConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
conditionValue = ((Node) textFNList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
break;
}// end of if clause
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var




}// end of getSubjectCondtionAttribute
/////////////
public static String getObjectCondtionAttribute(String subjectValue , String
objectValue , String actionValue) {
String conditionValue = "";
String SubjectPIP = "";
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String ObjectPIP = "";
String ActionPIP = "";
try {
// System.out.println (" Reading the PIP Database ");
DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(new File(" PIPdata.xml "));
// normalise text representation
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfRules = doc.getElementsByTagName ("rule ");
int totalRules = listOfRules.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfRules.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstRuleNode = listOfRules.item(s);
if (firstRuleNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstRuleElement = (Element) firstRuleNode;
//-------
NodeList subjectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
Element subjectConditionElement = (Element) subjectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFSList = subjectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
SubjectPIP = ((Node) textFSList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList objectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Object ");
Element objectConditionElement = (Element) objectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFOList = objectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ObjectPIP = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList actionConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
Element actionConditionElement = (Element) actionConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAList = actionConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ActionPIP = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
if (subjectValue.equals(SubjectPIP) && objectValue.equals(ObjectPIP)
&& actionValue.equals(ActionPIP )) { NodeList firstConditionList =
firstRuleElement.getElementsByTagName (" ObjectAttribute ");
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFNList = firstConditionElement.getChildNodes ();




}// end of if clause
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
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}// end of getObjectCondtionAttribute
/////////////////////////////
public static String getEnvironmentCondtionAttribute(String subjectValue ,
String objectValue , String actionValue) {
String conditionValue = "";
String SubjectPIP = "";
String ObjectPIP = "";
String ActionPIP = "";
try {
// System.out.println (" Reading the PIP Database ");
DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(new File(" PIPdata.xml "));
// normalize text representation
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfRules = doc.getElementsByTagName ("rule ");
int totalRules = listOfRules.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfRules.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstRuleNode = listOfRules.item(s);
if (firstRuleNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstRuleElement = (Element) firstRuleNode;
//-------
NodeList subjectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
Element subjectConditionElement = (Element)
subjectConditionList.item (0);
NodeList textFSList = subjectConditionElement.
getChildNodes ();
SubjectPIP = ((Node) textFSList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
//-------
NodeList objectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Object ");
Element objectConditionElement = (Element)
objectConditionList.item (0);
NodeList textFOList = objectConditionElement.
getChildNodes ();
ObjectPIP = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
//-------
NodeList actionConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
Element actionConditionElement = (Element) actionConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAList = actionConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ActionPIP = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
if (subjectValue.equals(SubjectPIP) && objectValue.equals(ObjectPIP)
&& actionValue.equals(ActionPIP )) {
NodeList firstConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" EnvironmentAttribute ");
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFNList = firstConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
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conditionValue = ((Node) textFNList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
break;
}// end of if clause
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var




}// end of getEnvironmentCondtionAttribute
/////////////////
public static String getEventCondtionAttribute(String subjectValue , String
objectValue , String actionValue) {
String conditionValue = "";
String SubjectPIP = "";
String ObjectPIP = "";
String ActionPIP = "";
try {
// System.out.println (" Reading the PIP Database ");
DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.
newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(new File(" PIPdata.xml "));
// normalize text representation
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfRules = doc.getElementsByTagName ("rule ");
int totalRules = listOfRules.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfRules.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstRuleNode = listOfRules.item(s);
if (firstRuleNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstRuleElement = (Element) firstRuleNode;
//-------
NodeList subjectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
Element subjectConditionElement = (Element) subjectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFSList = subjectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
SubjectPIP = ((Node) textFSList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList objectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Object ");
Element objectConditionElement = (Element) objectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFOList = objectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ObjectPIP = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList actionConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
Element actionConditionElement = (Element) actionConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAList = actionConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ActionPIP = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
if (subjectValue.equals(SubjectPIP) && objectValue.equals(ObjectPIP)
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&& actionValue.equals(ActionPIP )) { NodeList firstConditionList =
firstRuleElement.getElementsByTagName (" EventAttribute ");
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFNList = firstConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
conditionValue = ((Node) textFNList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
break;
}// end of if clause
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var




}// end of getEventCondtionAttribute
/////////////////////
public static void addAttributesToDB(String PIPadd , String subject , String
resource , String action , String subjectAttribute , String objectAttribute ,
String environmentAttribute , String eventAttribute) {
// PIPadd can be any PIP database in the system instead of (PIPdata.xml) below
File docFile = new File(" PIPdata.xml ");
Document doc = null;
try {
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder ();
doc = db.parse(docFile );
} catch (java.io.IOException e) {
System.out.println ("Can ’t find the file ");
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.print(" Problem parsing the file .");
}
Element root = doc.getDocumentElement ();
NodeList children = root.getChildNodes ();
Element ruleElement = doc.createElement ("rule ");
Node updateText = doc.createTextNode ("");
ruleElement.appendChild(updateText );
Element subjectAdd = doc.createElement (" Subject ");
String str_subject = subject;




Element objectAdd = doc.createElement (" Object ");
String str_object = resource;




Element actionAdd = doc.createElement (" Action ");
String str_action = action;
Node actionAddNode = doc.createTextNode(str_action );
actionAdd.appendChild(actionAddNode );
ruleElement.appendChild(actionAdd );
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//-------
Element SubjectAttributeAdd = doc.createElement (" SubjectAttribute ");
String str_SubjectAttribute = subjectAttribute;




Element ObjectAttributeAdd = doc.createElement (" ObjectAttribute ");
String str_ObjectAttribute = objectAttribute;




Element EnvironmentAttributeAdd = doc.createElement (" EnvironmentAttribute ");
String str_EnvironmentAttribute = environmentAttribute;




Element EventAttributeAdd = doc.createElement (" EventAttribute ");
String str_EventAttribute = eventAttribute;







public static void updateAttributesDB(String PIPupdate , String subjectValue ,
String objectValue , String actionValue , String nodeAttribute , String
oldAttribute , String newAttribute) {
String conditionValue = "";
String SubjectPIP = "";
String ObjectPIP = "";
String ActionPIP = "";
try {
// PIPupdate can be any PIP database in the system instead of
(PIPdata.xml) below
String filepath = "c:\\ file.xml";
DocumentBuilderFactory docFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance ();
DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docFactory.newDocumentBuilder ();
Document doc = docBuilder.parse(filepath );
// normalize text representation
doc.getDocumentElement (). normalize ();
NodeList listOfRules = doc.getElementsByTagName ("rule ");
int totalRules = listOfRules.getLength ();
for (int s = 0; s < listOfRules.getLength (); s++) {
Node firstRuleNode = listOfRules.item(s);
if (firstRuleNode.getNodeType () == Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
Element firstRuleElement = (Element) firstRuleNode;
//-------
NodeList subjectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Subject ");
Element subjectConditionElement = (Element) subjectConditionList.
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item (0);
NodeList textFSList = subjectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
SubjectPIP = ((Node) textFSList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList objectConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Object ");
Element objectConditionElement = (Element) objectConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFOList = objectConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ObjectPIP = ((Node) textFOList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
NodeList actionConditionList = firstRuleElement.
getElementsByTagName (" Action ");
Element actionConditionElement = (Element) actionConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAList = actionConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
ActionPIP = ((Node) textFAList.item (0)). getNodeValue (). trim ();
//-------
if (subjectValue.equals(SubjectPIP) && objectValue.equals(ObjectPIP)
&& actionValue.equals(ActionPIP )) { NodeList firstConditionList =
firstRuleElement.getElementsByTagName(nodeAttribute );
Element firstConditionElement = (Element) firstConditionList.
item (0);
NodeList textFAttList = firstConditionElement.getChildNodes ();
conditionValue = ((Node) textFAttList.item (0)). getNodeValue ().
trim ();
if (nodeAttribute.equals(firstConditionElement.getNodeName ())
&& conditionValue.equals(oldAttribute )) {
firstConditionElement.setTextContent(newAttribute );
}// end of if clause
break;
}// end of if clause
}// end of if clause
}// end of for loop with s var
// write the content into xml file
TransformerFactory transformerFactory = TransformerFactory.newInstance ();
Transformer transformer = transformerFactory.newTransformer ();
DOMSource source = new DOMSource(doc);
StreamResult result = new StreamResult(new File(filepath ));
transformer.transform(source , result );





Listing A.27: PIP Class
